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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is about the practitioners of political public relations in Scotland and 
Catalonia. The study is focused on investigating the constitutive elements of political 
PR practitioners as a professional group and as a practice, and the influence that 
different media systems have on the practice of political PR. This is a comparative 
study that combines micro and macro-level analysis. The thesis is one of the first 
studies to approach political PR as a profession and to compare sub-state nations to 
explore communication practices in the political sphere.  
The theoretical framework for this thesis combines a neo-institutional approach to 
professions, and the theory of media systems models to explore and compare the 
context where political PR practitioners work. The empirical data of this thesis derives 
from in-depth interviews to Heads of Communication in parties and governments in 
Scotland and Catalonia. The analysis of the empirical data is based on thematic coding. 
The central argument of this thesis is that the practice of political PR and its 
practitioners occupy a professional role in the division of labour in the political sphere 
of Scotland and Catalonia. The professional role of political PR practitioners is that of 
a hybrid model that combines classic traits of professions with informal structures and 
shared professional identities resulting from the constant influence of the political and 
the media sphere. As a practice political PR is about relationship management and 
networking with the core actors and channels of the media sphere. Media systems 
provide the profession with different tools of influence over the media sphere 
influencing levels of professional power and professional performance. Catalan 
practitioners have a wider range of institutional tools because of the strongly 
interdependent relationship between the media and political spheres. Whereas Scottish 
practitioners use their professional power and performance to overcome the limitations 
to political influence in their media system. 
 
LIST  OF  KEYWORDS:  political public relations; sub-state nations; media systems; 
spin doctors; professionalization.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis is about the experts who manage communication strategies and practice 
political public relations within political parties and governments. They are understood 
as a profession and are analysed in a comparative perspective. This chapter will 
introduce the main reasons to undertake this study and, related to this, the theoretical 
approach taken for such purposes.  
‘Naturally every politician of consequence has needed influence 
over the press and hence has needed relations with the press’ 
(Weber, 1994 p.11). 
Communication has been a major concern for political parties and governments 
(Wring, 2001). Nevertheless, there is little known about the experts who, as staff 
members of political parties and governments, manage the day-to-day communication 
activities and electoral campaigns – i.e. political public relations. What is it that they 
actually do in political parties and in governments? Where do they come from Political 
parties and governments in Western democracies now face an increasingly complex 
communication sphere with: the already-established 24/7 news outlets; decline of trust 
in traditional news media; severe financial crises facing media groups; and the 
emergence of diverse and rapidly changing forms of online communication 
(Chadwick, 2013). In addition to these changes in the communication sphere, recent 
social and economic developments are redefining the way politics is understood 
(Vowles and Xezonakis, 2016). A significant part of these changes are related to the 
reconfiguration of nation-states and the emergence of sub-state nations, and new forms 
of territorial organisation also at the supra-state level (Detterbeck and Hepburn, 2010). 
In that complex context, political parties and governments appoint experts informally 
labelled as ‘spin doctors’ to help them survive in the new communicative and political 
eco-system.  
The starting point of this thesis is that there is a need to generate new knowledge about 
political public relations experts that overcomes the limitations of the ‘spin doctor’ 
concept and places these experts in the wider picture of media and political systems. 
Consequently, there is a need to develop research that combines micro and macro level 
analysis to explain the elements that constitute the practice of political public relations. 
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This thesis aims to contribute to add to the the recently-emerged field of political 
public relations empirical data on the characteristics and main traits of the practitioners 
of political PR. The goal is to contribute to understand how political PR is put in 
practice in governments and parties.  
 Existing knowledge on the experts who manage communication or political public 
relations activities within political parties and governments is problematic and needs 
to be further developed from comparative perspectives. Previous studies have 
represented these experts as the figure of the ‘spin doctor’ (Atkinson, 2005; Esser et 
al., 2001; Schmitz and Karam, 2013; Sumpter and Tankard, 1994), a folk term 
originally used by USA and UK journalists to complain about political parties 
threatening their journalistic independence (Byrne, 2014). In these studies, ‘spin 
doctors’ are presented as the deviation from a normative model of party press officers 
because of their lack of ethical standards and professionalism (Ribeiro, 2015; Sumpter 
and Tankard, 1994). These assumptions are problematic because their empirical basis 
is limited to analysing journalistic representations of these experts in cases where they 
have become public figures – primarily within the USA and UK in the late 90s. None 
of these studies, despite their elaborate, long lists of the daily activities of the spin 
doctor (ie. Gaber, 2000), have used the same experts as primary sources of 
information, nor have they used a clear theoretical framework to elaborate on their 
analysis. Until now, these studies have been uncritically accepted (Stockwell, 2007) 
and there have been no serious attempts to develop adequate theoretical frameworks 
to explore these key experts beyond the concept of ‘spin doctors’. 
In addition to the lack of adequate theoretical frameworks to examine political public 
relations experts, there is a lack of comparative knowledge not only in the case of ‘spin 
doctors’, but more generally in the field of political communication on sub-state 
nations (Fernández-Quijada and Sellas, 2013).  The lack of comparative studies on 
political PR practitioners or ‘spin doctors’ results in a lack of knowledge about how 
different cultural, media and political context influence these practitioners. In addition, 
comparative studies in political communication and public relations have so far 
remained focused on the nation-state level (Esser, 2013; Gibson and Rommele, 2009; 
Hallin and Mancini, 2004; Pfetsch, 2013).  
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Sub-state nations are essential elements to understand some of the most important 
changes happening in a globalised world where the power of the state seems to be 
declining (Tierney, 2005). Comparative studies on sub-state nations and territorial 
politics have built on their own area of sub-expertise in political science and political 
sociology (Keating, 2008; Stolz, 2010; Swenden and Maddens, 2009) nevertheless, 
these studies do not examine the communication dimension of sub-state nations. Sub-
state nations present an opportunity to explore the role that communication plays in 
this sphere of the political world where political parties and governments face complex 
challenges in claiming their differentness and legitimising their status on a new 
territorial level (Detterbeck and Hepburn, 2010). Exploring political public relations 
experts in sub-state nations is a first step in understanding the communicative 
dimension of these units of analysis, which challenge traditional conceptions of state 
boundaries and, therefore, of their respective media systems. 
Scotland and Catalonia have been, and still are, experiencing crucial political 
developments that might shape their territorial organisation as sub-state nations. These 
political developments, including a wide-range of events from independence 
referendums to political conflicts with the state, make communication a central 
concern for political actors as one of the keys to navigate the newly-emerging 
landscape.  
The devolution of the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government in 1999 were 
regarded as an open door to generate a new mode of understanding the relationships 
between governments, parties and news media (Schlesinger, 1998). The relationship 
between news media and Tony Blair’s government had become an issue because of 
the controversial figure of Alastair Campbell, who at the time was the government’s 
Head of Communication – or Blair’s spin doctor, as labelled by UK journalists 
(McNair, 2004). UK journalists reacted against Campbell, who was accused of 
misleading journalists with false information and using aggressive media relations 
methods (Esser, Reinemann, and Fan, 2000). Scotland’s political life began operating 
within this media relations context, and in 2012 an independence referendum was 
announced. However, in these almost two decades, few have explored what happened 
to Scottish ‘spin doctors’ the after Campbell era. Who are the communication experts 
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in Scottish political parties? How do they operate in the media system of a devolved 
nation? Are they similar to equivalent experts in other sub-state nations?  
Catalonia, considered as having many common aspects with Scotland’s political 
autonomy development (Greer, 2007) and having also announced in 2012 their 
intention to demand an independence referendum, has developed a stronger and more 
independent Catalan media system (Guimera and Fernandez, 2014) and has a series of 
party communication experts that have always remained out of the media’s focus. The 
term ‘spin doctor’ is not to be found in Catalan news media and there are no famous 
public figures such as Alastair Campbell. Brown (2003) speculated that spin doctors 
only make sense in those media contexts where news media are commercially-oriented 
and news frames have not been already determined by historical traditions of 
parallelism between parties and news media. Media relations in Catalonia are 
embedded in a context of strong interdependency between political powers and news 
media, with a dedicated Catalan public broadcast system; a system of public subsidies 
to private news media; and news media having traditionally played a significant 
political role in key historical events (Fernández, Sarabia, Sánchez, and Bas, 2011; 
Hallin and Mancini, 2004). Nevertheless, there are several previous studies that 
indicate party communication experts in Catalonia play an important role in 
Catalonia’s political life as agenda-setting actors (Aira, 2010; Castelló and Montagut, 
2011) and as media relations managers (Xifra, 1997). Despite these differences, are 
Catalan communication experts similar to their Scottish equivalents? How does a 
different media system impact these professionals? 
To contribute to the generation of new knowledge on this area, it is argued that the 
figure of spin doctors, or political public relations practitioners, needs to be 
reconceptualised. This reconceptualisation of the political public relations expert 
needs to incorporate a defined and clear theoretical framework missing from previous 
studies. In addition, these experts need to be reconceptualised in alternative political 
scenarios that have not only an interesting communication dimension but are also 
representative of some the most significant political changes occurring in Western 
democracies, such as changes in the territorial organisation. Consequently, the 
reconceptualisation of this figure needs to happen in a micro- and macro-dimension: 
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firstly, these individuals who have been identified in different Western democracies 
(Esser, Reinemann and Fan, 2001; Charon, 2004; Aira, 2010) need to be approached 
as a professional group in order to capture the complexities and dynamics of this group 
and to overcome the limitations of the ‘spin doctor’ concept; secondly, this 
reconceptualisation needs to happen in a comparative perspective to explore patterns 
of similarities and differences across existing media and political systems. 
This thesis examines the Head of Communication figure within political parties and 
governments in Scotland and in Catalonia with the following specific aim: to generate 
empirically-based knowledge about the structure and practice of the political public 
relations profession in a comparative perspective. This general aim relates to two main 
research questions: what are the constitutive elements of the performance and practice 
of the political public relations profession?; and how do specific national media system 
impact the political public relations profession? To answer these questions, this thesis 
draws from first-hand empirical data obtained through in-depth interviews with the 
communication heads of the main Scottish and Catalan parties and respective 
governments. Two main assumptions underpin this research design: the experts in 
communication hired as Heads of Communication for parties and governments are part 
of a professional group; and this professional group is to be found in different political 
systems, with some variations that relate to the characteristics of each national media 
system. This thesis is operationalised by combining micro- and macro-levels of 
analysis and combining two interdisciplinary theoretical frameworks for each level of 
analysis.  
There are two basic pillars in this thesis and two sub-aims related to it: political public 
relations experts will be examined as a profession; and these professionals will be 
placed in the larger picture of political and media systems in sub-state nations. This 
thesis aims to advance and generate new knowledge on these experts and their 
characteristics by exploring their professional category from an alternative 
explanatory framework, particularly the neo-institutional theory on professions 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2008). Conceptualising political public relations 
as a professional group challenges previous studies that rejected categorising these 
experts as such (D. G. Lilleker and Negrine, 2002; Pfetsch, 2004). Neo-institutional 
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theory views professions as dynamic social institutions that are not necessarily formed 
by classic professional characteristics, such a body of certified knowledge, codes of 
ethics and professional associations, but that might be reproduced and maintained 
through different social practices and structures (Noordegraaf, 2007).  
This thesis aims to contribute to an existing body of comparative work in political 
communication that, until now, has generally ignored sub-state nations as valid units 
of comparison and has also ignored political public relations experts as a significant 
element of these media systems.  As neo-institutionalists affirm, professions are 
maintained and socially-created from the actions of individual practitioners, and they 
are mutually-constitutive of the context in which they operate (Scott, 2008). Therefore, 
political public relations cannot be understood in isolation from the wider context, in 
this case the media and political systems. Redefining Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) 
dimensions of media systems, this thesis explores the media and political systems of 
Catalonia and Scotland to examine the impact of different systemic configurations on 
the political public relations profession. The aim is not to explore the adequacy of 
Hallin and Mancini’s models to the cases of Catalonia and Scotland, but to use their 
four media system dimensions as analytical concepts to explore the context in which 
political public relations operate.  
Main argument 
The main argument of this thesis is that inside media systems, along with politicians 
and journalists, is a third group with professional characteristics: political public 
relations practitioners. These professionals operationalise the relationship between 
political parties or governments with the wider communicative sphere, which includes 
not only news media but any element that projects the image of these political actors 
on the public. The profession emerges in different media and political systems, with 
degrees of variation in their professional power related to the tools to influence the 
communicative sphere that are available to these professionals in each system. More 
specifically, the data demonstrates that: 
- Political public relations’ professional structure responds to a hybrid model 
of professions constructed around a client-oriented professionalism found 
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across Scotland and Catalonia. These professionals share conceptualisations 
of professionalism and ethics based on serving the needs of the party rather 
than a public service-oriented view commonly associated with journalists and 
politicians.  
- When media systems are explored from the perspective of the political public 
relations practitioner, a series of structural features emerge as tools (e.g. 
public subsidies) that political powers can use to influence and shape the 
media sphere. These tools, along with the degree of interdependency and 
complexity in the relationship between political actors and news media, relate 
to the differences encountered in terms of professional power and autonomy 
between Scotland and Catalonia. When the sub-state dimension is explored 
from the perspective of the political public relations profession, it emerges that 
territorial decentralisation affects professionals in Scotland and Catalonia 
because it determines the availability of tools of influence over the media 
system. 
- Catalonia’s high degree of interdependence and complexity in the relationship 
between the media and political spheres provides practitioners with a larger 
number of institutional and informal tools of influence over the media sphere. 
The complexity of a relationship that has many dimensions –a system of public 
subsidies; the use of news media as part of political strategy; a network of 
media pundits controlled by parties; the active intervention of news media in 
key political events – is the basis for Catalan practitioners to claim their 
relevance and become essential professionals for any party or government. 
- Scottish practitioners occupy similar organisational positions to their Catalan 
counterparts. However, Scottish practitioners operate in a context dominated 
by a more liberal and less interventionist media policy tradition, with 
partisanship restricted to online media and newspapers, and an overall 
relationship between the political and the media spheres based more strongly 
on managing personal and individual contacts with journalists and news 
editors. In that sense, their power is limited. 
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The findings of this thesis highlight the relevance that communicative needs have 
acquired for political parties and governments, up to the point that a profession has 
emerged to attend these needs. It also sheds light on the relevance that sub-state nations 
have as valid units of analysis to explore significant features of political 
communication. This thesis and its findings could be of interest to scholars exploring 
both actor and systemic dimensions of the relationship between the political and the 
media spheres, to political scientists interested in party organisation and party strategy, 
and to sociologists working on the emergence of new professions. More specifically, 
this thesis aims to generate debate and interest about the need to build strong 
explanatory and interdisciplinary frameworks to better conceptualise the interaction 
between communication practices and politics.  
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 review the academic 
literature that has approached the figure of communication experts in the political 
sphere. In addition, Chapter 2 develops the theoretical framework of the thesis. 
Chapter 3 explores the media and political contexts where political PR practitioners in 
Scotland and Catalonia. It the basis to start the empirical analysis of the thesis.  Chapter 
4 puts forward the research design of the thesis based on a comparative and qualitative 
approach to the professional group of political PR practitioners. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 
offer the analysis of the empirical data. Chapter 5 explores the individual 
characteristics of those who practice political PR and the main professional norms and 
ethical principles of the profession. Chapter 6 looks into the role that political PR 
practitioners play in governments and political parties. Chapter 7 explores the 
performance and professional power of political PR practitioners in relation to the 
wider media system. Chapter 8 discusses the findings of the data analysis results in 
relation to the core debates in the academic literature.  
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CHAPTER 1 POLITICAL PUBLIC RELATIONS PRACTITIONERS: 
PORTRAYAL AND EVALUATION IN ACADEMIC LITERATURE 
 
This chapter examines the academic literature about spin doctors and the political 
and media contexts in which they operate. The aim is to assess the strengths and 
weaknesses of the different approaches to the issue. This chapter offers an 
integrative approach of different academic fields –political science, media studies 
and public relations- that address the same ontological phenomenon –
communication experts in political parties and governments- and yet remain 
disconnected.   
The chapter puts forward two arguments. Existing studies are problematic because 
they offer an incomplete account of political public relations practitioners. Biased 
explanatory frameworks and a lack of robust and comparative empirical data are 
the main shortcomings in the literature. This chapter argues that political public 
relations offers the most convincing framework to capture the complexities and 
dynamics of communication experts who work in political parties and 
governments. Political public relations is also a convenient overarching umbrella 
to integrate existing knowledge on these experts. Studies on these experts is spread 
over many different fields that do not speak to each other. Furthermore, this 
knowledge is hidden under different labels, designating these experts as spin 
doctors, media consultants, or press officers. There are gains to be made if this 
knowledge and its many labels are articulated under one single area of knowledge, 
delimited by one label.  
The chapter is structured into five sections, one for each field that examines 
communication experts in the political sphere. Each section analyses the dominant 
normative frameworks, theoretical approaches and empirical basis used by each of 
these fields when studying political public relations practitioners. In general terms, 
media scholars demonise spin doctors as a deviation from the romanticised 
normative model of the press officer. They are usually ignored in public relations 
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studies because political parties are not considered spaces where public relations is 
practised. Finally, political marketing scholars do not consider in-house party or 
government staff as part of their model of political consultants.  
1.1 Five different fields and one ontological object of study 
This section examines and problematises how different bodies of literature 
portray and evaluate political public relations practitioners. There is much to 
be said in favour of existing studies. Nevertheless, they all have serious 
limitations. The main limitation is the existence of different field-related 
normative frameworks that generate incomplete accounts of communication 
experts in political parties and governments.  
Five different fields approach the study of communication experts in political 
parties and governments: media studies, public relations, political 
communication, political marketing and political public relations. Each of 
these fields has its own normative framework. These normative frameworks 
determine different conceptualisations of the role that communication plays in 
the political sphere and the subsequent methodological and empirical 
approaches to its study. Table 1.1 summarises these normative frameworks 
according to: the role they attribute to communication in the political sphere; 
the way these fields evaluate communication experts in the political sphere; 
and the empirical data that underpins these studies. 
Table 1.1 Main approaches in the study of communication experts in the political 
sphere 
Field 
Kind of 
communication 
knowledge 
Role of experts 
Source of 
empirical 
data 
Political marketing 
 
Strategies and 
techniques to satisfy 
the needs of the 
political market 
Political marketing 
consultants: help 
politicians to 
Limited to 
external 
campaign 
consultants 
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understand the 
market 
(Harris, 2001; Strömbäck, 2007; Newman, 2008; Savigny, 2009; Cwalina, Falkowski and Newman, 
2011) 
Political 
communication 
News management 
Spin doctors: 
proactive strategists 
of media relations 
Politicians 
and 
journalists’ 
assessments 
of their 
relationships 
(McNair, 2000; Brown, 2003a; Stockwell, 2007; de Vreese and Elenbaas, 2009; Mcknight, 2015) 
Political public 
relations 
Purposeful 
communication to 
maintain and build 
relationships 
Political public 
relations 
practitioners: 
involved in the 
management of all 
communication-
related relationships 
No empirical 
studies 
(Kirby, 2005; Froehlich and Rüdiger, 2006; Xifra, 2010; Strömbäck and Kiousis, 2013; Gonçalves, 
2014) 
Public Relations 
Public relations is 
only practised in 
government 
communication 
Spin doctors: 
propagandists 
Limited to 
practitioners 
in government 
(Verčič et al., 2001; Grunig, Grunig and Dozier, 2002; Sriramesh Dejan and Vercic, 2003; Botan and 
Taylor, 2004; Moloney, 2006) 
Media studies 
Political 
communication as 
an attempt to breach 
the watchdog role of 
news media 
Spin doctors: 
deviation of an ideal 
model of press 
officers 
Journalists’ 
perceptions on 
these experts 
(Sumpter  and Tankard, 1994; Atkinson, 2005; Frenkel-Faran and Lehman-Wilzig, 2007; Brants and 
Voltmer, 2011; Schmitz and Karam, 2013; Fisher, 2014) 
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Table 1.1 shows which areas of knowledge lack robust empirical data because 
these normative frameworks limit the empirical basis of most studies. Media 
studies only use journalistic sources for their studies because they want to 
examine how spin doctors impact journalists. Public relations studies ignore 
practitioners working in political parties because they consider these settings 
more related to propaganda than to public relations. Political marketing studies 
do not consider in-house permanent staff members –the majority in the 
European context- as part of their model. Political communication studies are 
too focused on the wider relationship between politicians and journalists and 
rarely use first-hand data from spin doctors. Political public relations has no 
strong normative frameworks, but, because it is a young, emerging field, there 
are almost no empirical studies on this area. There is consequentially a gap in 
the empirical data: none of these studies approached practitioners working in 
parties and government. 
 In addition, as observed in Table 1.1, these fields are dominated by constant 
attempts to assess the positive or negative impact of communication experts in 
the political sphere. Consequently, the literature is divided between those fields 
that portray these practitioners as a threat to democracies –media and public 
relations– and those studies that regard these practitioners and their activities 
as beneficial for democratic debate(Hobbs, 2015): political marketing, political 
communication, political public relations. Generally, scholars criticise spin 
doctors because they examine the relationship between politicians and news 
media from normative, liberal democratic ideals that argue for a free press 
serving as a watchdog of political powers (Raupp and Kocks, 2016). In that 
context, spin doctors are regarded as manipulative attempts from political 
parties to control free media. In contrast, the strategic perspective found in 
political studies understands the role of communication expertise in democracy 
as enhancing the relationship between parties and voters (Lees-Marshment, 
2010) since communication strategies allow parties to better know their voters’ 
needs and communicate their messages more efficiently, thus promoting 
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democratic discourse. The following sections will examine the main strengths 
and problems in each of these fields.  
1.2 Spin doctors in media studies 
There is a body of media and political communication studies that consider the 
figure of the ‘spin doctor’ and its main activity, ‘spinning’, as a threat to 
democracies(Sumpter and Tankard, 1994; Gaber, 2000a; Franklin, 2003;  
Bennett and Entman, 2003; Swanson, 2004; Ribeiro, 2015a). These critical 
scholars argue that spin doctors are a deviation from a normative model of 
press officers (Sumpter and Tankard, 1994; Gaber, 2000a) and spinning a 
deviation from a normative model of media relations (Bennett and Entman, 
2003). 
It is usually the case that those who argue for the dangers of these 
communication professionals tend to use the term ‘spin doctor’ and their 
studies tend to focus on the effects that ‘spinning’ has on news production and 
political engagement (Gaber, 2000a; Moloney and Colmer, 2001; Franklin, 
2003; Dhani, 2011). The term ‘spin doctor’ is an Anglo-Saxon pejorative term 
created in 1984 by American journalists during the Mondale-Reagan debate to 
refer to the candidates’ advisors who, after the debate, tried to convince 
journalists that their respective candidate had won the debate (Sumpter and 
Tankard, 1994). The term was later imported to the UK and Australia (Fisher, 
2014), and widely used by journalists during Tony Blair’s government at a time 
of contentious relationships between Blair’s Head of Communications and the 
news media(Esser, Reinemann and Fan, 2000). However, spin doctor does not 
appear in other media contexts, such as in Spain or Catalonia where the public 
is unaware of the significance of the term (Xifra, 2010b). 
Even though some scholars point out that the negative connotations embedded 
in the term ‘spin doctor’ have softened in the last decade (Ribeiro, 2015), it is 
still the case that ‘spin doctor’ remains an unscientific neologism(Frenkel-
Faran and Lehman-Wilzig, 2007) that is difficult to use as an analytical term 
(Brown, 2003). Consequently, the use of the term spin doctor as an analytical 
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tool is questioned here because, as McNair alerts, ‘the media analyst should be 
cautious in endorsing the journalists’ terms and referential frames’ (2000, 
p.137). Nevertheless, media and political communication studies make the 
conscious choice of using the term ‘spin doctor’ because they endorse a 
negative view of these experts working in parties and governments. 
Media studies compare spin doctors to a romanticised old press officer. Spin 
doctors lack the professionalism and ethical standards of old press officers 
working in political parties and governments(Tenscher, 2004; Serrano, 2010) 
.These new professionals were presented as having aggressive communication 
strategies: always ahead of the opposition’s moves, using ‘unorthodox 
methods’ and personal contacts with top editors to push their ‘liquid’ versions 
of truth, and always acting in their client’s interest (Sumpter and Tankard, 
1994). Schmitz and Karam (2013), after surveying 163 Brazilian journalists, 
contend that there is a ‘legitimate demarcation between a professional and 
ethical press office that plans and executes its strategies and proactive actions, 
and the spin doctor’ (p.104). From their perspective, spin doctors do not build 
proactive and long-lasting relationships with journalists, they are not loyal to 
the truth, and they use lobbying, advocacy and public affairs techniques.  
Spin doctors are regarded by critical media scholars as a danger to democracies 
because their main work - i.e. ‘spin’ - is seen as a way of managing 
relationships between political actors and journalists that endangers the 
journalists’ independence from political powers (Stockwell, 2007). It is not 
very clear what, exactly, is meant when the word spinning is used because its 
use has been extended from referring to the core action of ‘spin doctors’ to 
describe the entire Public Relations profession (Atkinson, 2005; Louw, 2005). 
However, in the political context, Swanson (2004) defines ‘spin’ as a negative, 
omnipresent tendency ‘by which political actors try to shape journalists’ 
reports to partisan advantage’ (2004, p.51).  
 Spin is associated with political control of meaning, which threatens 
journalistic independence (Hobbs, 2015).  For instance, Brants and Voltmer 
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(2011) see spinning as the cause that has undermined the cooperation between 
journalists and politicians. Politicians and governments try to ‘control the spin 
of a message, but journalists have strategic considerations of their own, such 
as a desire to convey news that sells’(Fogarty and Wolak, 2009, p. 134). From 
these perspectives, the spin doctor becomes the figure that puts into practice 
political elites’ attempts to control media coverage and, therefore, the presence 
of spin doctors is dangerous because they allow for ‘powerful manipulation 
and distortion of the democratic process’ (Street 2011, p.10). These views are 
similar to those found in the public relations field. 
1.3 Public relations: spin doctors as propagandists 
Public relations is the practice and discipline that explores communication 
practices within organisational settings (Heath and Toth, 2009). One might 
contend that political parties and governments are also organisational settings 
(Panebianco, 1988; Webb and Kolodny, 2006) with their own communication 
practices. However, the field of public relations has an uneasy relationship with 
communication practices in the political sphere, and subsequently with the spin 
doctors who practise them. This uneasy relationship between public relations 
and politics limits the capacity of the field to serve as an exploratory 
framework for communication practices in the political sphere. The argument 
unfolds as follows. 
Public relations scholars consider spin doctors as representing a dangerous 
tendency ‘towards the manipulative and propagandistic’ (Moloney, 2000, p. 
117) and, therefore, spin doctors are damaging for the public legitimacy and 
reputation of the field and practice of public relations(Moloney, 2006; Coombs 
and Holladay, 2014). In general terms, the field of public relations –
particularly the dominant system theory or functionalist paradigm(Grunig, 
Grunig and Dozier, 2002) -rejects the use of public relations for propaganda 
purposes (L’Etang, 2009). The functionalist PR paradigm makes a clear 
distinction between propaganda and public relations. Public relations is a 
managerial function that ensures two-way communication between the 
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organisation and its public and stakeholders (Grunig, Grunig and Dozier, 
2002), whereas propaganda aims to ‘manufacture compliance’ (Coombs and 
Holladay, 2014 p.18) using lies, deceptions and manipulative control of 
information (Heath and Toth, 2009). From this perspective, public relations is 
only practiced in ‘organizations (profit, nonprofit, and governmental)’ 
(Coombs and Holladay, 2014 p.31) and political parties are usually excluded 
from the field of public relations.  
PR textbooks rarely mention political parties or political competition, and, if 
they do, it is to remark on the exceptionality of those contexts where ‘genuine 
two-way symmetry can occur only where both parties have equal power to 
influence the other – and it is worth remembering that this is the rarest form of 
PR’ (Fwakes, 2001, p. 16). Or Leach (2009) argues that, theoretically, good 
public relations can improve the relationship between political parties and 
voters by helping them make more informed decisions and enhancing 
democratic debate. However, he is mainly skeptical because these are no longer 
parties’ core priorities in their promotion strategies.  
Until recently, PR scholars have only approached the political sphere through 
government public relations(Ledingham, 2001; Liu, Horsley and Levenshus, 
2010; Echart and Canel, 2011; Sanders, Crespo and Holtz-Bacha, 2011; Rice 
and Somerville, 2013; Waymer, 2013). Public relations studies focus on 
government communication because governments allow for ‘the cultivation of 
long-term relationships oriented to mutual understanding rather than being 
modelled on short-term, vote-winning approaches to communication’ (Echart 
and Canel, 2011 p.110). Short-term and vote-winning approaches relate to 
persuasion and the manufacture of compliance, and therefore the 
propagandistic model (Grunig et al., 1995). For instance, Lee (2014), when 
outlining the PR objectives of governments, qualifies the political purpose of 
government relations as ‘dangerous’. 
One of the reasons for the uneasy relationship between politics and public 
relations lies in the origins of the discipline. Although the discipline arose from 
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communication practices in political parties and governments in the early 20th 
century (Edwards, 2014), it has grown apart from the persuasive and 
propagandistic dimension of politics (Coombs and  Holladay, 2014). In the 
post-war context, Bernays (1955), the so-called father of public relations, 
warned that PR techniques in politics can be ‘subverted’ and used for anti-
democratic purposes. Similarly, the first book on the practice of PR within the 
US political context also warned of a negative change happening in the 
political sphere as ‘the propaganda function in politics has, more and more, 
moved out of the hands of the lay politician into those of the propaganda 
specialist’ (Kelley, 1956, p. 2). As Gonçalves (2014) argues, these first 
conceptualisations of PR, propaganda and politics, have remained in the 
functionalist approach to public relations. 
Although functionalists dominate the field, critical public relations scholars 
open the door to the inclusion of politics. Critical public relations scholars 
recognise similarities between modern forms of politics and the practice of 
public relations (McNair, 2004; L’Etang, 2006; Sheehan and Xifra, 2015). 
Unlike functionalist scholars, critical public relations scholars embrace the 
power and propagandistic dimension of public relations (Heath and Toth, 
2009). There have been some attempts from public relations scholars to 
integrate what they call applied communication areas, such as political 
communication, under the umbrella of PR theories(Xifra, 2001; Botan and 
Taylor, 2004).  In that sense, Botan and Taylor (2004) defend linking public 
relations to communication practices in the political sphere through issues 
management theory commonly accepted in PR theory. They argue 
communication practices in the political sphere are applied PR techniques to 
one specific issue, in this case political goals. From a more nuanced approach, 
Xifra (2001), in his study of public relations models in Catalan parties, states 
that PR is the main communication form that parties and governments use to 
communicate with their voters and citizens. However, the most significant 
attempt to link public relations theory and politics is the sub-field of political 
public relations (Strömbäck and Kiousis, 2013; see section 1.6). 
 18 
1.4 News management and spinning as political communication 
Political communication understands communication in the political sphere as 
the outcome of the relationship between the political and the media spheres 
(Raupp and Kocks, 2016). The relationship between spin doctors and 
journalists is the starting point for these scholars because they understand 
spinning –the core action of spin doctors- as news management. Spin, or news 
management, is a proactive, systematic strategy to manage media content 
(Stockwell, 2007; Brown, 2011; Quinn, 2012; Hobbs, 2015). The concept of 
news management is approached from three different perspectives in political 
communication: the rational choice approach(Quinn, 2012); the rhetorical 
approach (Brown, 2003); and the political communication compass (Hobbs, 
2015). In all three approaches, spin doctors are portrayed as active 
intermediaries in the relationship between the political and the media spheres. 
These perspectives, while useful to understanding the dynamics of the 
relationship between practitioners and journalists, fail to recognise the wider 
scope of tasks and functions of political public relation practitioners.  
Using the model of rational choice exchange, Quinn (2012) argues that 
political parties use spin doctors to control the information they provide to 
journalists. Journalists need this information, while at the same time parties 
need journalists to communicate with their voters; therefore, he argues a 
process of rational exchange –in the hands of the spin doctor- occurs. Quinn 
(2012) bridges rational-choice political theory and political communication to 
recognise the strategic decision-making processes behind spin doctors’ tasks. 
The second approach uses the idea of political communication as a rhetorical 
process to highlight the active role of spin doctors (Brown, 2003). Brown 
(2003) holds that spin or news management –he uses both terms 
interchangeably- is a dialogic or rhetoric process where bargaining, dialogue 
and mobilisation happen between the two parties to the relationship. Therefore, 
the spin doctor establishes a rhetorical dialogue with journalists, negotiating 
and promoting certain frames and meanings. Brown (2003) argues news 
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management is something characteristic of democratic politics and a proactive 
strategy rather than a detrimental practice.  
The third and final approach is the political communication compass (Hobbs, 
2015). This approach proposes a framework to assess and categorise the ethical 
value of the spin doctor’s actions using Habermas’ concepts of ideal speech: 
unversalisation and free speech. Hobbs (2015) argues that news management 
–the spin doctor’s main activity– is ethical when it does not interfere with the 
rational debate of ideas in the public sphere, and instead aims ‘to raise 
awareness of politicians, issues, services or policy initiatives’ (Hobbs, 2015 
p.9). He notes that spin doctors can interfere with the rational debate of ideas 
when their activities are covert and aim to deceive and manipulate journalists 
and the public, including the creation of fake partisan blogs or the use of fake 
whistle-blowers. Hobbs’ (2015) framework is useful to challenge the idea that 
only old press officers practiced ethical communication as some media studies 
defend –i.e. Sumpter and Tankard (1994). However, the framework lacks 
strong empirical data to test the validity or accuracy of some of the activities 
Hobbs attributes to spin doctors.  
1.4.1  Media systems and spin doctors 
The majority of studies on spin doctors focus their attention on the micro-level 
analysis of the spin doctor’s activities. There are only a few studies on political 
communication that consider the relationship between spin doctors and the 
wider media and political spheres (Brown, 2003; Esser, Reinemann, and Fan, 
2000; Frenkel-Faran and Lehman-Wilzig, 2007; Manning, 2001; McNair, 
2011). The main issue with these studies is that they lack a strong empirical 
basis or defined theoretical framework. Despite these studies not developing a 
systematic examination of how political and media contexts influence spin 
doctors, they point towards the need for a deeper exploration of this issue. Two 
main approaches stand out in this area. 
In the first, Brown (2011) claims that news management –or spin– is limited 
and less necessary in media systems with strong partisan audiences and strong 
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partisan media. He argues spinning is necessary in those contexts where news 
frames are open to be influenced and modified. If news media offer 
ideologically-shaped content, suited to the demands of the public or to pre-
established political views, then the spin doctor has less scope for action and 
his or her services are less necessary. He uses the UK’s two-party system to 
argue that spinning makes sense in contexts where the differences between the 
two parties are not so much ideological but of representation. 
Nonetheless, Brown’s (2011) views can be challenged because there is no 
comparative data to contrast whether spin doctors are less relevant in a strong 
partisanship media system. Until now, studies on journalistic sources point out 
that spin doctors are more powerful in those contexts where political and 
government sources are dominant in their relationship with journalists 
(Manning, 2001). Spin doctors’ capacity to influence is limited in those 
contexts where there are elevated levels of mistrust between journalists and 
politicians (Esser, Reinemann and Fan, 2001). However, these claims lack a 
wider theoretical framework to explain how these elements of mistrust and 
power could relate to other features of the media and political systems.  
The second approach can be interpreted as opposed to Brown’s (2011) 
arguments. Pfetsch (2001) argues that political public relations practitioners –
spin doctors- play a role in both politically-oriented (Germany) and media-
driven systems (USA). There are politically-driven political cultures, such as 
Germany, in which both journalists and political public relations practitioners 
perceive their roles as politically-oriented. Party goals shape how they perceive 
their professional role in a context where the traditional role of the German 
media has been that of mobilising pre-existing political factions. Political 
public relations practitioners seek coverage in those news media that ‘match’ 
their party aspirations. By contrast, the USA is a media-driven political culture 
where political public relations professionals seek unqualified media coverage 
in a more commercially-oriented media system. It should be noted that the aim 
of Pfetsch's (2001) study is the wider relationship between politicians and 
journalists, as is the case for the majority of studies in this area. Nevertheless, 
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this study(Pfetsch, 2001)  remained, until now, the only comparative study on 
the relationship between politicians and journalists in the USA and Germany 
that used political public relations practitioners as units of analysis alongside 
journalists.  
Brown (2011) and Pfetsch’s (2001) studies indicate there are elements in the 
relationship between the media and the political sphere that might influence 
the characteristics of spin doctors. Partisanship and political parallelism 
between news media and political parties seem to be factors that could 
determine the power and relevance of spin doctors.  However, these elements 
need a systematic and comparative approach to better understand the impact of 
the wider media and political systems on spin doctors. 
1.5 Political marketing consultants 
Political marketing frames communication in the political sphere as a process 
of exchange intended to identify and satisfy the needs of the political market 
(Cwalina, Falkowski, and Newman 2009). Therefore, political marketing 
practitioners ‘focus on candidate image, strategic product development, target 
marketing, news management, spin control, permanent campaigning and 
negative advertising’ (Plasser, Scheucher, and Senft, 1999 p.105). There is a 
significant body of research in the field of political marketing related to 
communication experts in the political sphere. Political marketing as a field 
uses the model of political consultants (Bohne, Prevost and Thurber, 2009) to 
define these communication experts. Political consultants are external experts 
hired by governments and political parties, mostly during election periods, to 
advise on specific areas such as media, polls, legislation and up to 34 different 
specialisations (Waismel-Manor, 2011). The object of study of this thesis is 
limited to in-house professionals in the area of communication and the market-
oriented view of political marketing studies is not endorsed here. However, 
some political marketing scholars consider famous spin doctors such as 
Alastair Campbell as political marketing practitioners (Notesthe et al., 2014). 
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Political marketing scholars were the first ones to identify that a change was 
happening within US parties as marketing experts were increasingly replacing 
‘party bosses’ as campaign directors (Reid, 1998). ‘Media expert’ is identified 
as one of the actors of political marketing, though Kinsey (1999) suggests that, 
despite being the one with most public visibility, he/she is not the most 
important. Pollsters and researchers are the ones creating the market 
intelligence that is afterwards used by the media consultant; consequently, 
from a political marketing perspective, the former have higher significance 
(Kinsey, 1999). This perspective contrasts with media or political 
communication studies that present spin doctors as autonomous and the most 
powerful expert in parties and governments (Stockwell, 2007; Hobbs, 2015). 
Political marketing conceptualises the political sphere as a political market and 
voters as consumers(Savigny, 2009). Political marketing includes political 
communication and public relations, but mostly refers to ‘a range of marketing 
tools including voter profiling, segmentation, micro-targeting and e-marketing 
to inform their communication’ that allow parties to ‘respond to market 
intelligence in the way they design the political product they offer’ (Lees-
Marshment, 2010 p.2). Political marketing scholars show concern in the use of 
PR in the political sphere because they argue its efficiency in reaching voters 
is highly dependent on contextual factors like the strength of the opponent or 
the channel of communication (Cwalina, Falkowski, and Newman 2009). They 
regard political marketing as those strategies that underpin parties’ activities, 
such as communication (Lees-Marshment, 2010).  
In terms of techniques used in political marketing, Lees-Marshment (2010) 
points to those activities that allow the party to get better knowledge of their 
voters. Based on the UK Labour Party, she depicts a Marketing Oriented Party 
model in which knowledge obtained from focus groups, polling and 
segmentation is used in different stages to inform strategies, redefine goals, 
generate new policies and evaluate success or electoral failure (Lees-
Marshment, 2010). Consequently, political marketing becomes a process and 
almost an organisational feature. Polling and segmentation become 
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organisational routines. Nevertheless, (Peng and Hackley (2007) argue the 
adoption of political marketing strategies seems to be dependent on internal 
party perceptions of political leaders and relevant figures. Parties adopt 
political marketing techniques and strategies if relevant figures see them as 
necessary for the party.  
Political marketing studies contribute to demonstrating that there is a group of 
professionals -in this case political consultants- and not only isolated spin 
doctors that possess specific skills and expertise(Panagopoulos, 2006; 
Grossmann, 2009) to manage the communication needs of parties and 
governments. However, the political marketing framework refers to very 
specific models of party organisation that might not fit the wide range of 
different political parties examined in this thesis.  
1.6 Political public relations: definitions and principles  
Political public relations offers the most adequate normative framework for the 
purposes of this thesis. The youngest of all the fields analysed above, political 
public relations seeks its place combining public relations, political 
communication and political marketing theories. Political public relations 
conceptualise communication in the political sphere as a management process 
to establish influential relationships in the political sphere (Strömbäck and 
Kiousis, 2013). There has been some interest in describing some of the 
activities of political public relations practitioners (Moloney and Colmer, 
2001; Louw, 2005; Froehlich and Rüdiger, 2006; Jackson, 2010). However, 
there is no established definition of who is a political public relations 
practitioner other than its use as a synonym for ‘spin doctor’ (McNair, 2000; 
Esser, Reinemann and Fan, 2001; Joe Atkinson, 2005; Jackson, 2010; de 
Vreese and Elenbaas, 2011; Somerville and Kirby, 2012). Hence, there is an 
opportunity to build a new definition of political public relations practitioner 
out of strong normative frameworks. 
The emergent field of ‘political public relations’ offers a more comprehensive 
framework for the study of communication experts working in political parties 
 24 
and governments. Three main arguments underpin the adequacy of political 
public relations. First, it places political organisations and their communication 
as objects of study per se. Parties, governments and other political actors are 
not examined through the lenses of their effects on the media. Second, the 
concept of the political public relations practitioner is useful for the purposes 
of this study because it is an integrated approach that acknowledges the 
managerial and strategic dimensions of communication experts working within 
political organisations (Jackson, 2010). Political public relations practitioners 
as a concept includes both external consultants and in-house practitioners 
working for political parties and governments. Third, it occupies that space 
between political communication studies that largely ignore public relations 
theory and public relations theory that addresses the uniqueness of political 
organisations’ communication (Stromback and Kiousis, 2011).   
Stromback and Kiousis (2011) claim political public relations aims to bring 
knowledge together from different fields such as political science or political 
communication. As a field of research, the distinctive trait of political public 
relations is that it recognises the purposeful nature of communication in 
politics –rejected from the discipline of public relations– and at the same time 
integrates different public relations functions.  Their definition of political 
public relations is, until now, one of the most nuanced attempts to define this 
area of expertise and knowledge that is situated between political 
communication and public relations: 
‘Political public relations is the management process by which an 
organization or individual actor for political purposes, through 
purposeful communication and action, seeks to influence and to 
establish, build, and maintain beneficial relationships and reputations 
with its key publics to help support its mission and achieve its goals’ 
(Kiousis and  Stromback, 2011 p.8). 
This conceptualisation of political public relations as a management function 
of relationships and influence for political purposes steps away from limiting 
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conceptualisations of ‘spin’ as manipulative news management (Swanson, 
2004).  Jackson (2010) emphasises that political public relations involves both 
a strategic level determining the interaction between decision-makers and its 
public, and a tactical level designing specific campaigns for political actors.  
Therefore, it should not be limited to media relations or news management 
exclusively (Stromback and Kiousis, 2011) as has been the case in some studies 
where ‘spin doctors’ have been identified as the core players of news 
management (Manning, 2001). The scope of political public relations is wider 
than political communication’s areas of study. Jackson (2010) finds the core 
difference between political communication and political public relations is 
that the latter focuses on a wider range of stakeholders who are influenced by 
or influence political actors. Political communication is usually focused on the 
chain of influence between politicians, journalists and public opinion.  
1.6.1  The political public relations practitioner 
In the past decade, there has been a significant increase in the number of studies 
that use the term ‘political public relations practitioner’ as a synonym for ‘spin 
doctor’ (Esser, Reinemann and Fan, 2001; Atkinson, 2005; de Vreese and 
Elenbaas, 2009; McNair, 2011). These studies offer useful descriptions of the 
activities usually associated with political public relations. In doing so, these 
studies overcome some of the restricted views encountered in political 
communication, political marketing and media studies. However, these studies 
are still limited because they do not take into consideration the impact of 
political and media systems and the lack of robust empirical data to underpin 
their categorisations. They also fail to offer explanatory frameworks to 
understanding how a group of individuals happens to reproduce the same 
practices in different contexts.  There have been some political PR studies at 
the supra-state level exploring EU institutions (Laursen and Valentini, 2013) 
but there are no comparative studies at the sub-state level. The argument 
unfolds as follows. 
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The main idea behind these political public relation studies is that the practice 
of political public relations includes not only news management or media 
relations, as defined in media and political communication studies. As 
Froehlich and Rüdiger (2006) declare, ‘the goals of political public relations 
extend beyond bringing attention to or away from political issues’ (p.18). The 
political public relations practitioner is, for instance, involved in 
communication processes in policy-making (Moloney and Colmer, 2001; 
Brown, 2003b; Louw, 2005). In that sense, Louw (2005) argues that the core 
activities of political PR practitioners are to: manage support/criticism during 
policy-making processes, including both media and stakeholder relations; 
manage internal party communication; and finally, and most importantly, 
shape audiences’ perspectives.  
McNair (2011) divides political public relations activities in ‘proactive 
devices’ and ‘reactive political public relations’. As proactive devices, McNair 
(2011) refers to those activities ‘designed principally to attract positive media 
coverage of an organization’ (p.7), which include party conferences, news 
conferences or the use of image management. As reactive political public 
relations, he depicts those activities used to limit damage to the organisation, 
and in this area he includes ‘lobbying of journalists, spinning of potentially 
damaging stories, suppressing of potentially damaging information’ (McNair, 
2011 p.7).  The political public relations practitioner finds a place in almost all 
aspects of the daily routines of parties and governments. 
Political public relations practitioners play strategic roles for parties and 
governments. Existing studies describe the strategic role of political PR 
practitioners as creators of a meta-narrative (Moloney and Colmer, 2001; 
Stockwell, 2007) and as agenda-setters (Aira, 2009). The role of the political 
public relations practitioner is to transform complex tactical moves happening 
behind the scenes into a meta-narrative (Stockwell, 2007) that seems natural 
or coherent to their public(Moloney and Colmer, 2001). They are also 
portrayed as active actors in agenda-setting processes. Aira (2009) claims the 
ultimate goal of ‘spin doctors’ is to influence news media agenda beyond 
 27 
traditional campaign or political events coverage, making sure the party’s 
interests get represented on a variety of different policy issues, such as culture 
or sports, thereby generating a sense of proximity between politicians and 
voters beyond traditional campaign coverage. Previous studies on spin doctors 
ignored that these practitioners have a role in the party or government’s overall 
strategy. Practitioners’ status –in-house or external- is not relevant, and neither 
is the organisation they work for –parties or governments. 
Political public relations studies overcome the limitation of public relations 
studies that associated dynamics of political competition with propaganda 
(Coombs and Holladay, 2014; Lee, 2014). Political public relations studies 
incorporate the dynamics of political competition –such as winning elections 
or different patterns of party competition for power- as part of political public 
relations. Practitioners’ activities are aimed to win elections, steer votes or 
maintain parties in power (Ribeiro, 2015; Jackson, 2010). Political public 
relations studies do not see the fact that top-down approaches to 
communication dominate parties and governments as problematic (Xifra, 
2010a). They argue that political contexts -and also public relations in general- 
cannot be examined according to ‘virtually impossible demands of dialogue’ 
(Somerville and Kirby, 2012 p.240) as found in the dominant propaganda 
framework of public relations. 
Despite offering a more nuanced approach, there is still scope for improving 
current understandings of political public relations practitioners. Political 
public relations studies do not have a strong empirical basis. Some of them 
used secondary sources, such as practitioners’ memoirs, as empirical data 
(Louw, 2005; Stockwell, 2007). There are very few studies that interviewed or 
questioned practitioners (Aira, 2009; Xifra, 2010a). Furthermore, none of these 
studies take into account whether political or media systems might impact the 
practice of political public relations. There is an absence of comparative 
studies on the practice of political public relations.  
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Political public relations is a good frame to define the actions of 
communication experts working in the political sphere. However, the 
discipline of political public relations needs to theorise their practitioners. The 
first step should be that of identifying core practices, tasks and roles of political 
public relations practitioners. Nevertheless, these practices, tasks and roles are 
not the result of isolated individuals. These practices happen in a context and 
for a reason. In the following chapter, I argue this exercise of theory-building 
around political public relations practitioners starts by examining them as part 
of a professional group and also part of specific political and media systems.   
1.7 Conclusions 
This chapter has demonstrated that different academic fields approached 
differently the same ontological object: communication experts in political 
parties and governments. These studies indicate that these experts threaten and 
challenge the watchdog function of journalists (media studies); help 
governments to build better relationships with their stakeholders but use 
propagandistic models of communication in political parties (public relations 
studies); are active mediators in the relationship between politicians and 
journalists (political communication studies); help parties and governments to 
understand the needs of the political market (political marketing studies); and 
play strategic roles in their organisations (political public relations).  
This chapter also demonstrated these studies have serious limitations. They are 
dominated by field-biased frameworks that assess whether these experts are 
good or bad for democracies. These field-biased frameworks have generated a 
restricted and limited view of political PR practitioners. There is not robust 
empirical data behind these studies. Neither are there comprehensive 
explanatory frameworks that go beyond examining isolated individuals doing 
the same communication practices. Nor is there any attempt to explain whether 
political or media systems might have an impact on these experts.  
On the basis of these arguments, the figure of the communications expert in 
the political sphere needs to be reconceptualised. Political public relations is a 
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good starting point to define and categorise communication practices in the 
political sphere. However, these practices need to be placed in a larger 
explanatory framework combining micro- and macro-levels of analysis to 
overcome existing limitations. The following chapter will propose a new 
framework to reconceptualise the figure of political public relations 
practitioner.
CHAPTER 2 PROFESSIONALIZATION OF POLITICAL PUBLIC 
RELATIONS PRACTITIONERS 
 
This chapter develops the conceptual framework that underpins the study of political 
public relations practitioners in this thesis. This chapter proposes the 
reconceptualization of political public relations practitioners as a profession and offers 
two theoretical frameworks to examine them and the media and political contexts in 
which they operate.  
The main argument of the chapter is as follows. Studies on political public relations 
practitioners lack the theoretical framework to explain how similar practitioners 
appear in different contexts. The practice of political public relations is most 
adequately explored if considered conceptually as a profession and examined 
accordingly in a comparative perspective. This chapter is based on the assumption that 
political expertise has developed over time, to the point where it has now grown in 
size and specialization (Bohne, Prevost and Thurber, 2009; Waismel-Manor, 2011; 
Serazio, 2014), in this case towards communication specialization. This political 
expertise now occupies a particular niche in the division of labour in the political field 
that can be seen through shared work and practices in different media and political 
contexts. Hence, there is a need to develop this analysis in a comparative framework.  
The aim of the chapter is to structure a conceptual framework based on two elements: 
a neo-institutional approach to understand professions, their practices and structures; 
and the theory of media system models to articulate a systematic and comparative 
approach to explore the wider media and political contexts in which these practitioners 
work. Professions are social and dynamic institutions constituted by the existence of a 
series of shared practices and identities, which are not necessarily linked to the 
existence of formal institutions such as trade bodies or codes of ethics. These shared 
practices and identities emerge both from the active role of the individual practitioner 
as a crafter of its own occupation, and from wider social contexts –in this case, media 
and political systems- that shape and also determine the way these practices are put in 
place. Existing approaches to the professionalization of political communication are 
inadequate for the purposes of this thesis.  
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The structure of the chapter is as follows. The first section explores existing 
approaches to the professionalization of political communication and political 
consultants, and demonstrates the lack of adequate sociological frameworks in the 
field. The second section presents the theory of media system models and its analytical 
concepts as the framework to explore the context in which professionals operate. The 
final section explores the main features of neo-institutional approaches to professions 
as the most adequate framework to study the specific characteristics of political public 
relations practitioners. 
It is not the goal of this chapter to reconceptualise definitions of profession and 
professionalization (Macdonald, 1995; Suddaby and Muzio, 2015), nor is it to explore 
the adequacy of the three different media system models to the two cases analysed in 
this thesis –Scotland and Catalonia. This chapter extracts analytical concepts from 
existing theories on professions and media system models that will provide a 
comprehensive portrait of the political public relations occupation, both at the micro-
level dimension (practices and self-identity) and the macro-level (influences of media 
and political contexts). These analytical concepts engage critically with the existing 
gaps in theoretical approaches to the study of political public relations practitioners, 
and provide the basis for articulating the research questions and aims of this thesis.  
2.1 Current understandings of professionalization and professions within 
the political communication sphere 
This section discusses the main shortcomings and limitations of existing studies on 
professions and professionalization in the political sphere. The term 
professionalization has been used in the fields of political communication and political 
marketing studies for a while now. The aim of this section is to demonstrate that these 
studies do not offer an adequate framework to explore the case of political public 
relations. The main limitations and shortcomings in these areas of study support the 
need to develop a less restrictive and sociologically-underpinned approach to the 
concept of profession, and a comparative approach that takes into consideration the 
influence of media and political systems beyond the US model of political consultants. 
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2.1.1  Professionalization of political communication 
This section explores current conceptualizations of the so-called professionalization 
of political communication. The main argument is that current conceptualizations of 
the professionalization of political communication (Holtz-Bacha, 2008; Negrine & 
Lilleker, 2002; Petrová, 2012) divert their scrutiny away from the individual 
practitioner. These conceptualizations overlook the emergence of occupations. The 
term professionalization is used to describe how political organisations mimic media 
routines to become better competitors (Gibson & Rommele, 2009; Mancini, 1999; 
Strömbäck, 2009), and ultimately legitimise their power by becoming similar to their 
immediate context (D. Lilleker and Negrine, 2002). These studies are actually 
describing processes of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) rather 
than a professional project. 
So far, political communication scholars have understood professionalization as the 
institutionalization of changes occurring in the interaction between political and media 
spheres (Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999; Mancini, 1999; Negrine and Lilleker, 2002b). 
Professionalisation of political communication is depicted as a process of adaptation 
to the new media environment that brings a more efficient and planned organization 
of skills and campaign resources that are now aimed at specific goals (D. Lilleker and 
Negrine, 2002). Professionalized campaigns are characterised ‘by being permanent, 
by the central campaign headquarters being able to coordinate the messages and 
management of the campaign and by using expertise in analysing and reaching out to 
members and target groups’ (Strömbäck 2009, p.97).  Therefore, political 
organisations become professionalized when they adopt centralised, permanent and 
expert-managed campaign organisation structures.  
Professionalization of campaigns is understood as a series of activities and practices 
that can be measured through different professionalization indexes (Gibson and 
Rommele, 2001; Lisi, 2013; Tenscher et al., 2015). These indexes measure the extent 
and relevance of ‘professionalised’ activities such as direct mail, telemarketing, 
newsletters, campaign teams, PR and media consultants, databases, opinion groups, 
opinion polls, focus groups, negative campaigning and continuous campaigning (Lisi, 
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2013). There are almost no references to the communication experts who design and 
manage these activities. These studies consider communication experts as playing a 
secondary role in the process of professionalization (Strömbäck, 2007). For instance, 
communication experts’ perceptions are sometimes included in professionalization 
indexes to evaluate the efficiency of professional campaign techniques (Tenscher et 
al., 2015). However, the emergence of communication experts is not considered a 
main driving force in the professionalization process. 
Within these approaches focused on measuring the emergence of new activities, 
political public relations practitioners are only taken into consideration as elements 
that are now increasingly used by parties in their campaigns (Holtz-Bach, 2008). In 
that sense, Mancini (1999) points out that some of the routines and tasks that political 
public relations practitioners carry out were formerly in the hands of party members 
or amateur volunteers. However, these routines are not considered indicators of the 
existence of a profession, but indicators of the degree of media influence over politics. 
Studies on the professionalization of political communication fail to recognise the 
emergence of a professional project because there is a lack of sociological 
underpinning in their analysis.  
Even in the very few cases when sociological dimensions have been put in place by 
these studies, they have failed to build strong theoretical underpinnings for the study 
of political communication or political public relations practitioners (Esser & 
Teschner, 2005). For instance, Negrine and Lilleker (2002) contend that political 
communication practitioners or political public relations cannot be considered 
professionals since they ‘lack of those elements that characterise classic professions’ 
(2002, p.28). Similarly, Pfetsch (2004) considers that both political public relations 
and journalism are ‘underprofessionalized because socialization in both areas takes the 
form of ‘learning on the job’’ (2004 p.351). Both studies only consider the concept of 
profession from a widely-questioned functionalist approach in which professions can 
only be recognised if they have abstract certified academic knowledge and governing 
institutions. These scholars fail to acknowledge that these functionalist approaches 
have been long disregarded by sociologists –see for example Larson (1979)- and that 
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there are alternative frameworks to understand professions based, for instance, on 
power (Abbott, 1988) or identity (Schinkel and Noordegraaf, 2011). 
These limitations indicate the need to seek alternative sociological approaches to the 
concept of profession and professionalization that reflect the reality of emerging 
professions beyond these wider changes of institutional isomorphism.   
2.1.2 Professionalization of external political consultants  
Beyond existing research on the so-called professionalization of political 
communication, there is a growing body of political science and political marketing 
research that has explored the professionalization of consultants and party employees 
in the political sphere (i.e Bohne, Prevost, & Thurber, 2009; Farrell, Kolodny, & 
Medvic, 2001; Grossmann, 2009; Panagopoulos, 2006). Despite contributing a wide 
range of relevant empirical data, the majority of studies in this area depend on a 
functionalist perspective of professions, focused on identifying the classic professional 
elements: certified knowledge, trade bodies and regulations. In addition, the 
applicability of their findings to the cases of Catalonia and Scotland is limited because 
their conceptualization of political marketing experts or political consultants is limited 
to the US model of external experts hired only for campaign purposes (Medvic, 2003).  
As Webb and Kolodny (2006) argue, the majority of studies on party professionals 
make use of a strict definition of profession that is only based on examining select 
items: training, mobility amongst different organisations, autonomy of the rank and 
file, self-regulation and commitment.  When these elements are applied to the 
European context, it emerges that European political marketing consultants present a 
lower degree of professionalization than their US counterparts because of low levels 
of association membership in Europe and the lack of formal training possibilities 
(Plasser, Scheucher and Senft, 1999). US campaign consultants, however, have been 
found to be on the way to becoming a profession because they meet three out of the 
five criteria that form a profession: they have professional associations, a formal code 
of ethics and institutional training (Waismel-Manor, 2011). No alternative elements 
that could signal the existence of a professional project, such as shared practices or 
identities, are taken into consideration in these approaches.  
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Despite using a limited functionalist conception of profession (Wilensky, 1964), 
studies on this area indicate the need to explore the impact that different media and 
political systems might have on emerging occupations in the political sphere. For 
instance, Plasser, Scheucher, & Senft (1999) explain that European parties tend to have 
more in-house professionals, rather than external consultants, because of the 
institutional background of political competition in Europe. They find that party-
centred styles of campaigns, media policies that allow free television advertising 
during campaigns and publicly-funded electoral campaigns facilitate the use of in-
house professional party staff (Plasser, Scheucher and Senft, 1999).  
The majority of studies (Panagopoulos, 2006; Bohne, Prevost and Thurber, 2009; 
Waismel-Manor, 2011) find that someone who is a permanent member of party staff 
cannot be considered a political consultant because ‘party staffers and political 
consultants do not entirely share the same perspective on elections’ (Medvic, 2003 
p.124). Medvic (2003) justifies his position through arguing that one of the traits of 
party professionalization is the need to hire external consultants to deal with the 
complexities of modern campaigning. Some minority voices in the field, such as 
Kolodny and Dulio (2003), argue that party consultants hired in lieu of permanent staff 
should be considered party employees. This conceptualization of party employees 
would open the door to establish comparative equivalences between the European and 
US models.  
The limitations in the political marketing and political science literature on 
professionalization indicate that there is a need for more comparative approaches in 
the study of emerging professions in the political sphere (Webb and Kolodny, 2006). 
Empirical data and alternative theoretical frameworks need to be drawn into the field 
to contest the idea that professionalization of communication in the political sphere is 
not only related to external professionals but also in-house experts are key in the 
European context. 
2.2 Neo-institutional approaches to the profession of political public 
relations 
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This section explores neo-institutional approaches to profession and 
professionalization. The aim is to provide a theoretical basis to reconceptualise 
political public relations or spin doctors as a profession. The following sections argue 
neo-institutional theory on professions offers an adequate framework to systematically 
investigate political public relations as a profession and, at the same time, to engage 
critically with the main shortcomings of the literature. 
The main issue with the academic literature is that there is not rich empirical data to 
explain how spin doctors, or political public relations practitioners, exist in different 
political and media systems but with similar characteristics (see Chapter 1). The main 
argument is that the use of the neo-institutional framework (Suddaby and Viale, 2011) 
will contribute to overcoming this gap in the existing academic studies. This thesis 
approaches political PR practitioners as a professional group as the way to offer a 
systematic analysis that explains the characteristics and features of these practitioners 
in different contexts. I aim to put forward an explanatory framework based on neo-
institutional approaches to professions. 
Neo-institutional theories on professions are significant and relevant for this thesis 
because they propose a redefinition of the traditional concept of profession. This new 
concept of profession is adequate to explore political public relations because it breaks 
with fixed notions of what elements should comprise a profession. Political public 
relations does not possess the traditional and characteristic elements of professions: 
trade bodies, codes of ethics, nor certified knowledge. Neo-institutional theories on 
professions are also adequate because they recognise the role of contexts and 
individual practitioners as active agents and constitutive elements of a profession. In 
that sense, neo-institutional theories provide a convenient framework to explore the 
impact that media systems have on political public relations.  
2.2.1  Profession, professionalization and professionalism 
The sociology of professions is an academic field that explores three inter-related 
concepts: professions, professionalization and professionalism (Macdonald, 1995; 
Empson, 2007). These three concepts help to explain the different theoretical 
frameworks that operate in the field: functionalist (Wilensky, 1964), power approach 
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(Freidson, 1986), and neo-institutional (Schinkel and Noordegraaf, 2011). The basic 
unit of analysis within the sociology of profession is the group of workers who are 
socially-recognised as a profession (Empson, 2007). The concept of 
professionalization explores how groups of workers become recognised as a 
profession (Freidson, 1999). Professionalism is the system of values and identities that 
supports professions (Evetts, 2013). It encompasses those norms, beliefs, and identities 
that define who is a professional or who acts professionally (Evetts, 2003).  
There are three main paradigms in the sociology of professions that define professions, 
professionalism and professionalization: trait or functionalist paradigms (Durkheim, 
1957; Wilensky, 1964); knowledge or power approaches (Larson, 1979; Freidson, 
1983); and neo-institutional or hybrid approaches (Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca, 
2011; Schinkel and Noordegraaf, 2011). Professions go from being defined as sets of 
norms in functionalist approaches, to socially-constructed elements to achieve power 
and social closure in power approaches, to the latest stage where professions seek new 
forms of survival in service-based economies (Svarc, 2015) and are seen as a hybrid 
(Noordegraaf, 2007). From a trait perspective, professionalization can only happen 
when occupations establish formal training schools, create professional associations 
and adopt a formal code of ethics to regulate practices (Wilensky, 1964). In opposition, 
power approaches defined professionalization as the power to create monopolitistic 
barriers of access to the occupation and gain autonomy from the state to articulate their 
own norms (Freidson, 1986). Finally, neo-institutionalists integrate the two previous 
approaches, recognizing that processes of professionalization have some stable and 
defined traits, but that these are socially-constructed through shared practices and not 
necessarily related to autonomy and monopolistic barriers.  
Functionalist approaches describe the ‘classic professional’ (Wilensky, 1964; Parsons, 
1968; Mayhew, 1997). Workers act professional –professionalism- when they adhere 
themselves to an externally-defined value system that regulates their actions, identities 
and behaviors as a guarantee of a good public service (Durkheim, 1957). From a power 
approach, the professional is someone who uses a scientific body of knowledge and 
gained experience under pre-defined competences –i.e. teachers teach- to offer 
solutions. This scientific knowledge and experience determine and guarantee the 
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quality of the service provided (Freidson, 1986). Neo-institutional approaches argue 
professionalism is nowadays used to guarantee economic success (Schinkel and 
Noordegraaf, 2011). Professionalism is no longer a supreme rule that guarantees a 
moral social order as claimed by functionalists (Parsons, 1968). Professionalism is 
seen as a discursive resource that shapes workers’ behaviours (Fournier, 1999; Bévort 
and Suddaby, 2015). The following section explores in detail this figure of the new 
professional described by neo-institutionalist and the core principles of this theoretical 
framework. 
2.2.2 Professions as embedded institutional actors 
Neo-institutional theory offers an adequate framework to study political public 
relations practitioners for two reasons. The first reason is because the theory provides 
a more flexible definition of profession as a concept. Neo-institutional theory situates 
practitioners’ actions, identities and relationships as constituents of one institution –a 
profession- embedded in a large eco-system. The second reason is because the theory 
explains the relationship and mechanisms of influence between professions and the 
large context in which they operate. Therefore, neo-institutional theory on professions 
offers a framework to understand the role that political public relations practitioners 
play in the political and media system. The argument unfolds as follows. 
As the label indicates, neo-institutional theories on professions use neo-institutional 
theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) to explore professions, professionals and 
processes of professionalization. Neo-institutionalism is a social theory that aims to 
explain organizations – including schools, business, and political institutions-  from 
their origins to the mechanisms that allow their existence and reproduction in society 
(Scott, 1995). Institutions or organizations cannot be understood as supreme and 
isolated elements that order social life. Neo-institutional theory argues institutions 
derive from the interactions between the internal actors of the institution, the institution 
and the context (Scott, 1995). Amongst the different approaches to neo-
institutionalism –normative, historical, rational choice, constructivists (Hay, 2009)- 
constructivist approaches are the dominant ones in the sociology of professions 
(Suddaby and Muzio, 2015). 
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Sociologists who study professions use this neo-institutional framework to argue 
professions are social and dynamic institutions or institutional fields with 
distinguishable structures (Abbott, 1988; Fourcade, 2006; Suddaby and Viale, 2011). 
Neo-institutionalism theory places professions as socially-constructed institutions 
struggling to survive in larger eco-systems (Abbott, 1988; Brock and Saks, 2015). 
Professions are institutions, but no longer constituted by stable and fixed norms as 
classic sociologists argued. The structures that constitute professions are dynamic and 
derive from the interactions between the internal actors of the institution, the institution 
and the context (Scott, 1995). Professions are seen as interconnected institutions trying 
to survive in a large ecological system (Suddaby & Muzio, 2015). Abbott (1988) 
explains that professions define their place in society by claiming specific areas of 
expertise to be their ‘own’ in opposition to other occupations, filling the gaps left by 
others in a large eco-system. 
 The concept of profession becomes dynamic in the sense that is open to new 
interpretations. As a dynamic social institution, the content of profession is defined in 
each case by ‘groups with common work’ that apply a series of skills and abstract 
knowledge to a specific area that is claimed to be exclusive (Abbott, 1988). As Abbott 
(1988) states, professions choose the areas in which they want to achieve full control 
of their activities. It might be, for example, to control academic certification in some 
professions, or basic practice norms in others. This idea is key to incorporate under the 
umbrella ‘profession’ new groups of workers, such as political public relations 
practitioners, that until now remained out of this category. Neo-institutionalists see the 
emergence of a new hybrid model of professionals in Western societies (Noordegraaf, 
2007; Muzio et al., 2011; Svarc, 2015). The concept of hybrid professional refers 
mostly to changes in professionalism that are the new focus of study for these neo-
institutionalists. 
2.2.3  New professionals and hybrid professionalism 
Neo-institutionalism in the sociology of professions has moved the focus of attention 
from the elements that indicated the existence of a profession to the elements that 
maintain and reproduce professions. Researchers are no longer interested in examining 
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different pathways to becoming a profession or to achieving power in certain areas. 
They are interested in how professions manage to survive in larger eco-systems 
(Fournier, 2000; Thornton, 2002; Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca, 2011; Suddaby and 
Viale, 2011; Faulconbridge and Muzio, 2012; Bévort and Suddaby, 2015). The 
elements of survival are found in professionalism (Noordegraaf, 2007; Schinkel and 
Noordegraaf, 2011).  Professionalism –i.e. behaving in a professional manner- is seen 
as the core structure that sustains professions in a context where neo-liberal economic 
policies restrict previous models of professionalization (Svarc, 2015); from this, a new 
hybrid professional emerges.  
One of the main critiques to neo-institutionalism is its obsession with structures and 
the marginalization of actors and agency within it (Empson, 2007). In one of the 
founding texts of neo-institutionalism, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) described how 
professions interacted with their context by imitating practices of other competitors 
and, therefore, becoming similar in a process of isomorphism. Similarly, Scott (1995), 
one of the fathers of neo-institutionalism, identified how professions, as institutions, 
create strong cognitive frameworks and systems of belief to survive in the larger eco-
system. Nevertheless, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) overlooked the role that individual 
practitioners play in these structures. Neo-institutionalists in the sociology of 
professions bring the focus back to individual actors (Noordegraaf, 2007; Lawrence, 
Suddaby and Leca, 2011; Muzio et al., 2011). In this process of survival, individual 
actors –in this case, professionals- have the capacity to ‘create, maintain and disrupt 
institutions’ (Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca, 2011, p. 215).   
One of the most interesting elements of neo-institutional theory is the figure of the 
hybrid professional and its hybrid professionalism. Recent studies point out the 
disappearance of the knowledge-based process of professionalization (Thornton, 
2002; Muzio et al., 2011; Bévort and Suddaby, 2015). In other words, there are 
professions that no longer seek to create a scientific and certified body of knowledge, 
and they no longer create structures such as trade bodies to act autonomously from the 
state or other powers. Professionalization is then ‘no mere matter of step-by-step 
strengthening of professional control in specific occupational domains—it has become 
a matter of contradictory and controversial attempts to get a grip on occupational 
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control’ (Noordegraaf, 2007 p.764). These studies point out that the classic model of 
professions can hardly be reproduced nowadays. Professions cannot establish strong 
boundaries because they operate in networked societies where work flexibility is the 
new rule (Fournier, 2000; Kirpal and Brown, 2007). Nor can they create strong 
professional associations to regulate practices because regulation does not fit in 
neoliberal economies (Evetts, 2003). 
Neo-institutional scholars then realise that professionalism, or being professional, is 
the core-centre of a series of new professions. Professionalism is presented as ‘the 
occupational behaviours and practices of workers who not only have full-time jobs but 
also possess a clear sense of what their work is about and when it is effective’ (Schinkel 
& Noordegraaf, 2011 p.68). The idea of profession maintains or gives significance to 
these self-identities. Professionalism is thus the social capital of professions (Schinkel 
and Noordegraaf, 2011).The focus then moves to practitioners and their way of 
behaving professionally. Lawrence et al. (2001) define this new focus as institutional 
work. They argue ‘the study of institutional work focuses on situated practices of 
actors reflexively engaged with the institutions that surround (penetrate) them’ 
(Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca, 2011, p. 56). Professional identity is understood as ‘the 
constellation of attributes, beliefs, values, motives, and experiences in terms of which 
people define themselves in a professional role’ (Schein, 1978 in Ibarra et al., 1999, 
p.764). Therefore, studying actors and professionalism is also studying institutions and 
their contexts because they are all mutually constitutive. This conceptualization of 
professionalism opens the door to combine micro- and macro-levels of analysis.  
In this new focus towards professionalism, scholars identify a change towards a 
dominant market logic in professionalism (Thornton, 2002). Professions need to be 
actively engaged with the market to survive: they need to generate economic benefit 
more than generate something good for society (Muzio et al., 2011). The new hybrid 
professionalism is constituted by ‘values and skills, such as creativity, multitasking, 
artistic talent, intuition and expression, orientation to the social economy and the need 
for clients’ (Svarc, 2015 p.402). Being professional is being efficient, and that is 
satisfying the client and generating income. New professions sell to their clients not 
their capacity to apply a scientific body of knowledge to specific problems, but their 
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expertise and creativity in finding new solutions to their problems (Noordegraaf, 2007; 
Svarc, 2015). This portrait of the new professional or hybrid professional might be 
closer to that of political public relations practitioners. Political public relations 
practitioners do not have a scientific body of knowledge like doctors or nurses; rather, 
they have their experiences and capacity to fulfil the communicative needs of parties. 
These experiences and capacities derive and depend on the larger eco-system in which 
they operate. 
Professions cannot be explained as isolated phenomena: they are embbeded in specific 
political and social contexts at the nation or state level (Fournier, 1999; Witz, 2003). 
In addition, professions also interact and respond to a globalized sphere (Fourcade, 
2006).  From a neo-institutional perspective, professions as institutions are part of 
‘interacting system, an ecology’ (1988, p.33) where larger social forces affect 
individual professions ‘through their structure within which professions exist’ (Abbott, 
1988 p.33). In the case of political public relations, the two most relevant structures 
are the political and media systems. Their eco-system is the relationship between the 
political and the media spheres.  
2.3 Professions, media systems and sub-state nations 
This section outlines a theoretical framework to examine the relationship between 
political public relations and media systems in sub-state nations from a comparative 
perspective. To do so, I use Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) conceptual framework to 
compare media systems. I define four key elements to understand the political public 
relations’ eco-system. These four elements are: political parallelism, or the nature of 
links between parties and media; development of political public relations 
professionalism (the original category was journalistic professionalism); structure of 
media markets, including social and online media; and the degree and characteristics 
of sub-state intervention on media policies and public broadcasting (the original 
category referred to state intervention). This reconceptualization of the theory of media 
systems incorporates two new elements: the profession of political public relations and 
sub-state nations.  
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As explained in Chapter 1, one of the main limitations of previous studies on political 
public relations practitioners, or spin doctors, is that they overlook the context where 
these practitioners operate despite the evidence that they exist in different countries 
(Sumpter and Tankard, 1994; Stockwell, 2007; Quinn, 2012). Comparative studies on 
political communication and media systems usually ignore political public relations 
practitioners as significant actors in the media sphere (J. G. Blumler and Gurevitch, 
1995; van Kempen, 2007; Aalberg, van Aelst and Curran, 2010).  In addition, these 
comparative studies of political communication and media systems tend to ignore sub-
state nations as contexts of study (Mihelj, 2012; Fernández-Quijada and Sellas, 2013). 
2.3.1 The relationship between the media and the political spheres 
The basic characteristic of political public relations is that it is situated in the interplay 
between the political and the media spheres (Frenkel-Faran and Lehman-Wilzig, 2007; 
McNair, 2011). The term ‘media systems’ in its most strict sense refers to a collection 
of organisations and structures that take part in the process of mass communication 
(Snczyk, 2009; McQuail 1995). However, within the context of political 
communication studies –and also in this research- it is used as a reference to the 
interaction between the political and the media systems (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). It 
is the case that political communication scholars have invested in comparative 
approaches of media systems because they are interested in ‘the effects of different 
ways of controlling the mass media politically’ (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1995 p.61). 
These frameworks seem to be a good starting point to begin exploring the relationship 
between political public relations and their eco-system.  
Different perspectives have emerged in this area. From a normative and functionalist 
perspective, the classic Four Theories of the Press (Siesbert, Peterson and Schramm, 
1956) argues that media systems’ political organization and functions are determined 
by the governing principles and structures of the societies in which they operate. 
Siesbert et al. (1956) described states where the press was entirely controled by the 
government (Soviet); where the press was subject to political scrutiny and government 
licensing (authoritarian); where the operating principle was freedom of speech 
(libertarian); and states where the press was used to promote beneficial political issues 
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(social responsibility). These models have been strongly criticised for the lack of 
elements that actually analyse the relationship between the economical forces and 
media structures (Nerone, 1995), and for not acknowledging variances within national 
systems (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1995) and being ethno-centric (Curran and Park, 
2000). 
Political communication studies in this area have looked at the effects that the 
interaction between the media and the political system have on audience orientation 
towards politics (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1995; van Kempen, 2007); characteristics of 
the production and communication of political messages (Pfetsch, 2013); and the 
content of news media (Aalberg, van Aelst and Curran, 2010). However, the most 
important development in this area of study was the publication of Hallin and 
Mancini’s theory of media system models (McQuail, 2005; Hardy, 2012; Humphreys, 
2012). Hallin and Mancini (2004) examine the interaction between the media and the 
political systems because of their effect on wider democratic politics; to that point, 
their approach includes not only media-centred perspectives. One of the strengths of 
Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) theory of media systems is that they have incorporated 
critiques to their theory in posterior reformulations of it (Mancini, 2013; Mancini, 
2012, 2015; Mancini & Hallin, 2012). 
The aim of the theory of media systems is to explore the political role of news media 
and its relationship to democratic politics (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). From their point 
of view, the relationship between media and political systems is articulated according 
to four dimensions: political parallelism, professionalization of media-related 
occupations, development of media markets and state intervention. Building from an 
empirical analysis of 18 countries, they outline three different models – North Atlantic, 
Liberal and Polarized Pluralist –  on the basis of four dimensions: development of 
media markets, political parallelism, journalistic professionalism and state 
intervention in the media system. Following these models, Catalonia –as part of Spain 
or as a Mediterranean nation- is classified as a Polarized Pluralist model and Scotland 
–as part of the UK- belongs to the Liberal model. Countries belonging to the Liberal 
model are characterised by an early development of commercial newspapers, little 
state intervention in media policies, strong journalistic professionalism, and 
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politically-neutral public broadcast systems. By contrast, in Polarized Pluralist models, 
there are higher levels of political parallelism; stronger state intervention in media 
policies; politically-controlled public broadcast systems; and a weaker development 
of commercial press (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). 
They argue the relationship between news media and political powers depends on the 
degree of mass circulation and the commercial orientation of newspapers. Newspapers 
oriented towards generating massive sales with a wide-range of targeted products tend 
to be less involved in the political game because their goal is to satisfy readers’ needs 
more than politicians. Political parallelism refers to the different degrees to which 
news media have distinct political orientations within the political system –referred as 
the party system. The ideological distribution of political parties within a system 
influences the degree of ideological and structural dependency of news media over the 
political system (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). 
There are many levels of analysis in Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) theory of media 
system models: they outline three different models of media systems in Europe -North 
Atlantic, Liberal and Polarized Pluralist; they analyse the historical development of 
news media and journalism; and they examine the different patterns of political 
systems in Europe. However, for the purposes of this thesis, the most important 
element is the framework they propose to compare media systems. This framework 
offers a systematic approach (with some limitations - see the following sections) to 
explore the relationship between the political and the media spheres and, therefore, the 
eco-system where political public relations operate.  
2.3.2 Incorporating political public relations into media systems 
The theory of media system models has received numerous critiques and contributions 
since its publication (de Albuquerque, 2011; Hardy, 2012; Humphreys, 2012; Norris, 
2013; Pfetsch, 2013; Brüggemann et al., 2014). However, none of these critiques point 
to the fact that the dimension of professionalization is only applied to journalists and 
not to other communication-related actors such as political public relations. Spin 
doctors or political public relations practitioners are absent from the conceptual 
framework outlined by Hallin and Mancini. The theory of media system models not 
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only overlooks political public relations but their conceptualization of professionalism 
and professionalization need to be revisited. 
Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) conceptualization of the relationship between journalistic 
professionalism and political parallelism is useful to start conceptualizing the role that 
political public relations might have in media systems. The two scholars refer only to 
the professionalization and professionalism of journalists, leaving the door open to 
raise similar questions ‘about other kinds of media professionals’ (Hallin & Mancini, 
2004 p.34). Hallin and Mancini (2004) argue that the degree of professionalization of 
journalists reflects the closeness or separation between the political and media 
systems. The more journalists are professionally autonomous, the less political powers 
can interfere in news media. Journalists are less professionalised when ‘political 
parallelism is very high, with media organizations strongly tied to political 
organizations, and journalists deeply involved in party politics’ (Hallin & Mancini, 
2004 p.38). 
Their understanding of professionalism and professionalization falls into a very 
limited view of professions and privileges a liberal model of journalism (Hardy, 2012). 
The degree of professionalization in this case refers to the capacity of journalism as an 
institution to remain autonomous from political and economic powers. Journalists 
achieve higher levels of professionalization and autonomy when ‘authority over 
journalists is exercised primarily by fellow journalists’ (Hallin & Mancini, 2004 p.35). 
Journalists become professionals when they have distinct professional norms that 
respond to their collective interests and respond to altruistic principles.  
As neo-institutionalists point out, professions aim to achieve complete autonomy from 
other powers, and doing so while in constant exchange with their surrounding 
institutions (Abbott, 1988; Schinkel and Noordegraaf, 2011). In this constant 
exchange, professions develop mechanisms to keep their role, place and legitimacy in 
the larger eco-system. Therefore, Hallin and Mancini (2004) miss one element in their 
analysis: mechanisms for maintenance and reproduction of a profession in a larger 
eco-system. Hallin and Mancini (2004) fail to identify that there are other actors in the 
relationship between politicians and journalists such as political PR practitioners.  
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Pfetsch (2013) criticised Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) approach because they do not 
account for the subjective dimension of the actors that are involved in the relationship 
between media and political systems. Certainly, the conceptual framework, even 
though it claims to examine subjective dimensions such as professionalism (Evetts, 
2013), does not capture micro-level dynamics between different actors. Despite these 
limitations, Hallin and Mancini’s framework is a good starting point for the purposes 
of this thesis.  If the characteristics of the relationship between political and media 
powers have a direct impact on journalists, it might be the case that similar parallelisms 
can be drawn to political public relations. Are political public relations different in 
contexts where there is a higher level of interventionism from political powers in news 
media?  
2.4 Sub-state nations in the conceptual framework of comparative media 
systems 
The theory of media system models is designed for the analysis of nation-states 
(Brüggemann et al., 2014).  However, Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) conceptual 
framework can be adapted to explore media systems in sub-state nations. To do so, I 
incorporate three analytical concepts: the decentralization of powers and media 
policies (Humphreys, 2012) as part of the role of the state category; the characteristics 
of the nation-building process (Keating, 1996); and the dynamics between the national 
and the state-wide media markets (Chakravartty and Roy, 2013) as part of the structure 
of media markets category.  These three elements can be used to strengthen Hallin and 
Mancini’s conceptual framework, along with the above reformulation of 
professionalism. 
The basic assumption of Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) conceptual framework is that 
each nation-state has a single and integrated media system. This assumption is not 
limited to Hallin and Mancini but dominates most of comparative studies in political 
communication (Hepp and Couldry, 2009). Ignoring sub-state media systems has two 
main consequences for Hallin and Mancini’s theory: they fail to acknowledge that 
media systems are no longer limited to the political boundaries of states (Chadwick, 
2013); and that the decentralization, or not, of media policies (Humphreys, 2012) is an 
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important element in the relationship between political powers and the media sphere.  
The bias against sub-state nations can be observed when Hallin and Mancini (2004) 
only note that some countries are not homogenous and they ‘characterized by regional 
variations in both media and political systems: the media in Quebec and Catalonia are 
distinct in a number of ways from the media in the rest of Canada or Spain’ (Hallin & 
Mancini, 2004 p. 71).  
In a latter revision of their work, they keep affirming that regional differences in terms 
of media structures, such as regional televisions in Germany or Spain, are ‘important 
to understand those cases, but less relevant to others we were considering’ (Hallin & 
Mancini, 2012 p.212). However, it is not a matter of mere regional variations, but that 
sub-state nations such as Scotland and Catalonia have their own media system 
(Schlesinger & Benchimol, 2014) that co-exists with state-wide media systems. 
Previous critiques to Hallin and Mancini’s conceptual framework criticised the lack of 
acknowledgement of sub-state nations and their media systems as part of plural and 
complex states (McQuail, 2005; Remington, 2006; Hardy, 2012; Humphreys, 2012; 
Chakravartty and Roy, 2013). I build on from these critiques to incorporate three new 
elements to Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) conceptual framework: decentralization of 
powers and media policies; new media; and nation-building projects. 
2.4.1 Decentralization of powers and media policies 
Decentralization of powers, and especially of media policies, should be included in 
Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) conceptual framework. Previous critiques to Hallin and 
Mancini’s analytical categories pointed out they should include in their comparative 
framework the categories of ‘Ethnic/Linguistic Structures (homogeneous, 
regionalised, sub-state nationalism)’ and ‘Majoritarian or Consensual on 
Federal/Unitary Dimension (unitary, decentralised, federal)’ to acknowledge the 
existence of sub-state nations (Humphreys, 2006 p.165). While this is a good starting 
point, this proposal has some limitations. The concept of ethnic/linguistic structures is 
problematic because the mere existence of ethnic or linguistic diversity does not 
indicate the existence of sub-state nations. Sub-state nations are characterised by 
having distinct political claims and constitutional aspirations (Keating, 1996; Tierney, 
2005), which might or might not be associated with ethnic or linguistic diversity. The 
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concept of a unitary dimension of the state is useful to identify the wider structure of 
the state, but it should incorporate what degree of decentralization or what powers 
operate at the sub-state level, with a special focus on media policies.   
2.4.2 New(s) media, professions and nation-building 
The other element missing in Hallin and Mancini’s analytical framework is the role 
that the media plays in nation-building projects both at the state and sub-state level. 
One might argue that in a globalized media context with a strong influence of social 
media and online news media, national boundaries are no longer a relevant category 
to explore media systems (Hepp and Couldry, 2009; Hardy, 2012). Nowadays, 
political public relations opperate in a similar media-saturated system dominated by 
technological expansion and a 24/7 news cycle (Stromback and Van Aelst, 2013).  
There is a transnational context related to the phenomena of mediatization of politics, 
understood as the adoption of media logics in political organizations, that affects the 
political public relations occupation (Stromback, 2008). Professions interact with 
transnational contexts –and start processes of internationalization- at the moment when 
the structures of the institutions that surround the profession, along with political and 
social contexts, are reproduced on an international scale (Fourcade, 2006). 
Nevertheless, both public and private media are still rooted in specific visions of 
nationhood despite the emergence of transnational news platforms such as google 
news (Flew and Waisbord, 2015).   
Hallin and Mancini only observe that media markets have a series of aims, such as ‘the 
maintenance of national language and culture’ (Hallin & Mancini, 2004 p.84).  
However, the maintenance of national language and culture is in itself a project of 
nation-building (Keating, 2008). This nation-building dimension seems to be a 
relevant dimension that might play a role in the relationship between political powers 
and the media in any level of politics. Without this dimension, it cannot be explained 
why Catalonia created its own communicative space and public broadcaster (Guimera 
and Fernandez, 2014) while Scotland continues to use the BBC’s structure and has no 
competences over media policies (Keating, 2010).  
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2.4.3 Revisiting the features of political parallelism 
Political parallelism is the analytical concept that explores how political parties or 
governments and the media (traditional and online) align themselves according to 
similar political, ideological or cultural views (Mancini, 2012; Ciaglia, 2013; Artero, 
2014). It is argued here the concept of political parallelism is a key element to explore 
the role that political public relations play in media systems. This concept is also key 
to understanding the similarities and differences between the Scottish and Catalan 
media systems (see Chapter 3). However, Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) original 
definition of the term and its features have some limitations. Their definition did not 
include online media and televisions. Their definition of political parallelism also 
implies that Southern European cases are the deviation of an ideal model represented 
by Anglo-Saxon countries (de Albuquerque, 2013). The argument unfolds as follows. 
The concept of political parallelism offers a convenient tool to contextualise the 
strategies and tactics described by political public relations practitioners. Political 
parties and governments need to get their messages across and the media needs to 
adopt a position around current policy issues, parties’ candidacies, elections and so on 
(Artero, 2014). When these positions coincide, political parallelism occurs (Mancini, 
2012). However, for these interests to coincide, political parties and governments need 
to deploy a series of efforts, techniques and strategies, such as promoting 
consensus/disagreement around policy issues, or rewarding/ignoring supporters (de 
Albuquerque, 2013). Do political public relations practitioners, as media relations 
managers, play a role in political parallelism?  
In one of the later revisions of media systems theory, Mancini (2012) explains that 
political parallelism can be observed through: bias in the selection and treatment of 
news; journalistic political affiliations or credos; and ties between parties and 
newspapers in terms of similar views; and membership of owners or journalists in the 
same elitist circuits as politicians. In this revision, he also included online media –
missing from the first conceptual framework- as an element that contributes to political 
parallelism. Posterior redefinitions of political parallelism added to this list the 
existence of media coalitions in favour of specific policies or party (Artero, 2014) and 
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new forms of political control over broadcast governance (Ciaglia, 2013). Both 
categories seem quite relevant to explore the referendum/post-referendum scenarios in 
Catalonia and Scotland and the debates around public broadcasting in each case.  
The concept of political parallelism comes associated with certain normative views 
that make it complex to handle. Hallin and Mancini use the concept of political 
parallelism as the core axis to differentiate between low political parallelism, i.e. 
public spheres associated with the liberal model of watchdog media, and high political 
parallelism, i.e. public spheres that divert from this model (Mancini, 2012). They use 
the categories of internal and external pluralism to define the different characteristics 
of political parallelism in each public sphere. In contexts of high political parallelism, 
each news media adopts specific political views –external pluralism. Hallin and 
Mancini see high political parallelism as related to the existence of clientelistic ties 
between parties and newspapers (Hallin & Papathanassopoulos, 2002), and to political 
polarization and the social marginalisation of groups that do not fall within existing 
political cleavages. However, in low parallelism, news media do not stick to one 
political cleavage but represent an internal plurality of views: news media act as 
independent institutions that watch political powers. While Catalonia –as part of 
Spain- belongs to the first category (Humanes et al., 2013), Scotland –as part of the 
UK- is usually associated to low levels of political parallelism. Therefore, do political 
public relations play different roles depending on the features of political parallelism? 
2.5 Conclusions and research questions 
Chapter 1 demonstrated that existing studies on spin doctors and political public 
relations practitioners offer a limited image of communication experts working in 
parties and governments. There is a lack of rich empirical data. This chapter 
demonstrates that, in addition to the lack of rich empirical data, there is a lack of 
conceptual frameworks that could explain the existence of similar practitioners in 
different contexts. This chapter argues that there are gains to be made if political public 
relations practitioners are conceptualised as a professional group and examined in a 
comparative perspective, taking into consideration the wider media-political system in 
sub-state nations. These gains are as follows.  
 52 
To approach and conceptualise political PR practitioners as a professional group, this 
thesis offers a systematic and theoretical framework to explain the existence of similar 
practitioners in different contexts. Section 2.1 shows that there is a lack of relationship 
between current understandings of the professionalization of political communication 
(Mancini, 1999; Negrine et al., 2007; Strömbäck, 2009) and the emergence and 
consolidation of occupations within the political communication sphere. Neo-
institutional theory on professions (Suddaby and Viale, 2011) provides a framework 
to overcome this conceptual gap in the field of political communication. The neo-
institutional framework provides a more dynamic and flexible approach to understand 
professional groups that do not follow traditional pathways of professionalization –
namely the creation of trade bodies or codes of ethics. Professions are understood as 
dynamic social institutions constructed by their own practitioners and their 
environment (Scott, 2008). Neo-institutional theory and its subsequent application in 
the sociology of professions makes a strong case for understanding institutions –such 
as professions- and contexts as a whole (Kuhlmann, 2013): hence, the comparative 
framework proposed.  
Chapter 1 shows that there is a lack of comparative studies on communication experts 
working in political parties and governments. This chapter argues the media system 
models theory (Hallin and Mancini, 2004) can provide the conceptual basis to 
articulate a comparative study on political public relations practitioners. The main 
reason is because Hallin and Mancini (2004) offer a comprehensive framework to 
analyse the relationship between media and political systems. The relationship 
between media and political systems is the context in which political PR practitioners 
operate. This chapter also argues that there are gains in using sub-state nations as the 
contextual frame for the comparative study. Although Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) 
framework was conceived with the state as the only political unit, decentralization and 
globalization processes (Keating, 2001) bring forward other political units of analysis 
such as sub-state nations.  
The conclusion of this chapter leads to the two research questions of this thesis. The 
first one relates to the conceptualization of political PR practitioners as a profession. 
If political public relations is conceptualised as a profession, what are the constitutive 
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elements of the performance and practice of political public relations? The second one 
relates to the comparative dimension. If media and political systems are taken into 
consideration, how do media systems impact the political public relations profession? 
  
 
 CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH CONTEXT: MEDIA SYSTEMS IN SCOTLAND 
AND CATALONIA 
 
This chapter examines the relationship between the political and media systems in 
Catalonia and Scotland. The aim of the chapter is to outline the political and media 
systems where political public relations practitioners operate. Political public relations 
work for the formal institutions conforming the political sphere: political parties and 
governments. However, these professionals are situated in the interactions between the 
political and the media sphere (McNair, 2011). Therefore, both spheres or systems are 
of equal importance to understanding the profession. More generally, the chapter 
examines the most important similarities and differences between the two cases, 
paving the way for the empirical analysis provided in the next two chapters.  
The main argument of the chapter is as follows. Both Catalonia and Scotland are living 
crucial political moments that generate a fertile political landscape for political public 
relations.  Scottish and Catalan parties require strong communication efforts to put 
across their different views on the respective debates about constitutional change and 
independence at the top of  media’s day-to-day agenda (Breeze et al., 2015; Elias, 
2016). However, Catalan practitioners operate in a large pluralist and differentiated 
Catalan media market, with strong interventionist media policies (Gifreu, 2012) and 
in a political system characterized by a quasi-state structure and a pluralist polarized 
party system. Scottish practitioners operate in political system with less powers 
devolved to Holyrood and a moderate pluralist party system (Detterbeck and Hepburn, 
2010), with a tradition of non-interventionist media policies, and a media system 
where Scottish news media are gradually declining (Schlesinger and Benchimol, 2014) 
and UK-wide news media dominate the landscape.  
The analysis is driven by according to Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) theory of media 
system models and the dimensions that they created to explore the relationship 
between media and political systems. This chapter focuses on three out of the four 
dimensions of the media system model’s conceptual framework: state intervention in 
media policies (adapted to sub-state nations), political parallelism, and structure of 
media markets (including social and online media). As explained in Chapter 2, the 
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fourth dimension –professionalization of journalists- is adapted to the 
professionalization of political public relations and examined in the data analysis 
because of its central relevance to this thesis. This chapter focuses only in the 
contextual elements that are relevant to political public relations in Scotland and 
Catalonia.  
The structure of the chapter is as follows. The first section explores the characteristics 
of the sub-state political system, and the role of the sub-state in media policies. It 
explores how the different media policies relate to projects of nation-building in 
Scotland and Catalonia. The section also reflects on the impact of media policies on 
the structure of media markets in both contexts. The second section also explores 
political parallelism in the context of the independence referendum debates in Scotland 
and Catalonia. The focus is on the elements that  influence news media political 
orientation and party loyalties. I use Hallin and Mancini’s dimensions to highlight the 
differences and similarities between Catalonia and Scotland’s media systems, and not 
to test the adequacy of their three media system models –Liberal, Corporativist and 
Polarized Pluralist.  
3.1 The characteristics of the political system at the sub-state level 
This section explores the different configurations of the political system at the sub-
state level in Catalonia and Scotland. More precisely, it explores the main 
characteristics of key political actors and institutions involved in the production and 
dissemination of political communication (Mazzoleni, 2010) in the two contexts. 
The political configuration of Scotland and Catalonia is brought to the attention 
because political PR practitioners interact with and work for two key institutions of 
the political system: governments and political parties. Nevertheless, the cases of 
Scotland and Catalonia exemplify an alternative territorial and institutional 
configuration that does not correspond with the traditional conception of the nation-
state (Keating, 2001). Political PR practitioners in Scotland and Catalonia operate in a 
political system that has not only a differentiated nation-building project but also 
dedicated political institutions and its own party system (Swenden and Maddens, 
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2009). The following lines will explore these political institutions focusing on the 
models of government and party systems in Scotland and Catalonia. 
3.1.1 The model of government 
The main difference between traditional conceptions of nation-states and sub-state 
units is the multilevel dimension of their political systems. Both in Spain and the UK 
political power is not distributed in homogeneous ways neither it is centralised in one 
political institution, both countries have an asymmetrical constitutional design 
(Keating, 2001). The political system is organised in terms of 17 autonomous regions 
in Spain and 3 devolved nations in the UK with different levels of power and different 
government systems in each of them. Scotland and Catalonia have not only their 
respective parliaments but different models of government structure that are of 
relevance to the study of political public relations in these contexts. Different models 
of government and democratic authority legitimation explain some of the differences 
encountered between Catalan and Scottish practitioners working in government 
settings –see Chapter 6. While the Catalan government has the power to appoint most 
management positions inside government agencies and institutions, Scotland relies on 
a professionalised and politically impartial body of civil servants that work along few 
politically appointed special advisors. 
Scotland’s political system structure is that of a Cabinet government that follows the 
Westminster model (Keating, 2001), one parliament elected by a mixed system of 
proportional representation and first past the post, and a moderated pluralist party 
system. This political configuration was adopted after the first devolution process of 
powers from Westminster to Scotland in late 90s.  Scotland, despite its union with 
England in 1707, has remained institutionally distinct thanks to its unique education, 
justice, and religious systems (McCrone, 2001) and a distinct Scottish press 
(Schlesinger, 1998). Nowadays Scotland’s devolved powers are health, transport, local 
government, justice, agriculture, sports and arts (Scottish Parliament, 2016).  
In relation to the research project here undertaken, one of the most important 
characteristics of Scotland’s political design is the Westminster model of cabinet 
government (Birrell, 2012) . Scotland’s government structures have been associated 
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to a rational-legal authority model (Keating, 2010) where the bureaucratic apparatus 
of the state is independent from particular parties and social groups, and acts 
accordingly to clear established procedures (Guzmán, 2014). This model explains, 
amongst other factors, the fact that the figure of ‘spin doctor’ that became famous in 
late 90s in the UK (Esser, Reinemann and Fan, 2001) is reproduced in a similar way 
at the Scottish level. In the cabinet model, the prime minister and the group of cabinet 
ministers are served by body of professional and politically neutral civil servants and 
a group of politically appointed special advisors in different areas, communication 
amongst one of them (Fawcett and Gay, 2010). The special advisor in charge of 
communication is the one identified in the news media as the government’s ‘spin 
doctor’ (McNair, 2000; Schlesinger, David and Dinan, 2001). Special advisors are 
regulated by a Code of Special Advisors (Scottish Government, 2017)  that limits some 
of their tasks and roles –see Chapter 6. This model diverges from Catalonia’s 
government structure. 
Catalonia is amongst the 17 Spanish autonomous regions considered one of the 
‘historical nationalities’ because Catalonia, along with the Basc Country and Galicia, 
had lost its political institutions during Franco’s dictatorship and also, because 
Catalonia had remained a separated kingdom –The Crown of Aragon- until 1710. 
Guibernau (2004) argues Catalonia acts as a ‘quasi-state’ since the majority of powers 
are devolved to its regional parliament. Catalonia’s dedicated powers are agriculture, 
language policy, radio and television services, healthcare, urban planning, culture, 
local government, territorial organisation, education and civil law (Flores, 2013). As 
part of the political contest between Spain and Catalonia, Catalonia’s legal-authority 
model has been accused of letting particular party interests dominate policy making 
(Keating, 1996). For instance, policies have been criticised for promoting clientelism, 
specially  in relation to those considered to be essential elements of their nation-
building project such as the creation of the Catalan Broadcasting System or the system 
of public subsidies to Catalan news media (Fernandez, 2013). 
 Catalonia’s government is organised under the structure of the ‘Generalitat’ where a 
President of the Generalitat is elected by the Catalan Parliament formed through a 
system of proportional representation (Pallarés and Keating, 2003). The President of 
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the Generalitat elects its government members or ‘consellers’. The government 
executive has the power to appoint not only special advisors but most management 
level positions in government agencies, amongst those the entire government 
communication team (Marin, 2016). Unlike Scotland, civil servants in Catalonia are 
not usually found in government communication departments. Neither  is there a code 
of conduct for politically appointed special advisors. In that sense, there are no similar 
conflicts to those experienced between Alastair Campbell and UK civil servants 
working in government communication departments (McNair, 2004). 
3.1.2 Party systems in sub-state nations 
The main difference between Scotland and Catalonia’s party systems is that in 
Scotland the pro-independence issue is usually associated with centre-left parties 
(McCrone, 2001) while nowadays in Catalonia there are pro-independence parties 
ranging from centre-liberal to radical left positions (Martí and Cetrà, 2016). In both 
cases, the main political change in the first decade of the 21st century is that parties 
that had historically supported more powers being transferred to Scotland and 
Catalonia have moved their political positions to a clear support for the independence 
of both nations (Keating, 2014; Serrano, 2014). The characteristics of party systems 
are of relevance for the study of political public relations because these can help 
understand, for instance, the different patterns of mobility of professionals from one 
party to another (see Chapter 5). 
In sub-state contexts with very active projects of nation-building party systems have 
one additional characteristic: in addition to the traditional left-right political spectrum, 
parties also position themselves along the pro or more sovereign/ anti-independence 
or less self-rule positions (Andre, Depauw and Deschouwer, 2016). Because of the 
multi-level political design previously explained, parties compete at the sub-state level 
for seats in the Catalan or Scottish parliament, they compete to represent Catalan or 
Scottish voters at the respective state-wide parliaments, and they also take part in the 
European elections. In both cases the party system is constituted by a wide range of 
sub-state parties only and federal branches of state-wide parties –see Chapter 5. 
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Both Scotland and Catalonia have had a distinct party system even before their 
political institutions were formally devolved in late 90s and late 70s respectively 
(Keating, 1997). For instance, the Scottish National Party – the government party at 
the time of writing these lines- was founded in 1934 and some of Catalonia’s historical 
pro-independence parties such as Esquerra Republicana (Republican Left) were 
founded in 1931. Not only pro-independence or pro-sovereignty parties have a sub-
state agenda, in both cases federal branches of state-wide parties have adopted Catalan 
or Scottish agendas that sometimes differ from the party’s position at the state level 
(Hepburn, 2010). From a communication perspective, this sub-state agenda implies 
that all parties need to invest and create dedicated communication strategies and 
communication teams to compete in the Scottish or Catalan political arena.  
Scotland is characterized by a dominant social-democratic tendency (Keating, 2010) 
with a strong recent awakening of pro-independence support. There are two main 
parties in the pro-independence dimension: centre-left Scottish National Party –the 
government party at the moment of writing these lines-, and the more leftist and 
sometimes SNP’s ally Scottish Greens. On the anti-independence axis there are three 
federal branches of state-wide parties:  centre-left Scottish Labour, more centrist 
Scottish Liberal Party, and centre-right Scottish Conservatives. UK’s Labour party has 
been traditionally considered the model of a catch-all marketing-oriented party 
(Savigny, 2009). However, in the Scottish context some scholars relate SNP’s 
behaviour to the model of a catch-all party (Bannon and Mohrie, 2005; McTavish, 
2016). The underlying idea is that SNP uses centrist policies combined with pro-
independence stands traditionally associated to left positions to attract a wide range of 
voters. 
 Catalonia is usually classified as a moderate pluralist party system (Requejo, 2006). 
However, the last Catalan elections and political developments surrounding the 
independence debate have contributed towards a stronger polarization of Catalan 
parties on the pro-anti independence axis and the fragmentation of parties on both sides 
of the debate (Martí and Cetrà, 2016). Some of the political parties included in the 
sampling of this thesis no longer exist or they have been disintegrated in coalition 
platforms. The independence issue has become the polarization axis between Catalan 
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parties and the cause for the changes experienced in the party political system (Elias, 
2016).  The debate around Catalonia’s independence has two elements: the claim for 
an independent Catalonia, and the demand for an independence referendum. There are 
parties that support the demand for a referendum but not independence itself. The vast 
majority of state-wide parties are against independence and against the demand for a 
referendum on independence (Olivieri, 2015). 
After the last 2015 election, the Catalan parliament has three pro-independence parties 
(one liberal Convergencia, one centre-left ERC, one radical left CUP), one centre-left 
coalition party that supports the independence referendum but not independence 
(Catalunya en Comú and Iniciativa), and three anti-independence federal branches of 
state-wide parties (PSC centre-left, PP and Ciutadans centre-right). One of the major 
changes in Catalonia’s political landscape is the disappearance of CiU. CiU governed 
Catalonia for more than 20 years and supported more powers being devolved to 
Catalonia (Dowling, 2009) moved to pro-independence positions resulting in the break 
up of the party in early 2015. The remaining members of pro-independence CiU are 
nowadays part of the pro-independence coalition ‘Junts Pel Sí’ (together for Yes) with 
ERC (Republican Left Party) that won the 2015 Catalan elections. CiU was considered 
the catch-all political marketing-oriented party of the Catalan landscape (Madí, 2007). 
It remains to be seen whether the remaining members of the party in the large coalition 
Junts Pel Sí would adopt some of these communication and strategy approaches.  
3.2 Media policies in the context of self-governing institutions and nation-
building projects 
This section explores how the characteristics of Catalonia and Scotland as sub-state 
nations relate to different media policies and eventually different media markets. This 
dimension of the relationship between political and media systems explores the 
attempts of formal political institutions –governments and parliaments- to intervene in 
the media sphere. As such, this dimension outlines the institutional framework of the 
media and politics relationship in which political public relations operate. It is 
important to draw a comparative analysis of the role of the state in media policies 
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because ‘there are considerable differences in the extent of state intervention as well 
as in the forms it takes’ (Hallin & Mancini, 2004 p.41).  
As explained in Chapter 2, Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) conceptual framework was 
originally designed and applied to nation-states or to plurinational countries, like the 
UK and Spain, while ignoring territorial diversity within these cases (Humphreys, 
2012). This section brings the analysis to the sub-state level of intervention on media 
policies. In order to do so, the analysis incorporates two elements characteristic of sub-
state nations (Ghai, 2013): features of the nation-building project and the degree of de-
centralised state powers. The features of the nation-building project refer to those 
symbolic and identity elements that constitute Catalonia or Scotland as distinct polities 
(Bechhofer and McCrone, 2009). The analysis of this section also examines the degree 
of power that Scotland and Catalonia have claimed and received from Spain and the 
UK in terms of media policies. The final part of this section links these two elements 
with a general overview of the structure of media markets in Scotland and Catalonia.  
According to Hallin and Mancini (2004) there are three main forms of state 
intervention on media policies: public broadcasting, press subsidies and media content 
regulations. The following examines each of these elements in Catalonia and Scotland.  
3.2.1 The relevance of nation-building strategies in the media system 
There are elements that indicate that Scotland’s nation-building project does not 
operate the same way as Catalonia’s identity and devolved statehood dimensions. 
While in Catalonia the Catalan and the Spanish identity have been in constant conflict 
and understood as incompatible national projects (Guibernau, 2013), Scottish identity 
is understood as less conflictive and sometimes compatible with British identity 
(Mccrone, 2001). 
Guibernau (2004) argues Catalonia acts as a ‘quasi-state’ since its devolved powers 
include the right to introduce socio-cultural policies aimed at regenerating the Catalan 
nation’ (2004, p.75). Catalonia is one of Spain’s 17 Autonomous Communities. 
However, the main difference between Catalonia and other Autonomous Communities 
in Spain is, as Guibernau points out, the existence of a Catalan nation-building project. 
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Garcia (2013) demonstrated in his study of Catalan governmental communication 
strategy that ‘Catalan governments have made intensive use of mass media campaigns 
and other soft power methods to enhance Catalan identity’ (García, 2013 p.558). 
Therefore, there are elements to affirm that media plays an important role in 
Catalonia’s nation-building project.  
 Successive Catalan governments used these devolved powers on culture, education 
and media as the keystone of the Catalan nation-building project (Keating, 1996; 
Guimerà and Fernández, 2014; Cetrà, 2016). Catalonia’s nation-building project is 
based on the existence of a separated Catalan language, the historic memory of 
independence and the development of a strong industrialization process (Keating, 
1996). As part of their nation-building project, Catalonia created: a Catalan-based 
education system (Clots-Figueras and Masella, 2013); cultural policies aimed at 
promoting Catalan-language and Catalan-based cultural productions (Villarroya, 
2012); and a Catalan communicative or media sphere with a Catalan public 
broadcaster and Catalan-based news media (Guimerà and Fernández, 2014). Strategies 
of Catalan nation-building have been identified in other areas such as sports (Xifra, 
2009) and art (Johnson and Cester, 2015). 
One of the main explanations for the centrality of media and cultural policies in 
Catalonia is the clash between this project of Catalan nation-building and Spain’s own 
nation-building project (Guibernau, 2013). This clash between the two nation-building 
projects is key to understanding some of the differences between Scotland and 
Catalonia. Some comparative studies between Scotland and Catalonia point out that 
‘the ruling class never wanted to identify United Kingdom with England whereas in 
Spain there was a clear identification between Spain and Castilla [old Spanish-
speaking kingdom]’1 (Solano, 2007:66). Spain’s nation-building project has 
historically questioned, and still questions nowadays, the legitimacy of Catalonia’s 
                                                 
1 The old kingdom of Castilla comprised the Spanish-speaking central territories of the Iberian 
Peninsula. Catalonia as well as Valencia and Aragon were part of the Catalan-speaking Kingdom of 
Aragon. The two kingdoms signed a declaration of union in 1469 but their respective self-governing 
institutions remained independent until 1713 in the aftermath of a succession civil war. Castilla 
represents the backbone of the Spanish nation-building project. Spain’s unification process was a 
‘process of incorporation into an essentially Castilian state and law’ (Keating, 2001, p. 41) 
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separated identity (Guibernau, 2013). For instance, in 2012 the Spanish Constitutional 
Court declared Catalonia’s recently-approved new home rule (Statute of Autonomy) 
illegal. Prior to this court ruling, the Spanish conservative party –Partido Popular- had 
promoted a signature campaign against Catalonia’s new Stature of Autonomy and a 
boycott campaign of Catalan products. As explained in the following section, this 
tension between the two nation-building projects has escalated over the past few years 
with the emergence of the independence movement and the institutional conflict 
around the independence referendum (Martí and Cetrà, 2016).  
There are no strong language or religious elements in Scotland’s differentiation 
process, but instead ‘a historic and institutional frame and a focus of identity for the 
construction and reconstruction of a spatially focused political community’ (Keating, 
2009 p.vi). Scotland’s nation-building project is based on the idea of an autonomous 
civil society with its own institutions, myths and historical memories. However, these 
distinct institutions are not as strongly focused on the media sphere as the Catalan 
project is.  
Scottish identity was not overtly contested by UK’s nation-building project but 
relegated to ‘the non-political spheres of sport, culture, and religion’ (Keating, 2009 
p.1). This coexistence of both nation-building projects might be related to the fact that 
Scotland has not generated as many cultural and media policies as Catalonia did. For 
instance, in areas that could be considered as essential in the nation-building project, 
such as film and cultural production, the Scottish Government ‘does not to be seen as 
overly interventionist’ (Munro, 2015 p. 279) and their funding policies remain vague 
and undefined. The majority of media policies remain in Westminster hands. The post-
independence referendum seems to be changing this scenario (Keating, 2014) and, as 
explained in the following section, some media powers are being transferred to 
Scotland. Nevertheless, these media powers are still limited compared to those of 
Catalonia.  
3.2.2 Interventionist media policies in Catalonia 
One of the most significant differences between Catalonia and Scotland’s media 
system is the degree of sub-state intervention in media policies. Catalonia has powers 
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over broadcast control and regulation, language policies and public subsidies to private 
news media (Guimerà and Fernández, 2014). These powers have been used to: create 
their own separated Catalan Public Broadcaster (CCMA); their own system of public 
subsidies to private news media; their own news agency (Agència Catalana de 
Notícies); and the creation of the Catalan Audiovisual Council (CAC), a regulatory 
body in charge of monitoring service quality of Catalan broadcasters. Policy-makers 
used these tools to create what they called the Catalan Communicative Space that 
aimed to promote national identity, increase home cultural production and promote the 
Catalan language in media products (Prado, 2014). The idea of the Catalan 
Communicative Space exemplifies a strong interventionist tradition and a strong 
relationship between Catalonia’s intervention in media policies and their nation-
building project.  
Catalonia’s interventionist attitude over media policies can be observed in their system 
of public subsidies to private news media. Spain transferred to almost all Autonomous 
Communities the power to create and establish public subsidies for private news media 
after their integration in the European Union (Fernandez Alonso and Blasco Gil, 
2014). These public subsidies can be found in almost all levels of government inside 
Autonomous Communities. Consequently, autonomous governments, sub-regional 
entities such as Diputaciones, and local councils can allocate public funds to be 
distributed to private news media based on their discretional criteria (Fernandez and 
Blasco Gil, 2005).  
These public subsidies are of special relevance in Catalonia because Catalonia is the 
Spanish Autonomy that spends the highest amounts on public subsidies to news media 
(Fernandez Alonso and Blasco Gil, 2014), and these funds are used as part of their 
nation-building project (Garcia, 2010). For instance, successive Catalan governments 
allocated funds to promote Catalan-language publications, to facilitate the process of 
digital migration, or simply as an emergency fund during the hardest periods of the 
economic crisis. Recent research has found that there are almost no impartial actors 
playing a role in the distribution of public subsidies to news media in Catalonia 
(Fernandez Alonso and Blasco Gil, 2014). Garcia (2010) argues that the Catalan 
Government uses the allocation of subsidies to control private media in order to 
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promote a nationalist agenda. However, any party in local governments or regional 
institutions can access these subsidies, not just nationalist parties. 
3.2.2.1 Public broadcasting in Catalonia 
Catalonia and Scotland differ strongly in their public broadcast structures. While 
Catalonia’s public broadcast system has six exclusive television channels and four 
radio stations (CCMA, 2015), Scotland is dependent on dedicated BBC channels and 
radio stations. In addition, the model of governance of Catalonia’s public broadcaster 
allows for a higher degree of political interference (Fernandez and Fernandez, 2012) 
than the UK’s model.  
Catalonia’s nation-building project is linked to its public broadcast structure because 
successive Catalan governments regarded the creation of their own public broadcast 
system, separate from Spain, as a tool to guarantee the ‘survival’ of their own language 
and identity (Guimerà and Fernández, 2014). For instance, the Catalan public 
broadcaster (CCMA) not only reports in Catalan but it also offers ‘ a Catalan view of 
the world’ (CCMA, 2015 p.17) with extensive international news coverage. Regional 
public broadcasting powers were initially conceded to the Basque Country and 
Catalonia during the democratic transition and were later extended to all 17 
autonomous communities in Spain (Fernández et al., 2011). Nevertheless, since its 
creation, the Catalan public broadcaster has generated heated political debates around 
its legitimacy (Terribas, 1994; Garcia, 2010; Guimerà and Fernández, 2014). 
Nowadays, because of the current independence debate, the political debate around 
Catalonia’s public broadcaster is focused on the supposedly pro-independence and 
pro-nationalist bias of its content (Durán, 2015).  
Catalonia’s public broadcast governance system corresponds with what Hallin and 
Mancini (2004) describe as the ‘government model’. In this model, control over the 
broadcast system is in hands of the parliament, and eventually of the party that has the 
majority of seats in parliament. The members of the Board of Directors (Corporació 
Catalana de Mitjans Audiovisuals, CCMA) of the Catalan Public Broadcaster are 
appointed and selected by the members of the Catalan Parliament: initially members 
need 2/3 of the votes to be elected and their mandate is for six years – two longer than 
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political mandates. The content of the public broadcast channels is supervised by the 
Consell de l’Audiovisual de Catalunya (CAC-Broadcasting Council of Catalonia) that 
is also selected using the same governance model. The Broadcasting Council is in 
charge of monitoring levels of plurality and content balance in any Catalan 
broadcaster, both private and public. 
 In this system of political influence, political intervention happens for two reasons: 
when the first vote fails to achieve 2/3 of the chamber’s support, members can be 
selected with simple majority vote in the second round of votes. As a result, the party 
that holds the majority of seats in parliament (and usually the government) can 
nominate their own candidates without the need to reach any agreement with other 
political forces in the parliament (Fernández et al., 2011)2. The second case of political 
intervention happens because of the links that the members of the Board of Directors 
have with political parties. As their candidacies are nominated directly by each 
political party, it is usually the case that the appointed person is a trusted representative 
of the party’s interests –this was widely accepted as a routine practice by most of the 
interviewees3.  
3.2.3 Media policies in Scotland 
Scotland and Catalonia differ strongly in the structure and characteristics of their 
media policies. There are two main characteristics of media policies in Scotland: media 
policies in Scotland are mostly operated on a UK basis (Hutchison, 2016), and 
Scotland has developed a less interventionist and hands-off policy over those areas 
with devolved powers on media (Keating, 2010; Schlesinger, 2009).  
At present, Scotland does not have differentiated and devolved legislation from the 
UK in terms of broadcasting impartiality and newspaper partisanship despite 
possessing press regulation as a devolved power (Hutchison, 2016). In that sense, one 
                                                 
2 This situation has changed because of the fragmented result of last Catalan elections, when none of 
the parties achieved the majority of seats. As a result, the 12 memebers of the Board of Directors have 
been distributed amongst the parties in parliament; each party has appointed one or more members 
according to their number of seats.  
3 For instance, the Head of Communication of the Partit Popular de Catalunya –interviewed for this 
research- has been recently appointed Director of RTVE (Spanish Broadcaster) for Catalonia. This 
appointment is made by the Board of Directors of the Spanish Broadcaster, the board is de facto 
controlled by the majority party in the Spanish Parliament - that in this case is the same Partido Popular.   
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of the most significant differences between Catalonia and Scotland’s media system is 
the existence of impartiality norms that limit partisanship to newspapers and oblige all 
UK broadcasters to offer balanced reporting of politics and current affairs (McNair, 
2009). In the aftermath of the Scottish independence referendum, the Scottish 
Parliament gained some control over Ofcom, the institution that controls and 
supervises impartiality regulations in private broadcasting (Scottish Parliament, 2016). 
Holyrood can now appoint one of the members of the Ofcom board; however, scrutiny 
over the BBC and its two Scottish channels and radio stations remains in Westminster 
hands. However, this can be considered as a small step compared to some of the 
recommendations of the Expert Group on the Leveson Report in Scotland. This 
parliamentary group recommended all news producers in Scotland –both print and 
broadcast- should be controlled by the same regulatory body (Sinclair et al., 2013). 
Nevertheless, the Scottish Government did not create new media policies out of this 
expert report (Hutchison, 2016). 
 Holyrood seems to be embedded in a hands-off policy over the devolved media policy 
areas (press regulation and film funding). In that sense, Schlesinger and Benchimol 
(2014b), comparing Catalonia’s system of public subsidies to news media, argue that 
‘it would be unimaginable for such a policy to be applied to the (Scottish) press’ (2014 
p.3) despite the strong economic crisis of most Scottish newspapers. Nowadays, the 
Scottish Government only funds part of BBC Alba as part of their policies to promote 
the use of Gaelic (Azurmendi, 2013), and also fund the cultural and film industry 
through Creative Scotland (Munro, 2015). It could be argued that the hostile attitude 
of most newspapers towards the SNP’s independence stance is behind the 
Government’s reluctance to offer funds to newspapers. However, new online media 
such as The Common Space or Bella Caledonia, more favourable to the independence 
movement, also demand some sort of public funding to survive (McAlpine, 2016). The 
role of media policies in Scotland’s nation-building project does not seem to be as 
relevant as it is in Catalonia’s case. As explained in the following section, the debate 
around devolved broadcasting policy in Scotland also exemplifies some of these 
issues.  
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3.2.3.1 The debate for a public broadcaster in Scotland 
One of the most interesting elements of Scotland as a sub-state nation is the lack of a 
separated Scottish public broadcast system. The ongoing debate about the public 
broadcast system in Scotland and its reliance on BBC structures exemplify some of 
the most significant differences with Catalonia.  It might be argued that the absence of 
a separated language is behind some of the differences here analysed; however, there 
are other elements that explain the differences between Catalonia and Scotland’s 
public broadcast structures. Nowadays, Scotland’s public broadcast structure is 
dependent on the BBC’s larger structure. BBC has three television channels that 
produce dedicated but not full-time Scottish content: BBC One, BBC Two and the 
Gaelic channel BBC Alba - plus one radio station, BBC Radio Scotland.  
The restoration of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 did not include the creation of a 
separated public broadcaster as it did in Catalonia’s case. It was not until 2007 that the 
first pro-independence SNP Government created the Scottish Broadcast Parliamentary 
Commission to explore the possibility of a separated Scottish TV and radio channel. 
Although the commission recommended the creation of a separated Scottish digital 
channel and all parties agreed initially, no funds were allocated for such purpose and 
the project was abandoned (Lynch, 2009a). The demand for a separated broadcaster 
remained a minority demand amongst some members of pro-independence parties –
SNP and Scottish Greens- until the referendum campaign, when strong accusations of 
bias in the BBC’s coverage triggered the debate again (Greig, 2016). There are two 
distinct voices amongst those who call for a different public broadcast structure for 
Scotland: those who want to create an independent network, and those who call for 
BBC Scotland to produce more Scottish-based content and transfer its control to the 
Scottish parliament. This last option is currently the Scottish Government’s official 
position on the matter (Minister, 2015). 
One of the main characteristics of the BBC, and subsequently BBC Scotland’s 
governance structure, is that it is considered to be an effective system with low political 
interference and low political parallelism (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). Technically, there 
is low political interference on BBC’s governance because the governing board is not 
dependent on Westminster Parliament: the members of its board are appointed by the 
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Queen in Council following the UK government’s recommendations after an open 
public call to select candidates (Department for Culture, 2006). However, this system 
does not stop UK politicians from complaining or ‘threatening’ the BBC and its 
journalists. For instance, during the 2015 UK election campaign, BBC’s political 
editor Nick Robinson announced David Cameron, the Conservative Party candidate, 
threatened to close down the BBC (Robinson, 2015). Impartiality regulations 
technically prevents the BBC from adopting official editorial stances on current affairs 
(McNair, 2009). Nonetheless, during the Scottish referendum campaign, pro-
independence activists complained the BBC showed bias against the pro-
independence campaign, Yes, Scotland. Greig (2016), after analysing some of BBC’s 
coverage during the Scottish referendum, argues that ‘BBC’s coverage, on the whole 
was more favourable to the No Campaign’ (2016, p. 419). 
As previously explained, the aftermath of the independence referendum has revitalised 
the debate around public broadcasting in Scotland. At the time of this writing, the 
public broadcast debate in Scotland is focused on the possibility that BBC Scotland 
will produce the first prime time news show that includes both Scottish and 
international affairs. This change of broadcasting policy is opposed by the 
Conservative Party in Westminster because they see it as a threat to the BBC’s role in 
promoting the union of the United Kingdom. Also, the Smith Commission, in charge 
of debating the new powers to be transferred to Scotland after the referendum, has 
once again addressed the issue of public broadcasting. However, this time the 
commission does not advocate for the creation of a separated Scottish channel but for 
scrutiny powers over BBC Scotland to be transferred to the Scottish Parliament. It also 
recommended that the Scottish Government should have a voice in the BBC’s charter 
renewal when the BBC’s budget and overall governance guidelines are discussed.   
3.3 Political parallelism in the context of the independence referendum 
debates 
This section explores the ideological affiliation and subsequent parallelism between 
parties and news media in Scotland and Catalonia. The second key element to 
understand the eco-system where political public relations operate is the structure and 
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characteristics of media-politics alignment, also known as political parallelism. This 
concept is key to understanding the relationship between political actors and news 
media in the context of the independence referendums in Catalonia and Scotland. 
 Political parallelism is the analytical concept that explores how political parties or 
governments and the media (traditional and online) align themselves according to 
similar political, ideological or cultural views (Artero, 2014; Ciaglia, 2013; Mancini, 
2012). During the referendum campaigns, communication strategies become central 
because the framing of a key issue ‘by political actors and key information sources 
may therefore be unusually important to a referendum outcome’ (Vreese, 2007 p.2). 
Therefore, political parallelism between parties and news media becomes central. 
Catalonia and Scotland were no exceptions in this case.  
3.3.1 The influence of the independence referendum debates 
At the point when this thesis started in late 2012, the Scottish and the Catalan projects 
for an independent future were commencing and, by the time I started my fieldwork 
in early 2014, those projects were already in place. In late 2012, the Scottish 
Government had just signed the Edinburgh Agreement with the UK’s Government that 
allowed Scotland to conduct an independence referendum in 2014. The two official 
party campaigns for the yes and the no vote (Yes, Scotland and Better Together) began 
work in June 2012. At the same time, Catalonia’s parliament was debating the 
‘Declaration of Sovereignism and for the right of Catalonia’s people to decide’ 
(approved in January 2013). This declaration gave the Catalan Government permission 
to start the process and demand an independence referendum from Madrid’s 
Government.  
Events unfolded as expected in Scotland, and by 2014 both campaigns and parties were 
actively promoting their arguments for the independence referendum that was held on 
September 18th. The Yes, Scotland campaign developed a strong online and social 
media campaign (Baxter, Marcella and Varfis, 2011; Quinlan, Shephard and Paterson, 
2015) while the Better Together campaign had the support of all UK-based and 
Scottish-based newspapers except for the Sunday Herald (Dekavalla, 2016). This 
media division between the two campaigns became part of the confrontation between 
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the two sides that, for instance, resulted in pro-independence campaigners protesting 
outside BBC Scotland’s building for its alleged bias against the Yes, Scotland 
campaign. Voters rejected Scotland’s independence (55.3%), but the Yes, Scotland 
campaign successfully managed to increase support for independence from 35% in 
July 2012 to 45% in September 2014 (Curtice, 2015). As professor Keating argues, 
‘the referendum may have buried the issue of Scottish independence for the time being 
but it has radically altered the internal politics of Scotland and the relationship of 
Scotland to the United Kingdom’ (Keating, 2014:19). As shown in Chapter 7, political 
public relations practitioners in Scotland and Catalonia contend that the referendum 
context altered their relationship with news media. 
The independence issue in Scotland has been associated mostly with the SNP as it has 
been the party’s key issue and they were the ones to promote and advocate for an 
independence referendum as the government party in 2012 (Flamini, 2014). Scotland 
is a multi-party system with a diversity of left-right parties, and along the pro-
independence/ anti-independence axis there are positions that range from supporting 
independence or more devolution powers for Scotland or federalist options (Hepburn, 
2010). However, the sovereignist and pro-independence parties in Scotland are 
situated in the centre-left axis with the SNP and the Greens. Only one Scottish 
newspaper had openly declared its support for a yes vote –the Sunday Herald- and one 
pro-independence newspaper was created in October 2014, The National (Hutchison, 
2016). Until then, independentist and sovereignist positions did not have the support 
of Scottish or British newspapers (Hazel, 2001).  
In sharp contrast to Scotland, Catalonia faced several legal restrictions, until finally 
there was no agreement with Madrid’s Central Government to authorise an official 
independence referendum. The Catalan Government, with the support of pro-
independence parties, decided to set up an unofficial consultation that took place in 
November 2014 with a 35% turnout and 80.8% support for Catalonia’s independence 
(Elias, 2016). However, because it was an unofficial consultation, there were no 
official campaign structures, only pro-independence parties that actively campaigned 
for a yes vote in the referendum. Although anti-independence parties rejected 
launching an official campaign, it could be argued that the battle between the two sides 
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happened in the media sphere. Recent studies have demonstrated that almost all 
Madrid-based newspapers framed the consultation negatively, blaming the Catalan 
government for breaking the law, while Catalan-based newspapers presented a positive 
image of the consultation (Ballesteros, 2015). It has also been demonstrated that both 
Catalan and Spanish newspapers acted as political actors in determining the framing 
of the independence debate (Lejarza et al., 2015). 
In Catalonia, the current political debate on its future as an independent nation has two 
elements: the independence referendum and the independence itself of Catalonia. 
These two elements are of significance because there are Catalan political parties that 
advocate for an independence referendum but not for the independence of Catalonia 
(Podem En Comú, former ICV) and parties that advocate for both the referendum and 
Catalonia’s independence from centre-right to radical left positions (Esquerra 
Republicana, Convergència, CUP). On the other extreme of the debate, there are anti-
independence and anti-referendum parties in centre-left (PSC) and centre right 
positions (Ciutadans, PPC). This ideological pluralism can be found as well in the 
ideological distribution of news media (see the next section). 
The last Catalan elections in 2015 and the political developments surrounding the 
independence referendum have contributed to a stronger polarisation of Catalan parties 
on the pro-anti-independence axis and the fragmentation of parties on both sides of the 
debate (Martí and Cetrà, 2016). Polarisation between the two sides of the debate is 
reflected in the bilateral opposition between pro- and anti-independence parties that 
cannot reach agreement with the other side while they manage to form coalitions 
amongst themselves (Elias, 2016). The emergence of the independence movement has 
altered Catalonia’s party system. For instance, CiU, the ruling party of Catalonia for 
25 years, changed its core policy from a sovereignist vision of Catalonia inside Spain 
to defending the independence of Catalonia (Elias, 2016).4 As a result of this change, 
the Catalan newspaper La Vanguardia, once the unconditional supporter of CiU 
                                                 
4 At the time of writing, CiU as such no longer exists. The coalition that originally formed the party 
officially broke their relationship in 2015. The pro-independence party, Convergència, lost a significant 
share of votes but is still in government as part of the larger coalition of pro-independence parties Junts 
Pel Sí (Together for Yes).  
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(Chaqués-Bonafont, Palau and Baumgartner, 2015), no longer supports the party’s 
pro-independence stance.  
As it can be observed, the independence context in Catalonia and Scotland altered the 
media and party landscape. Despite this similarity, next section explains their 
differences in terms of political orientation and party loyalties in the Scottish and 
Catalan news media. 
3.3.2 News media political orientation and party loyalties 
There are significant differences between Scotland and Catalonia in terms of how the 
different news media align themselves with different political ideologies, cultures, and 
in some cases with political parties. The association between political parties and news 
media is of special relevance in Catalonia (Baumgartnet and Chaqués Bonafont, 2015), 
where the media mimics quite closely political parties’ framing of different policy 
issues. By contrast, in Scotland, the editorial positions of indigenous newspapers do 
not always reflect the different political viewpoints and ideologies found in Scottish 
political parties (Hutchison, 2008; Dekavalla, 2016). These differences between the 
two sub-state nations can also be observed in the content of news media, journalistic 
cultures and the partisanship of media audiences.  
One of the most significant elements that needs to be taken into consideration when 
using sub-state nations as units of analysis is that ‘in addition to ideological positioning 
on economic and social stances, centre-periphery issues add a third ideological 
dimension’ (Medeiros, Gauvin, & Chhim, 2015:14). Political actors, and subsequently 
the media, operate in a two-dimensional sphere: left-right, centre-periphery. In 
addition, both Catalonia and Scotland are multi-party systems that operate in the 
context of a larger state –Spain and the UK- that is characterised by having a strong 
two party system (Hepburn, 2010; Requejo, 2006). Similarly, Catalonia and Scotland’s 
media system coexist with Spain and the UK’s media systems. As a result, news media 
in both cases have a multi-layered and complex scenario to navigate to define their 
editorial stances. 
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Relationships of political parallelism in Catalonia are of special relevance because 
Catalan news media (radio, television and newspapers) are considered to have a very 
important role determining the national agenda, which is especially prominent in the 
current sovereignty process (Prado, 2014). The closeness between political parties and 
news media is exemplified, for instance, in the use of editorial pieces that have been 
traditionally directed towards influential elites, as was the case in November 2009 
when twelve Catalan-based newspapers published a common editorial piece to give 
their support to the new Catalan Statute of Autonomy and against the Spanish 
Constitutional Court (Lopez and Barrero, 2012). This closeness is something 
characteristic of the wider Spanish media system where links between political parties 
and news media have been of strong significance since the start of the democratic 
period in the late 1970s (Gunther, Montero and Wert, 2000).  
The Spanish media system is considered to have high levels of political parallelism 
because ‘each party clearly (is) allied with one of the major news outlets’ (Chaqués-
Bonafont, Palau, & Baumgartnet, 2015 p.114) along the left-right political spectrum. 
Catalonia mimics this alignment between parties and media outlets, but reflects the 
double division (left-right and pro-anti independence) (Canet, 2011). These 
relationships of parallelism are usually described in the literature as external pluralism 
because each media outlet represents a different point of view or political cleavage 
(Mancini and Hallin, 2012; Artero, 2014). Mancini (2012) contends external pluralism 
‘often does not foster the integration of different points of view’ because there are no 
common points for encounter and debate in the media sphere. Several studies have 
contradicted Mancini’s assumption (van Kempen, 2007; Artero, 2014; Brüggemann, 
2014) and, for instance, Vaccari (2011) demonstrates that relationships of parallelism 
foster online activism and participation.  
As previously explained, one of the most important characteristics of Catalonia’s 
media system is the existence of public subsidies to private newspapers and 
broadcasters. There is empirical evidence that suggests successive Catalan 
governments used these subsidies as a tool to influence relationships of political 
parallelism (Fernandez and Blasco Gil, 2005; Fernandez Alonso and J. J. Blasco Gil, 
2014). For instance, the media group Grup Godó -owner of the newspaper La 
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Vanguardia- received the largest amount of subsidies over the 25 years CiU was in 
government (Fernandez and Blasco Gil, 2005). Nowadays, although the newspaper 
does not support Catalonia’s independence as CiU does, the Grup Godó owns RAC1 
a pro-independence radio station with the largest number of listeners in Catalonia 
(EGM, 2016). Similarly, the newspaper Ara (left and pro-independence) received 
almost one-million euros from the left wing coalition government between PSC (now 
anti-independence), ERC (main pro-independence party) and ICV (now part of the 
coalition Catalunya Sí Que Es Pot). 
Catalan news media, as well as the Spanish ones, usually express their editorial support 
through the general framing of news and, most importantly, through the topics selected 
(Baumgartnet and Chaqués Bonafont, 2015). Media consumers do not need open 
editorial pieces to identify those frames with specific political parties. One of the 
features of Catalonia’s media system is the strong tendency for voters to consume the 
news media that shares their same political views (Capdevila Muntadas, 2014). 
Consuming news media on the basis of political preferences is more accessible in 
polarised, pluralist contexts such as Catalonia because the ideological spectrum of 
news media tends to mimic the party ideological spectrum (Hallin & Mancini, 2004).  
Relationships of political parallelism in Catalonia are also related to the so-called 
advocacy journalistic culture of southern European countries (Hallin & 
Papathanassopoulos, 2002). Advocacy journalism refers to the use of journalism to 
promote specific causes (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). The concept of advocacy 
journalism is the result of comparing different traditions of journalism against the 
normative liberal model of objective journalism (Jensen, 2008). In Catalonia’s case, 
this advocacy tradition is related to the process of nation-building. Catalan news 
editors working in bi-lingual or Catalan language-based media, as do Basque editors, 
see news media as ‘natural vehicle through which to reach and unite that community, 
harmonizing a region of shared language, culture, and ethnic ancestry’ (Lewis, 2008 
p.420). Around 56% of journalists working in this news media regard their 
professional role as that of a supporter and activist for Catalan language rights 
(Zabaleta et al., 2010). However, it should be noted that this percentage is the lowest 
one when compared to journalists working in other minority language news media: for 
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instance, 80.2% of Scottish-Gaelic journalists declare themselves as activists over 
strict professional journalists (Zabaleta et al., 2010).   
The difference is that in Catalonia these professional attitudes go hand-in-hand with a 
general media landscape that considers political elites as in control of the news media’s 
agenda (Van Aelst, Sehata and Dalen, 2010). Spanish journalists and news editors 
complain that politicians have a strong influence over the news agenda (Casero-
Ripollés, García-Santamaría and Fernández-Beaumont, 2015). More precisely, in 
2006, 92% of Catalan journalists considered the dominance of political and economic 
interests over journalistic criteria one of journalism’s major problems in Catalonia 
(Alcala et al., 2006). In that sense, there is a wide-spread belief that these journalistic 
advocacy orientations in Catalonia, and in Spain, respond to political pressures rather 
than to journalists’ choices (García-Avilés and Fuente-Cobo, 2014).  
Relationships of political parallelism are not unique to Catalonia and can also be found 
in Scotland’s media sphere. Scotland’s media sphere is different from that of Catalonia 
because the political dominance of the pro-independence SNP is not paralleled with a 
significant pro-independence printed media. Pro-independence media can be found in 
a newly-emerging Scottish online sphere. In addition, there are no institutional features 
like press subsidies that affect these relationships, as previously explained. Political 
parallelism is restricted to national and online newspapers because local newspapers, 
which still enjoy some substantive readership shares, remain politically impartial and 
do not offer their support to specific parties or candidates (Hutchison, 2016). 
 Scottish newspapers are considered one of the pillars that distinguish the Scottish from 
the UK public spheres, along with the Church, education and the Scottish legal system 
(Hutchison, 2008; Mcnair, 2008). However, the restoration of the Scottish Parliament 
and the emergence of a defined Scottish party system did not generate a context of 
external pluralism where Scottish media outlets became associated with different 
social visions (Dekavalla, 2009). As Keating (2009) notes, the relationship between 
Holyrood and the Scottish press is not an easy one. Scottish newspapers were 
editorially supportive of the restoration of the Scottish Parliament and contributed to 
the demands for more powers for Scotland in the early 2000s (Dekavalla, 2009). 
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Nevertheless, most Scottish newspapers have been hostile to Scottish nationalism and 
to the idea of an independent Scotland (Hazel, 2001b), with the exception of the 
Sunday Herald. In addition, during the post-devolution years, the Scottish press was 
mainly interested in covering political corruption and scandals in the new parliament 
(Mcnair, 2008) and Scottish newspapers lost its leadership in the market.  
Scotland’s printed media sphere has, at the same time, strong relationships of political 
parallelism and newspapers that offer selective support to the SNP. For instance, the 
Daily Record, once the most read newspaper, is not only editorially pro-Scottish 
Labour but there is ‘a revolving door between newspaper staff and Labour personnel’ 
(Hassan, 2014 p.78) as several Daily Record journalists became Scottish Labour spin 
doctors. At the same time, the nowadays most read newspaper, the Scottish edition of 
the Sun, supported the SNP in the last three elections but does not support to SNP’s 
pro-independence stance.  Similarly, the Herald used its parent title, the Sunday 
Herald, to officially support a Yes vote during the independence referendum 
(Hutchison, 2016). 
The overall UK press has one of the highest levels of political parallelism in Europe 
(Popescu, Gosselin and Pereira, 2010). However, its journalistic culture is usually 
associated with the liberal model of public sphere (Hallin and Mancini, 2004), where 
journalists differentiate between facts and opinions in contrast to advocacy journalists 
who participate in advocating for certain ideas (Hanitzsch, 2007). Scottish journalists 
have been found to romanticise notions of ‘ideal’ newsrooms where journalists fight 
to obtain hard-news as differentiated from producing commercially-oriented news 
content (Frith and Meech, 2007). Nevertheless, as Hassan (2014) points out, Scottish 
journalists take an active part in relationships of political parallelism as demonstrated 
in the aforementioned case of the Daily Record. Furthermore, at the beginning of the 
devolution years journalists regarded Scottish political life as mediocre in contrast to 
major political developments happening in London (Mcnair, 2008). During these 
years, Scottish journalists also declared that being too invested in Scottish nationalism 
limited their career options in London, where they considered to be better professional 
opportunities (Hazel, 2001). This attitude goes in line with the Scottish press strongly 
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focusing on corruption and scandals during the first years of the Scottish Parliament 
(Dekavalla, 2016).  
Scottish quality newspapers –and wider UK titles- usually express their political 
parallelism through editorial pieces published during election campaigns, and these 
pieces are considered to be significantly influential amongst voters (Cairney and 
McGarvey, 2013). However, there is little data on media audiences’ partisanship in 
Scotland as a separated unit of analysis from the whole UK. Nevertheless, it can be 
assumed that it might be harder for Scottish audiences to find their exact political 
views reflected in one newspaper because, until very recently,5 the newspaper 
ideological spectrum did not include, for instance, pro-independence or nationalist 
options (Blain and Hutchison, 2008). On the basis of the limited data available, it is 
known that in the last 2015 UK general election, SNP voters referred to the Daily 
Record as their most-read newspaper, followed by the Scottish Sun (YouGov, 2015).  
However, the Daily Record has been traditionally a strong supporter of Scottish 
Labour Party (Mcnair, 2008) with a centre-left political orientation that declared its 
opposition to Scotland’s independence during the referendum. According to 
YouGov’s political attitudes database, readers of The Herald (a left wing, anti-
independence newspaper) are also predominately SNP voters6.  
3.4 Conclusions 
This chapter compared Catalonia and Scotland’s political and media systems. Using 
some elements of Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) conceptual framework, the aim was to 
provide a general overview of the media and political institutions where political 
public relations operate. The central idea of the chapter is that Scotland and Catalonia 
are fertile political and media landscapes for political public relations practitioners. 
The central element of this fertile landscape is the existence of multi-level territorial 
politics, the recent emergence of the independence debates in Scotland and Catalonia 
and the salience of nation-building projects in the media-politics relationship. In 
                                                 
5 After the Scottish Independence referéndum, four new pro-independence news media have emerged: 
the newspaper The National, the online magazine CommonSpace, the news blog Bella Caledonia and 
Newsnet. 
6 https://yougov.co.uk/profileslite#/Scottish_National_Party/media  
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addition this chapter argues that different projects of nation-building have generated 
different configurations of the relationship between political and media systems in 
Catalonia and Scotland. 
More specifically, the relationship between political and media systems in Catalonia 
is characterised by a strong political interventionism and a structural dependency of 
media outlets on political powers. News media are central in Catalonia’s nation-
building project and successive Catalan governments have promoted the creation of a 
Catalan media system –the Catalan Communicative Space- through different media 
policies and public broadcast structures. Some of these media policies include a system 
of public subsidies to private news media that operates both at the Government and 
local council level. Catalonia also has its own public broadcaster, public news agency 
and a broadcast regulatory body. These policies respond to Catalan identity being 
historically incompatible or in conflict with Spain’s nation-building project and the 
need to protect and promote Catalan language. News media in Catalonia and Spain are 
powerful political actors strongly aligned with the different political viewpoints, in 
addition to their structural dependency over media policies. The emergence of the pro-
independence movement and the conflict over the independence referendum 
contribute to the polarisation between Catalan pro-independence news outlets and 
Spanish anti-independence news media. 
The relationship between political and media systems in Scotland is characterised by 
low interventionist media policies, restricted political parallelism, and a smaller 
Scottish media system with a long-standing Scottish press that is struggling to survive 
in the post-referendum context. News media play a significant but different role in 
Scotland’s nation-building project. The long-standing existence of a separated Scottish 
press that was not threatened by Britain’s nation-building project might explain the 
low interventionist media policies in Scotland. The demand for a separated public 
broadcaster, despite being more significant in the post-referendum context, is not a 
consensus demand amongst all political parties as was the case in Catalonia. Political 
parallelism is restricted in Scotland because impartiality regulations apply to 
broadcasters and because, until very recently, the Scottish press did not reflect the 
different political viewpoints in Scotland’s political system. The emergence of the pro-
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independence movement and the referendum campaign have activated and translated 
part of the political-media relationships to the online sphere.  
This chapter has provided the basis to start the empirical analysis of this thesis. The 
next three chapters aim to place political public relations professionals in the context 
described above using data obtained from in-depth interviews.  
   CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
This research approaches the study of political public relations. More specifically, this 
thesis examines political public relations using a framework chosen from the sociology 
of professions and applied in a comparative study. The main unit of analysis is political 
public relations practitioners. This is not a study of how these practitioners are 
perceived by neighbouring professions, such as journalists or politicians, as previous 
studies have done (e.g. Atkinson, 2005; de Vreese & Elenbaas, 2009; Frenkel-Faran 
& Lehman-Wilzig, 2006). Neither is it the aim of this study to assess whether political 
PR practitioners fit into a categorical idea of profession. The aim of this study is to 
examine how these practitioners conceive of their own practices and identities, and 
how these reflections relate to the wider media and political contexts. In line with the 
aim of this thesis, the research design places political public relations practitioners as 
the core data source and their reflections as the data to be examined from a qualitative 
comparative perspective.  In the following sections, I discuss the research questions 
and the rationale for the research design.  
4.1 Research questions and aims 
The starting point of this thesis is that the concept of spin doctor needs to 
reconceptualised. As demonstrated in Chapter 1 and 2, there is a need to develop new 
conceptual frameworks to understand communication experts in political parties or 
governments beyond the notion of spin doctors. Furthermore, it seems necessary to 
develop empirically-based studies on these experts, who are labelled in this study as 
political public relations practitioners. For these reasons, the unit of analysis of this 
thesis is the group of political public relations practitioners. This thesis approaches the 
study from a comparative perspective. The approach combines actor-behaviour 
centred analysis with a structuralist analysis of macro-level institutional arrangements 
(Esser and Hanitzsch, 2012). In line with this approach, there are two research 
questions and three main aims: 
 
Q1: What are the constitutive and characteristic elements of the performance and 
practice of  political public relations? 
Q2: How do specific national media systems impact the political public relations 
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practice? 
 
Related to these two research questions, this thesis has three main aims: 
A1: Outline the elements that characterise the group of political public relations. 
A2: Explore the practice of political public relations and determine the main tasks, 
functions and roles of its practitioners. 
A3: Outline the elements of the media system that influence the practice and profession 
of political public relations. 
The underlying idea is to build knowledge about political public relations in three 
levels: the inner dynamics and professional practices; the profession within particular 
institutional settings such the party or government; and the profession within the media 
system context. These three aims also give the underlying data analysis structure. Data 
analysis will move from a micro-level to a macro-level following this path with three 
corresponding chapters: profession, party and government, and media system. The 
final aim of the data analysis is to offer a comprehensive picture or complete portrait 
of political public relations practitioners.  
The two research questions aim to articulate the relationship between profession, 
professionalism and larger institutional contexts.  I approach the relationship between 
these three elements, firstly, from the assumption that professions are constituted by 
shared practices and perceptions of professionalism and identity (Schinkel and 
Noordegraaf, 2011). Secondly, professionalism is examined as an identity element 
based on those ‘experiences, understandings and expertise, shared ways of perceiving 
problems and their possible solutions’ (Evetts, 2003 p.799). Finally, the comparative 
approach of the research questions derives from the assumption that professions are 
part of a larger ecological system that influences and shapes its core characteristics 
(Abbott, 1988). This larger ecological or institutional system is better observed from 
a comparative perspective. In this case, the larger ecological system refers to the 
relationship between political and media systems –as defined by Hallin and Mancini 
(2004)- where political public relations operates.  
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Q1: The first research question derives from a descriptive need. This question seeks to 
explore the main characteristics and defining traits of the political public relations 
profession as conceived by its own practitioners in two different contexts. This 
question stems from the lack of studies that have addressed political public relations 
as a profession and, consequently, the lack of empirically-based knowledge about the 
core functions, activities and professional profiles of its practitioners (Davis, 2000). 
As can be observed in Table 3.1 the analysis of the profession is focused on two 
interrelated analytical concepts: practice and performance. This thesis understands 
practice and performance using Pentland and Feldmand’s (2005) interpretation of 
Latour's (1986) theory of performativity. Practice in this case refers to the daily 
performance of routines of political public relations practitioners in governments and 
political parties. Therefore, the focus is on the main tasks, functions and roles 
undertaken by these professionals. Performance, on the other hand, refers to those 
norms, distinctive characteristics, basic principles and ethical standards that guide or 
shape practices (Pentland and Feldman, 2005). The analytical concept of practice is 
rooted in the idea of actions, and the second concept of performance reflects identity. 
Both concepts of practice and performance are understood as mutually constitutive 
even though they are treated in separated chapters. 
Table 4.1 Elements explored at the micro-level analysis of the political 
public relations occupation 
Performance: professionalism and 
professional structures (Chapter 5) 
Practice: jurisdictional boundaries and 
roles (Chapter 6) 
Professional norms 
Ethical principles 
Professional role models 
Professional requirements: 
expertise and knowledge 
Routes of access to the profession 
Daily routines 
Main professional tasks 
Assigned roles in the 
party/government 
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This question explores, on the one hand, the elements that practitioners consider to be 
essential to enter the professional group (professional background and career 
requirements), and what norms they consider to be applied to the practice of the 
profession (ethical principles and norms). On the other hand, this sub-question 
examines the tasks and functions claimed to be exclusive to the occupation, and how 
those functions and tasks are transformed into specific roles within political 
organisations. This question constitutes the basis for the articulation of the wider 
comparative study of the two media systems. 
Q2: The second research question examines the impact of media systems on the 
practice of political public relations. It examines how practitioners perceive their 
profession and strategies of media relations in relation to the wider media-system 
contexts in Scotland and Catalonia. To answer this question (see Table 1.2), the 
analysis focuses on three specific elements of media systems that articulate the 
relationship between the political and the media sphere according to Hallin and 
Mancini’s (2004) media system models: practices of political parallelism, structure of 
media markets, and the role of the State in media policies. As explained in Chapter 2, 
Hallin and Mancini’s conceptual framework is adapted to sub-state nations, and it also 
includes social and online media. This question originates from the need to incorporate 
larger institutional structures, such as media systems, in the analysis of political actors’ 
behaviour (Benson, 2010). There is a lack of studies that reflect on the impact that 
larger media and political structures have on political communication processes 
(Brown, 2003b).  
Table 4.2 Analytical tools used to explore the influence of media systems on the 
practice of political public relations (macro-level) 
Elements to examine Analytical tools used for the examination 
 
Conceptualizations of professional 
power 
Media systems dimensions: 
Political parallelism  
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Strategic thinking in the management 
of media relations 
The role of the State in media policies 
(decentralization and media policy power) 
Structure of media markets (including 
social and online media) 
 
This second research question requires data on Catalonia and Scotland’s media 
systems that cannot be obtained from practitioners’ responses only. For that reason, 
Chapter 3 uses existing research to outline the main characteristics of Catalonia and 
Scotland’s media systems on the basis of the three analytical concepts described in 
Table 3.2. This data on media systems is then compared with practitioners’ perceptions 
on the political and media environment (see Chapter 7).  The analysis does not aim to 
test the validity of the three models developed by Hallin and Manicin (2004), but to 
use their two most important analytical categories to examine the interaction between 
media and political systems in Scotland and Catalonia. The following section 
examines how these two questions respond to specific ontological assumptions and 
how, on the basis of that ontological assumption, I can generate knowledge using 
specific methodological approaches.  
4.1.1 Key concepts and terminology 
There are three key concepts in this thesis –institutions, profession, political and media 
systems- and one terminological issue with the term ‘spin doctor’ that need 
clarification. These three concepts emerge from the different theoretical frameworks 
developed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 1. The concepts are exposed here for the sake of 
clarity and to provide a clear rationale for the research design.  
The concept of institution is the overarching concept of this thesis. The elements 
explored in this thesis (political PR practitioners, media and political systems) are 
approached as institutions and the relationship between these two institutions is 
explored. Exploring these elements as institutions implies recognising them as 
distinctive types of social forms with their own governing mechanisms in constant 
interaction with their wider context (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Amongst the 
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different types of institutions, political PR and its practitioners is approached as a type 
of professional institution. Media and political systems are explored as the wider 
institutional context where political PR is practiced. The concept of institution 
provides this thesis with an overarching analytical category. It allows the researcher to 
interpret the results of the data analysis according to the characteristics and dynamics 
of certain type of societal structures. Chapter 2 explained this thesis approaches the 
concept of institutions and more precisely, professional institutions from a neo-
institutional perspective.  
The concept of profession is used in this thesis to explore political PR from an 
alternative framework to existing studies in this area. There are two reasons that 
underpin the use of the concept profession. Chapter 2 demonstrated that the use of the 
term profession, professional and professionalization is problematic in existing studies 
on the professionalization of political communication. The idea of professionalization 
is used to describe how political organisations mimic media routines to become better 
competitors (Gibson & Rommele, 2009; Mancini, 1999;Strömbäck, 2009). In addition, 
as explained in Chapter 1 and 2, previous studies do not provide an explanatory 
framework to the fact that there are a series of communication practices in the political 
sphere and people whose main employment is to manage and design these 
communication practices.  The concept of profession provides a link between a series 
of communication practices in the political sphere and the people who design, 
coordinate and execute these practices.  
 
The concept of profession serves in this case as a tool to generate new knowledge 
about political PR practice and its practitioners.  As previously stated, it is not the goal 
of this thesis to determine whether political PR can be categorised as a profession but 
to systematically approach the object of study and generate empirical data. To do so, 
as explained in Chapter 2, this thesis approaches the concept of profession not in a 
close categorical sense but as a socially constructed institution whose distinctive traits 
are dynamic and constantly evolving (Noordegraaf, 2007).  
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The concepts of political and media systems provide the conceptual framework to 
explore the context where political PR practitioners work. The term ‘system’ is 
adopted from Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) theory of media system models. In the 
context of Hallin and Mancini’s theory and in this thesis, the term ‘system’ is not used 
to indicate a functional system theory approach. As Mancini explains ‘system’ is a 
general category that for the purposes of their theory and also the purposes of this 
thesis, serves to contrast two aggregates of institutions (Mancini, 2015). The concept 
of system is used as a synonym or general category for a group of institutions 
belonging either to the political or media spheres.  
The concept of political system refers in this thesis to the political institutions involved 
in the production and dissemination of political communication: governments, 
political parties and parliaments (Mazzoleni, 2010). The concept of political system 
serves to englobe patterns of similarities and variations between Scotland and 
Catalonia. Media system refers in this thesis to the aggregate of news media and core 
political communication channels.  
4.1.1 Terminology 
One of the key elements of this research design is the use of the different terminologies 
that exist to refer to the communication expert working in political parties or 
governments. Particularly, the use of the term spin doctor in this thesis needs to be 
included as part of the research design because of the complexity and connotations 
associated to it(McNair, 2004; Hobbs, 2015)  –see Chapter 1. 
This thesis will use the term spin doctor as a synonym for political public relations 
practitioner. There are two main reasons to do so. First, this is a conscious decision of 
the researcher in an attempt to remain closer to the object of study. As demonstrated 
in the data analysis –see chapter 5, practitioners in Scotland and Catalonia use the term 
‘spin doctor’ as an informal label to designate their equal counterparts in other parties 
or governments. The use of the term ‘spin doctor’ is one of the traits that indicate the 
existence of a sense of common identity amongst practitioners in Scotland and 
Catalonia. In that sense, the researcher embraces the informal definition offered by 
interviewees as a valid categorical term.  
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The second reason is the underlying idea that the concept of ‘spin doctor’ needs to be 
reconceptualised. This reconceptualization starts by setting aside traditional negative 
connotations of the term – manipulative, liar, political control, see Chapter 1 for more 
details- and exploring practitioners’ view of the term ‘spin doctor’. This is not to affirm 
that practitioners’ views are accepted uncritically rather these views are used as the 
starting point to explore the ‘spin doctor’ phenomena from alternative perspectives to 
existing academic knowledge in this area. Therefore, the use of the term spin doctor 
as a synonym for political public relations in the context of this thesis aims to bring 
new empirical-based knowledge about these popular figures. 
4.2 Combining micro and macro-level approaches 
This section explains the conceptual rationale that underpins the object of study and 
the methodological choices explained in the following sections. The first part outlines 
the ontological approach to the relationship between professionals and media systems. 
The second section justifies from an epistemological perspective the use of 
practitioners’ reflections and testimonies to explore the purpose of this thesis. As 
Patomaki declares, being explicit with the ontological and epistemological foundations 
of research is the key to generate ‘more adequate sets of empirical evidence’ 
(Patomaki, 2002:99). In that sense, these three items –epistemology, ontology and 
methodology- should be dependent and linked by a conceptual rationale (Stanley, 
2012).  
4.2.1 Ontological implications 
This thesis combines micro- and macro-level analysis. To do so, the thesis needs to 
give ontological and epistemological account of three interrelated elements: individual 
agents (political public relations practitioners), an institution (profession of political 
public relations), and the wider eco-system (media and political systems). From an 
ontological perspective, these three elements are constitutive of a reality that is 
socially-constructed (Burr, 2003). This argument derives from the assumption that ‘the 
construction of reality is an active process of creating the world. The reality people 
experience everyday life is a constructed reality’ (Sarakantos, 2005, p.37). Institutions 
such as a profession or a media system are not independent entities that exist separated 
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from individual agents. Both individual agents and institutions are mutually 
constituent of a reality constructed by both actors.  This ontological stance relates to 
the sociological dilema between agency and structure (Giddens, 1984). However, in 
this case, this thesis does not explore whether agency shapes structure or vice versa. 
The thesis explores how actors and structures co-construct each other.  
This thesis approaches the tension between agency and structure from a revised neo-
institutional approach. As explained in Chapter 2, the concept of the profession is 
viewed in this thesis from a neo-institutionalist perspective. This neo-institutional 
perspective has ontological implications that extend to the entire thesis. Classic neo-
institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995) overlooks the role of 
individual agents in institutions (Hay, 2009).  However, the proposed neo-institutional 
approach combines both the macro-level interaction between different institutions and 
the role that individual agents play in these institutions (Scott, 2008; Lawrence, 
Suddaby and Leca, 2011; Schinkel and Noordegraaf, 2011). This theoretical 
framework provides a basis to explain the mechanisms of influence of media systems 
over political PR practitioners.  
From this perspective, professions and media systems are dynamic, socially-
constructed institutions (Scott, 2008). Institutions are maintained and reproduced in 
society through the routines and habits of both individual agents and other 
organisations in the environment. Individual agents –political public relations 
practitioners- have the capacity to ‘interpret, translate, transpose, edit, and recombine 
institutions’, and at the same time ‘actors reflect on and strategically operate within 
the institutional context where they are embedded’ (Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca, 
2011, p. 55). 
4.2.3 Using political public relations as a main data source 
The objects of study in this thesis are the reflections, actions, ideas and assumptions 
that political public relations practitioners have about their own profession and the 
structural media system context in which they operate. This methodological choice 
poses some epistemological questions. One might argue that the study of individual 
agents limits the results of this study to a micro-level dimension. For instance, most 
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studies on the relationship between politicians and journalists limit their analysis to 
the internal dynamics of the relationship (Örebro, 2002; Stromback, 2006; Ross, 2010; 
Van Aelst, Sehata and Dalen, 2010). In this thesis, actors’ testimonies and reflections 
are seen as sites to explore the wider context where these relationships happen. This 
a-contextual epistemological approach can be challenged. 
Despite the above-mentioned differences between neo-institutionalism and 
structuration theory, Gidden’s (1994) approach is of use in this case. Macro-level 
systems can be explored through the eyes of individual agents because ‘systems are 
grounded in the knowledgeable activities of situated actors’ (Giddens, 1984:25). Neo-
institutionalists in the sociology of professions also agree that institutions are enacted 
through the roles, rites and rituals of actors that ‘at the same time challenge, modify, 
and disrupt them (institutions)’ (Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca, 2011, p. 57). Following 
this reasoning, I argue the study of individual political public relations agents can shed 
light and generate valid knowledge of the wider political and media systems where 
they operate. As explained in the following section, this epistemological approach 
requires a qualitative research design. 
4.3 Qualitative approach to the study of political public relations 
practitioners 
This section explores the two main reasons that underpin the qualitative approach of 
this thesis and the limitations implied in the use of this approach. 
The first reason for using a qualitative approach emerges from the complex and 
subjective nature of the object of study (Flick, 2009): the construction of a profession 
from a comparative perspective. Experiences, shared practices and meanings of an 
occupational group and its practitioners can hardly be treated as isolated or specific 
causes of a certain phenomena as is commonly assumed in quantitative perspectives 
(Williams and May, 1996). It is not the goal of this thesis to seek specific causes and 
variables of the political public relations phenomena, but to explore and understand 
‘how social experience is created and given meaning’ (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005:10). 
This thesis aims to generate knowledge on the active role that practitioners have in the 
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construction of their own practices, shared values and how these relate to larger social 
and economic structures.  
The second reason lies in the fact that there is scope to add new knowledge from a 
different methodological perspective. Quantitative approaches have historically 
dominated the field of political communication (Graber and Smith, 2005; Karpf et al., 
2015), and it is a growing tendency in public relations (Jain, De Moya and Molleda, 
2014). For instance, there is a strong need for qualitative data to explore the so-called 
professionalization of political communication (Tenscher et al., 2015). Existing 
studies have quantified the use of new communication practices as an indicator of an 
ongoing process of professionalization (Gibson & Rommele, 2009; Strömbäck, 2009). 
However, very few studies (Plasser, 2001; Tenscher et al., 2016) use qualitative data 
-such as interviews with experts or politicians- to explore and analyse the process of 
professionalization of political communication.  
Political communication scholars are concerned about the lack of methodological 
innovation (Vowe and Henn, 2016) and the inability of the field to to keep pace with 
‘a world that looks radically different today politically, socially, and technologically’ 
(Karpf et al., 2015, p. 1889). Precisely Karpf et al. (2015) highlight that the field of 
political communication has not been able to explain the fast professionalization of 
political communication. These scholars argue political communication research 
needs to invest in the use of qualitative methods, such as in-depth interviewing or 
observation, to overcome these limitations. However, there are other voices in the field 
that find the way to move forward is to develop ‘more formal, variable-based, and 
causality-seeking approach that includes larger samples in order to allow for 
generalizations’ (Esser, 2014, p. 26). This thesis sits within Karpf et al.’s (2015) 
position. There are certain phenomena in the political communication sphere, such as 
the emergence of professions, that cannot be explained through clearly-delimited 
variables and cauality-seeking approaches.  
Qualitative approaches have long been portrayed as limited because of the subjectivity 
of the data (Hammersley, 2008). As Maxwell & Chmiel (2011) argue, it would be 
naïve to deny that researchers’ subjectivity and their objects of study play a central 
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role in the design, analysis and interpretation of the data. For that reason, one of the 
strategies to overcome these critiques is to embrace both the subjectivity of the 
researcher as an analyst of a certain reality, and the subjectivity of the object of study: 
political public relations practitioners as definers of their own reality. This is not to 
deny the need for accuracy and reliability in the data, but rather to recognise the 
closeness between the researcher and the object of study as an enriching experience 
that generates meaningful knowledge (Flick, 2009). Qualitative methodological 
approaches derive from a commitment to understand ‘social phenomena from the 
actor’s own perspective and examining how the world is experienced’ (Taylor, 
Bogdan, & DeVault, 2016:3). 
The validity of qualitative studies is to be found in the ‘usefulness of concepts and 
frameworks’ (Maxwell & Chmiel, 2011:507) that contribute to theoretical 
generalizability and transferability of concepts.  In this case, it is only through the 
qualitative study of experiences of political public relations practitioners that 
conclusions can be drawn – for instance, about how political actors make sense of the 
wider (media) structures in which they operate. The role of qualitative studies is to 
embrace the diversity and complexity of the social life as a whole, setting aside 
attempts to discount the subjectivity of those involved in the research process (Flick, 
2009). 
To conclude, it can be stated that a qualitative approach is not only adequate for the 
‘subjective’ character of this research, but it also contributes to generating new 
perspectives in areas of knowledge dominated by quantitative approaches.  
4.4 Comparative approach 
The main reason to adopt a comparative approach is because ‘only through 
comparative research will it become possible to identify and understand the structural 
and semi-structural determinants and factors that shape the practice of political public 
relations’ (Stromback and Kiousis, 2011, p. 320). There are almost no comparative 
studies on the practice of political public relations. In addition, there are almost no 
comparative studies between sub-state nations in terms of media systems and political 
communication practices (Terribas, 1994; Castelló and Capdevila, 2013). This thesis 
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aims to overcome the gaps in the academic literature by comparing political PR 
practitioners in carefully-structured conditions.  
This thesis compares political public relations in the context of each of their media 
systems in two sub-state nations. The goal of this double comparison is to explore the 
elements that shape the practice of political public relations both at the micro- and 
macro-level. I articulate the comparison by contrasting practitioners’ testimonies and 
reflections in Catalonia and Scotland against two backdrops: the configuration of the 
political public relations profession and the characteristics of each of their media 
systems. Precisely, Pfetsch and Esser (2011) find that comparative methodology offers 
good potential when the focus of the research is on the interplay of the political actors’ 
behaviour and the structural context. National media and political contexts are in this 
case considered essential elements in the configuration of the political public relations 
occupation and used as the explanatory framework for patterns of similarities and 
differences. 
 
The comparative approach of this thesis is based on the assumption that, on the one 
hand, political communication practices and media structures are no longer limited to 
nation-wide or state-wide contexts (Swanson, 2004). Comparative approaches also 
facilitate the examination of transnational trends that directly impact the configuration 
of professions that are no longer restricted to the boundaries of the state-nation 
(Faulconbridge and Muzio, 2012).  On the other hand, it is also assumed that despite 
the existence of transnational political communication practices, these practices are 
still influenced by the peculiarities of each media and political system (Flew and 
Waisbord, 2015).  
 
Comparative perspectives are necessary because research on political public relations 
so far has been dominated by mono-cultural approaches, with a special focus on 
Anglo-Saxon contexts ( i.e Atkinson, 2005; Brown, 2003; Moloney, 2001; Stockwell, 
2007). There is also a lack of comparative perspectives in public relations, which is 
traditionally focused on analysing individual cases rather than looking for 
transnational similarities and differences (Jain, De Moya and Molleda, 2014). While 
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comparative approaches are dominant in the field of political communication (Pfetsch, 
2004; Ciaglia, 2013; Canel and Voltmer, 2014; Esser and Pfetsch, 2016), these tend to 
overlook political public relations as significant actors in media systems. As explained 
in the next section, the vast majority of comparative studies in political communication 
focus their analysis on state-nations (Hepp and Couldry, 2009). The growing 
descentralization of state-nations and the emergence of sub-level territorial units with 
distinctive political claims are largely ignored.  
4.4.1 Using sub-state nations as units for comparison 
This thesis uses sub-state nations as the unit of comparison. This section argues that 
sub-state nations are valid units of analysis, and are potential explanatory frameworks 
to better understand the role that communication plays in politics. There is a strong 
normative bias against sub-state nations in comparative political communication 
studies (Chakravartty and Roy, 2013). The vast majority of comparative studies in 
political communication use nation-states as the basis for their comparison (Hallin and 
Mancini, 2004; Stromback and Dimitrova, 2011; van Dalen, Albaek and de Vreese, 
2011; Esser et al., 2012; Pfetsch, 2013). However, nowadays nation-states are no 
longer the only referential framework as ‘states must share their prerogatives with 
supra-state, sub-state and trans-state systems’ (Keating, 2001 p.ix). While there are 
some comparative studies focused on the supra-state level of political communication, 
such as the European Union (Cornia, 2010; Tenscher, Mykkanen and Moring, 2012; 
Valentini, 2013), there are almost no comparative studies on the political 
communication features of sub-state nations. 
Sub-state or stateless nations are ‘territorial communities with their own identity and 
a desire for self-determination included within the boundaries of one or more states’ 
(Guibernau, 2004 p.9). These territorial communities are significant political entities 
with their own party system (Detterbeck and Hepburn, 2010), executive and legislative 
institutions (Keating, 2010), and therefore their own media systems (P. Schlesinger 
and A. Benchimol, 2014). Some political communication scholars descredit what they 
label as regional variations because they regard them as non-representative cases 
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(Hallin & Mancini, 2012). However, the lack of a state status does not seem a strong 
reason to descredit the explanatory force of sub-state nations.  
These territorial communities –such as Quebec, Basque Country, Flanders, Catalonia 
or Scotland- have generated a significative body of comparative studies in the field of 
territorial politics (Keating, 1996; Stolz, 2009; Swenden and Maddens, 2009; 
Hepburn, 2010; Liñeira and Cetrà, 2015). These studies contribute to understanding 
the relationship between language and nationalism (Cetrà, 2016), new forms of multi-
level political competition (Hepburn, 2010) or issues in globalization and identities 
(Fletcher, 1998). There are no elements that might indicate sub-state nations are not 
suitable explanatory frameworks to understand the profession of political public 
relations.  
 
4.4.1.1 The comparison between Scotland and Catalonia  
Catalonia and Scotland are relevant cases for the study of political public relations 
practitioners because of both their similarities and differences as sub-state nations. 
There is a long tradition of comparison between the cases of Catalonia and Scotland 
because of the similarities in their nationalist movements and independence processes 
(Solano, 2007; Greer, 2007; Keating, 1996; MacInnes, 2004; Moreno, 1988; Paquin, 
2001). This thesis contributes to overcome the gap of comparative knowledge between 
Scotland and Catalonia in regards to their political communication spheres. 
 
There is a significant body of research on media systems and political communication 
features in Catalonia (San Eugenio, Ginesta and Xifra, no date; Xifra, 2009; Fernández 
et al., 2011; Carrillo and Ferré-Pavia, 2013; Guimerà and Fernández, 2014) and in 
Scotland (Dekavalla, 2016; Frith & Meech, 2007; Larrondo, 2014; Mcnair, 2008; 
Schlesinger, David, & Dinan, 2001). Nevertheless, there are very few studies that 
compare the political communication dimension of these two sub-state nations where 
significant differences between the two cases emerge (Castelló & O’Donnell, 2009; 
Fernández, 2016; Terribas, 1994) . Furthermore, not only are these sub-state nations 
are ignored as valid units of analysis by political communication and public relations 
scholars, but they are barely mentioned when the UK or Spain’s media systems are 
 96 
explored in the literature (i.e. Franklin, 2003; Freedom, 2009; Hawes, 2012; Jackson, 
2004). 
Background similarities between Scotland and Catalonia are the basis for a 
comparative framework that enables this research to claim extensive conclusions. 
When comparing two different political systems, some kind of equivalence needs to 
be established (Van Deth, 1998). In this case, the work of political public relations 
practitioners can be framed in equivalent terms because of the similarities in the 
political context. According to Geer (2007:15), these two sub-state nations ‘are often 
presented as easily comparable’. The main political reasons for this easy comparison 
are: they are both middle-sized sub-state nations; their political autonomy is relatively 
recent; and they are both exponents of civic nationalism (Greer, 2007). Therefore, 
political public relations operate in a similar multi-level political context with a 
national dimension where sovereignist movements are emerging, and a state-wide 
dimension where political institutions retain competences over certain powers and 
policies (Fabre, 2011). Sub-state nations as units of analysis have been largely ignored 
in political communication studies (Fernández-Quijada and Sellas, 2013). 
 
In addition, the work of political public relations can be framed in equivalent terms 
because of the emerging independence referendum debates in Catalonia and Scotland. 
In September 2014, Scotland held an independence referendum and, just two months 
later, Catalonia held a symbolic non-binding consultation. Political agendas became 
similar in both contexts with parties and civil society being immersed in the pro- vs. 
anti-independence debate (Liñeira and Cetrà, 2015). However, it is not the aim of this 
thesis to examine the consequences of the referendum campaigns: these are only taken 
into consideration as part of the wider political context. 
 
One of the main reasons for a comparative study between Scotland and Catalonia lies 
in the assumption that ‘even similar phenomena are never identical’ (Van Deth, 
1998:4). Despite the similarities between Scotland and Catalonia, some of the most 
interesting elements of this comparison are the differences in their respective media 
systems, the articulation of the relationship between the media and the political sphere, 
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and the public visibility of political public relations practitioners. While Catalonia has 
a strong level of political autonomy on media policies (Guimerà, 2013) and its own 
public broadcaster, Scotland’s parliament has no media policies, devolved powers and 
no separate public broadcast system from the wider UK (Keating, 2014).  
 
Furthermore, according to Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) models of interaction between 
political and media systems for modern democracies, Scotland (as part of the UK) 
belongs to the Liberal Media System Model and Catalonia (as part of Spain) to the 
Polarized Pluralist System Model. The first one is described as a context with a strong 
commercially-oriented press, a politically-independent public broadcast system and 
liberal media policies. However, the Polarized Pluralist context is characterised by 
strong levels of state intervention in media, the economic dependency of private news 
media on state subsidies, and highly-politicised public broadcast systems (Hallin & 
Mancini, 2004). As responsible for the articulation of the relationship between the 
media and political spheres, political public relations in Scotland and Catalonia operate 
in different political and media structures. In that interaction, within the UK and 
Scotland, ‘spin doctors’ are portrayed by the media and known by the general public, 
whereas in Catalonia and Spain, ‘spin doctors’ remain outside the focus of the media 
and the public is not generally aware of their existence.  
 
To conclude, it can be stated that Catalonia and Scotland are relevant cases for the 
study of political public relations practitioners because they offer the opportunity to 
compare how the political public relations occupation is articulated in a similar 
political contexts but in different media system structures.  
4.5 Interviewing as a main data collection method 
The data collected for this thesis is based on in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 
the Heads of Communication of political parties in Scotland and Catalonia. This 
section will first elaborate on the rationale for this methodological choice and then will 
describe how the method was put in action.  
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The use of interviews as a data collection method derives from the lack of 
methodological diversity in the field of study, and the ontological and epistemological 
approach to the method. I argue that the use of in-depth interviews for the study of 
political public relations contributes to original knowledge because it provides a 
different perspective from previous studies and it reflects, for the first time, how 
political public relations practitioners portray themselves. As previously stated, this 
thesis aims to overcome the dominant methodological approach to the study of 
political public relations or ‘spin doctors’ based on quantitative content analysis of 
media representations of political public relations practitioners (Frenkel-Faran, 2008; 
Atkinson, 2005; Sumpter and Tankard, 1994; De Vreese and Elenbaas, 2009; Esser et 
al., 2000). These methodological perspectives have generated limited knowledge on 
‘spin doctors’ as these are only viewed through the eyes of a neighbouring (and also 
main competitor) profession, the journalists.  
Interview methodology has been absent in most of the research done on the area of 
political public relations (Davis, 2002; Castello, 2010; Gaber, 2004; Serazio, 2014). 
In-depth interviewing has been used as a data collection method for very few studies 
on US political consultants (Dulio, 2004; Magleby & Patterson, 1998; Medvic, 2004). 
However, as explained in Chapter 1, US political consultants are not entirely 
equivalent to political public relations practitioners in the European context. There 
seems to be some reticence amongst political communication scholars to use in-depth 
interviews as a stand-alone data collection method (Serazio, 2014). For instance, 
Graber (2004), in her review of political communication research methods, only 
considers in-depth interviews as a tool to ‘broaden the insights gained from larger 
surveys’ (Graber, 2004:64). However, interviewing data can offer more than just 
complementary data.  
Beyond these considerations, the use of in-depth interviewing is also the most feasible 
data collection method. It could be argued that ethnographic approaches with 
participant observation methods are also adequate data collection methods. 
Nonetheless, I disregarded ethnographic and participant observation methods because 
of the difficulties in accessing political spheres. Access to political spheres is usually 
restricted because political parties and governments are fearful of unveiling their 
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tactics and strategies to the wider public and particularly, to their political counterparts 
(Harvey, 2011).  
4.5.1 Using self-reflection to generate new knowledge 
The use of interviews in this thesis is based on the idea that self-reflection can produce 
knowledge about the phenomenon here explored (Roulston, 2010a). Certainly, the 
process of interviewing is “inextricably and unavoidably, historically, politically and 
contextually bound”(Fontana and Frey, 2005, p. 695). However, this thesis embraces 
the subjectivity and contextual character of the interviewing process.  
The aim of this thesis is to generate knowledge about a group of practitioners and the 
political and social context of their practice. To obtain this data, professionals need to 
engage in a reflexive process with its own profession and the system in which they 
operate. Interviewing facilitates this process of reflexive engagement (Roulston, 
2010b). The aim is not to obtain simple descriptions of daily routines that could be 
obtained, for instance, through online questionaires. In this case, the aim is to engage 
practitioners in offering more than simple descriptions. This requires a process of 
feedback between the researcher and the source of data that can only be achieved 
through direct questioning (Roulston, 2010a).  
The underlying idea is that interviewing facilitates the process of story-telling. The 
process of story-telling is a process of meaning-making (DeMarrais, 2004). 
Interviewees make sense of their own experiences by “selecting constitutive details of 
experience, reflecting on them, giving them order, and thereby making sense of them” 
(Seidman, 2006, p. 7).  From an epistemological perspective, actors not only put in 
practice a series of actions –in this case occupational tasks and functions- but they are 
constantly monitoring and discursively reflecting on them as part of the way of 
enacting them(Giddens, 1991). Social actors’ knowledge is not incidental but integral 
of the systems and structures in which they are embedded (Giddens, 1984). In other 
words, researchers can get to know the social world through people’s responses 
because these reflect people’s role in constructing their own social environment. 
However, the following section explains there are some restrictions, and advantages 
at the same time, in the case of political PR practitioners as they are elite members of 
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the political and media sphere.  
4.5.2 Interviewing elites 
 This section explores the challenges and advantages involved in interviewing an elite 
group such as political PR practitioners. This thesis interviews members of an elite 
group to obtain information to finally make generalizable claims about political PR 
practitioners’ characteristics (Goldstein, 2002). In addition, this elite interviewing 
happens at the sub-state level of politics, Scotland and Catalonia. In this context, elite 
interviews are considered of special utility because they can capture the different 
characteristics of political actors at this level of politics (Beamer, 2002).  
This thesis is one of the first studies to categorise political PR practitioners as political 
elites. Practitioners are an elite because formally, they occupy powerful managerial 
positions within political institutions (see Chapter 6). Political PR practitioners are 
considered political elites because they are directly involved in the political process 
(Beamer, 2002), they are involved in the communication dimension of the political 
process.  
Interviewing elites implies additional challenges for the researcher (Desmond, 2004) 
and the data analysis (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002). The main challenge for the 
researcher when conducting elite interviews is the power dimension that appears when 
interviewing political elites  (Smith, 2006). The previous section highlighted the 
relevance of the researcher stimulating interviewees’ self-reflection through questions 
and observations. Nevertheless, in the case of elite interviewing the relationship 
between the interviewee and the researcher is more asymmetrical than in non-elite 
interview settings (Desmond, 2004). In the context of this thesis the asymmetrical 
relationship is related to two elements: the position political PR practitioners occupy 
in parties and governments, and the gender dimension. 
During the interview, and specially during the first minutes, the researcher and the 
interviewee construct and establish the role and identity they will adopt in the 
exchange of information (Kezar, 2003). Chapter 5 explains political PR practice is a 
male-dominated professional field. There are very few female practitioners and part of 
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the professionally accepted behaviours relate to sexist attitudes. In this context, the 
female gender and young age of the interviewer plays a role. However, I did not 
become aware of this limitation until I got the chance to interview female practitioners 
and they exposed their ideas on the gender dimension of the profession. Reflecting on 
my own practices I realised some of my interviews might have been affected by this 
dimension of the profession. 
The role and position of political PR practitioners in political institutions is a challenge 
both for the interview process and the data analysis stage. One of the paradoxes of 
interviewing political PR practitioners is that they are experts in preparing their 
candidates for media interviews –see Chapter 6. In that sense, the researcher faces an 
additional challenge because practitioners feel they can control the interview format, 
despite academic interviews differ from journalistic ones  (Harvey, 2011).  In this 
context, having a background in journalism allowed me to identify when interviewees 
behaved in a media-like attitude. My role in those cases was to remember the 
exploratory and non-political dimension of the interview.  
Finally, the role and position of political PR practitioners is also a challenge for the 
data analysis stage.  Beamer (2002) recommends the researcher should be particularly 
cautious when assessing interviewees’ responses about their roles and contributions as 
they might have been overstated. The following section explains that this challenge 
was taken into consideration during the interview process and it shows the different 
strategies adopted by the researcher to guarantee the validity of the data.  
4.5.3 Operationalization 
In line with this rationale, I operationalised the method in the following way. I opted 
for in-depth interviewing with open-ended questions to allow the participants to 
reconstruct their experiences (Seidman, 2006) and to avoid imposing any previous 
categorizations of the phenomena studied (Fontana and Frey, 2005). However, these 
individual experiences are not to be framed as a single item but as a ‘patchwork quilt’ 
(Saukko, 2005) or as a constructed and flowing narrative of a complex image of what 
these practitioners are. I established two main areas of inquiry related to the research 
goals: 
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- Micro-level, definition of the profession. Practitioners were asked to describe their 
daily routines; their career paths; what they considered to be the ethical norms of 
the occupation; and their relationship with the political organization. 
- Macro-level, contextualization of political public practitioners within the political 
and media sphere. Practitioners were asked to describe their relationships with 
journalists, editors and politicians. I insisted on getting details about their 
strategies. They were asked to evaluate the consequences of the current political 
panorama (independence referendum) for their occupation and their relationship 
with news media.   
During the interview process I used the following strategies to encourage participants 
to reflect on their work and contrast elements of bias in their answers: 
• Interviewing setting. The interviews were conducted as close to the working 
scenario as possible in order to contextualise and observe some real 
interactions. For instance, when interviews took place in the Catalan and the 
Scottish Parliament, respectively, I was able to observe encounters between 
practitioners and parliamentary journalists who sometimes interrupted the 
interviews or walked around the building in their news-gathering daily 
routines.  
• Stimulating competitiveness. One of the main characteristics of the political 
field in democratic societies is its competitive nature (Mazzolenni, 2001). As a 
consequence, political actors like to comment on each other’s point of view, 
statements or actions. Thus, this can be an alternative path to contrast and 
compare different points of view. For example, it is quite common among 
political public relations practitioners to constantly compare and contrast 
their work in order to develop better communication strategies.  
• Referencing hypothetical scenarios. In order to analyse the degree in which 
the speaker is describing actual situations or idealistic ones, the interview 
guidelines include a series of questions that refer to hypothetical scenarios. 
The goal is to force the interviewee to describe how he/she would operate in 
alternative situations. These alternative situations can be historical and well-
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known scenarios such as Tony Blair’s period. 
• Contrasting opinions with written sources. These written sources referred to 
both monographs written by former political public relations practitioners 
(Sellers, 2010; Johnson, 2001; Prince, 2005) or opinion articles written by 
journalists about the work of political public relations. The goal is to stimulate 
the interviewee to express his/her point of view from different perspectives. 
4.5.4  Sampling 
The sampling criteria is of high relevance for the purposes of this thesis. By selecting 
specific interviewees, this thesis establishes the frameworks of who and who cannot 
be considered a political public relations practitioner. Also, by restricting the nature of 
the political organizations included in the sample, this thesis pre-defines the 
organizational context of my definition of the political public relations occupation. 
The process of sampling started after this thesis was granted ethical approval by the 
Department of Media, Communication and Performing Arts at Queen Margaret 
University. 
 
As it can be deducted from the previous statements, political public relations 
practitioners constitute the key informants of this research. This research understands 
political public relations practitioners as the person in charge of the communication 
strategy of a government, political parties and/or political campaign platforms. The 
criteria for sample selection was to refer to those practitioners that held or were in the 
past Head of Communication for Catalan and Scottish political parties or governments. 
I selected practitioners that worked for the two main political institutions involved in 
the production and dissemination of political communication (Mazzoleni, 2010): sub-
state governments and political parties –see Table 4.3.  
 
Table 4.3 Political institutions included in the sample 
 Government 
institutions 
Political Parties 
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Scotland 
Scottish Government: 
Head of Communications. 
Senior Political Spokesperson 
for the First Minister (Special 
Advisor in Communication) 
Scottish National Party 
Director of Strategic 
Communications 
Scottish Labour 
Head of Strategy and 
Communications 
Scottish Conservatives 
Communications Director 
Scottish Greens 
Head of Media 
Scottish Liberals 
Communications Director 
Catalonia 
Catalan Government, 
Generalitat de Catalunya: 
Secretary of Government 
Communication and News 
Media 
Esquerra Republicana 
de Catalunya (ERC) 
Convergència i Unió 
(CiU) 
Partit Popular de 
Catalunya (PPC) 
Partit Socialista de 
Catalunya (PSC) 
Iniciativa per 
Catalunya  
Ciutadans 
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Practitioners occupying the positions described in Table 3.4 have ‘the special 
knowledge, status or communication skills’ (Wellington, 2007: 95) needed to become 
key informants. Through a snowballing process, I gained access to these practitioners 
and I also identified potential interviewees that had not been included in my initial list. 
In that process, I decided to include former practitioners as part of the sample because, 
once liberated from their contractual obligations with the party, these practitioners 
were keen to explain more insightful details than those who practiced the occupation 
at the time of the interview.  
 
To better reflect the contextual determinants of the two cases, I expanded the scope of 
the sampling to referendum campaign platforms because at the time of the interviews 
both Scotland and Catalonia were getting ready to set up independence referendums. 
From a broader point of view, ‘the defining characteristics of political actors are not 
their inherent nature but either if they have political agendas and are trying to influence 
the political process’ (Stromback & Kiousis, 2011:10). However, eventually Catalonia 
was not allowed to set up an official referendum campaign and only Scottish 
referendum campaign platforms (Better Together and Yes Scotland) were included in 
the sample. As it can be observed in Table 4.4, a total of 23 practitioners and former 
practitioners from 13 political parties were interviewed. All participants were given a 
consent form.  
 
There are two key elements that were excluded from the list provided in Table 4.3 that 
need to be justified. The first one is the exclusion of a key political institution in 
Scotland: the Scottish Office. The main reason is that there is no Catalan institution 
equivalent to the Scottish Office. The relationship between the Spanish Government 
and the Catalan Government is not articulated through a dedicated office but through 
a second parliament chamber –Senado- based in Madrid. The focus of this research is 
limited to the sub-state level and for practical purposes, the Scottish Office is a relevant 
institution for future research that explores the political communication dimension in 
the relationship state- sub-state. In terms of the political parties sample, I opted to limit 
my sample to those parties with parliamentary representation at the moment of 
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conducting the interviews.   
 
The second element excluded from the sampling reflected in Table 3.4 is the civil 
service body and its corresponding head that is in charge of communication at the 
Scottish Government. As explained in Chapter 3, there are no civil servants involved 
in communication departments at the Catalan government. There are civil servants 
dealing with administrative tasks but all management levels, the one this research is 
interested in, are politically appointed. In that sense, some of the very interesting 
debates that happen in the Scottish and also, UK context between the professional body 
of civil servants doing non-political government communication and special advisors 
in communication providing the political intake are non-existent in the Catalan case.  
 
Table 4.4 shows the names of each interviewee and the political institution they were 
working for and/or worked in the past. The aim of Table 4.4 is to explain that the same 
interviewee sometimes had worked for different political institutions. Most cases that 
related to the party’s position (government or opposition) but in Catalonia’s case there 
were two interviewees that had worked for more than one party –see Chapter 5 for 
more information.  
 
Table 4.4 List of interviewees and political institutions they worked for 
INTERVIEWEES 
POLITICAL INSTITUTION 
Political Party  Government  
John Fellows Scottish National Party - 
Kevin Pringle 
Scottish National Party 
Yes, Scotland 
Scottish Government (SNP) 
Stuart Nicholson  - Scottish Government (SNP) 
Simon Pia Scottish Labour - 
Rami Okasha Scottish Labour - 
John Mclellan Scottish Conservatives - 
Ramsay Jones 
Scottish Conservatives UK Government (Special 
Advisor on Scotland) 
Susan Stewart Yes, Scotland - 
Rob Shorthouse Better Together - 
Jason Rose Scottish Greens - 
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James Mackenzie Scottish Greens - 
Adam Clark Scottish Liberals - 
David Madí Convergència i Unió Catalan Government (CiU) 
Francesc Sanchez Convergència  - 
Veronica Fumanal 
Ciutadans  
+ 
 Partit Socialista de Catalunya 
- 
Eladio Jareño 
Partit Popular de Catalunya 
+ 
Partit Socialista de Catalunya 
- 
Toni Bolaño Partit Socialista de Catalunya Catalan Government (PSC) 
Victor Francos Partit Socialista de Catalunya - 
Pep Taberner Partit Socialista de Catalunya Catalan Government (PSC) 
Marc Rius Iniciativa per Catalunya - 
Jordi Trilla Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya Catalan Government (ERC) 
Sergi Sol Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya - 
 
This list of participants does not aim to be exhaustive, but rather a representative 
sample of the wide range of practitioners in Scotland and Catalonia. As observed in 
Table 4.4, I successfully managed to interview at least one practitioner from each 
political party in Scotland and Catalonia. However, because of the snowballing 
process, participants influenced the selection of interviewees through their 
recommendations and suggestions (Taylor, Bogdan and DeVault, 2016). At least five 
more practitioners were contacted but most of them rejected my interview offer 
because of confidentiality issues.  
4.6  Qualitative data analysis 
This section provides a rationale for the qualitative data analysis method deployed and 
a detailed account on how the data analysis was carried out. The data is systematised 
through thematic analysis and data coding. The data analysis and the process of 
conclusion-drawing are underpinned by the concept of discourse and social practice 
(Fairclough, 2001).  
Amongst the biggest challenges in the interviewing process are data analysis and data 
interpretation (Gibson and Brown, 2009). The researcher needs to be forefront and 
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transparent in the use of methods of data analysis to claim the validity of the results 
and the subsequent generation of knowledge (Roulston, 2011). For that reason, this 
section explains the approaches taken to each one of the concurrent steps in qualitative 
data analysis: data reduction, data display, and conclusion-drawing (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994).  
The approach taken to conclusion-drawing determines previous steps in data reduction 
and data display (Gibson and Brown, 2009). In this case, the data analysis and 
conclusion-drawing stems from the assumption that practices and discursive resources 
are interconnected (Fairclough, 2001). This thesis draws conclusions on the 
characteristics and practices of a professional group using interviewees’ responses. 
The underlying idea is that interviewees ‘interpret and represent to themselves and 
each other what they do, and these interpretations and representations shape and 
reshape what they do [social practices]’ (Fairclough, 2001, p. 4). From that 
perspective, interviewees’ responses are not only isolated discourses, but are 
constitutive elements of their daily practices, actions and reflections. This thesis draws 
conclusions in trying to establish a nuanced explanation of how political public 
relations practitioners reflect on their own practices and wider social systems. The final 
aim is to generate knowledge on both the practitioner-level and systemic-level 
elements that build the political public relations occupation. 
The data analysis process starts with the transcription of the material as the researcher 
has to make a series of decisions that can eventually discriminate, vary or expand the 
empirical data available for analysis (Roulston, 2011). At this point, I opted for a 
verbatim transcription respecting the original language of the interviews: English, 
Spanish and Catalan, despite knowing that might limit the accessibility of the 
transcripts. However, political public relations practitioners, as experts in the use of 
the language, were keen on using games of words, metaphors comparisons and bad 
language that only made sense in the original language and that enlightened my 
understanding of the phenomena. Only those quotes used in the data analysis chapters 
have been translated to English.  
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The data is analysed following thematic analysis in three steps: examining 
commonalities, differences and relationships (Gibson and Brown, 2009). In this case, 
the data is coded combining a series of deductive a priori categories with inductive 
empirical codes. This data analysis method derives from the use of semi-structured, 
in-depth interviews. Pre-established areas of inquiry in the interviews –see section 4.5- 
were transformed into a priori general categories to locate these themes in the data 
(examination of commonalities; see Table 4.5).  These categories were then combined 
with inductive codes that indicated how these general themes were expressed in the 
data. For instance, the relationship between the interviewee and a journalist is coded 
using the double label ‘relationship with journalists: conflictive’. Or when significant 
elements of their professional identity were detected I would signal them as 
‘professional identity: ideological boundaries’ (examination of differences). As 
observed in Table 4.5, five general codes emerged (these are only the most significant 
and common empirical codes.  
 
Table 4.5 List of data analysis codes 
General theme- a priori 
codes 
Specific issue- empirical codes 
Professional identity 
Background experience 
Evaluation of colleagues 
Media relations 
Ethics 
Issues in the relationship 
Independence referendum 
Media subsidies (Catalonia) 
Strategy 
Social media 
Role in the party 
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Job descriptions 
Tasks 
Daily routines 
These codes were transferred to NVivo to facilitate the process of identifying patterns 
and differences. NVivo proved to be a useful tool to store data and codes. Nevertheless, 
patterns of relationships and differences were best observed with manual analysis of 
codes. Table 4.5 shows that coding demonstrated interesting relationships between the 
general topics and specific issues (examination of relationships). For instance, ethical 
considerations only emerged as related to the interviewees’ relationships with news 
media and not with their job descriptions or professional identity. The following data 
analysis chapters will explore the relationships between the five big categorical codes 
above and the empirical data.  
4.6.1 The theoretical framework and the data analysis 
The analysis of the data is structured in three chapters. Each chapter (see table 4.1 and 
4.2) explores a different dimension of the data starting from the micro-level dynamics 
of practitioners’ professional identity (chapter 5); to the immediate macro-level of 
practitioners’ role in political institutions (chapter 6); to the wider macro-level context 
of practitioners’ interaction with the media and political spheres (chapter 7). This 
structure not only reflects the different levels of analysis but it is supported by the 
theoretical framework previously described. 
Chapter 5 is supported by the concept of hybrid professions and hybrid 
professionalism (Noordegraaf, 2007; Schinkel and Noordegraaf, 2011). The chapter 
assumes that identities in workplaces are not restricted to the existence of formalised 
professional structures but shared values, ideologies and approaches to work routines 
also play a relevant role. In that sense, the chapter explores formalised professional 
structures such as career paths and professional knowledge, along with shared values 
and ideologies.   
Chapter 6 explores the relationship between institutions and political PR practitioners. 
The chapter is supported by the concept of institutions as dynamic social constructs 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) . The chapter explores how practitioners make sense 
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and describe their routines in the context of different political institutions (parties and 
governments). In that sense, it explores how individual agents can make sense of the 
institutional environment where they operate. 
Chapter 7 analyses the data underpinned by the media and political system concepts. 
The chapter explores how practitioners understand and perceive they play a role in the 
relationship between these two institutional spheres. The analysis is based on the idea 
that political institutions (in this case, parties and governments) form a distinct sphere 
from that of media institutions (news media, online platforms) but there is a constant 
relationship flux between the two of them. The political PR practitioner is in this 
chapter assumed to have a key influential role in this relationship. The relationship 
between the two spheres is analysed taking into consideration the elements outlined 
by Hallin and Mancini (2004) in their theory of media system models.  
To conclude, this thesis approached the analysis of empirical data combining 
qualitative analysis with a thematic analysis approach to coding. Relationships 
between codes and categories are understood as a discursive construction of practices 
and reflection of the wider systemic structures (i.e. media systems). 
 
4.7  Conclusions 
This chapter has presented the two main research questions and the methodological 
design of this thesis. There are two key elements in this chapter. The first is the unit of 
analysis, and therefore the main perspective of this thesis, is that of political public 
relations practitioners. These practitioners’ reflections and testimonies –carefully 
obtained through in-depth interviews- are the core data this thesis works with. The 
second element is the dual analysis that runs through this thesis. This thesis explores 
political public relations practitioners by combining micro- and macro-level analysis 
from a comparative perspective. Two main research questions lead this combined 
analysis: what are the constitutive elements of the performance and practice of the 
political public relations profession?; and how do specific national media systems 
impact the political public relations profession?  The analysis of the data –through 
thematic coding- builds up from the constitutive elements of the profession to the role 
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and functions in political parties and governments, to finally explore the impact of the 
wider media system on the profession.  
 
CHAPTER 5 THE POLITICAL PUBLIC RELATIONS PRACTITIONER: 
PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY AND PROFESSIONALISM 
 
This chapter focuses on the performance of political public relations. The chapter 
examines the main characteristics of the individual political public relations 
professional and the core elements of their professionalism. This chapter is the first of 
the three chapters that analyse the data obtained from in-depth interviews with political 
public relations professionals. As explained in Chapter 4, the data analysis is structured 
in three steps and three corresponding chapters that go from the micro-level dimension 
to the macro-level.   
The aim of this chapter is to explore the performative aspect (Feldman and Pentland, 
2003) of the daily routines and actions of political PR practitioners. The goal of the 
chapter is to explore what norms, values and professional profiles relate to the 
professional group of political PR. In order to do so, this chapter draws from the 
analysis of the socio-demographic characteristics of the interview sample, and from 
the analysis of professional identity elements found in the interview responses. The 
analysis is based on the assumption that professional structures are not necessarily 
linked to formal structures, such as having a certified body of scientific knowledge 
(Noordegraaf, 2007). Professionalism is understood as emerging from a defined 
professional identity (Evetts, 2013) based on a series of professional norms and 
professional (ethical) principles. 
The main argument of the chapter is as follows.  Practitioners identify themselves as 
part of a specific social group restricted to those with previous experience in media or 
party politics management, and with a good network of contacts within the party. The 
ideal practitioner is presented as someone who remains in the shadows, combining 
exclusive dedication to serving the needs of the media with loyalty to party or 
government’s interests.  
The structure of the chapter is as follows. The chapter is divided in three sections. The 
first section outlines the main socio-demographic characteristics of the interview 
sample to explore the profile of political public relations practitioners. The second 
section examines the career paths and entry requirements for the profession as 
understood by practitioners. The final section analyses principles and the ideal type of 
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the political public relations practitioner. This section outlines interviewees’ beliefs 
and values related to the norms and occupational behaviours that characterise the 
‘ideal’ spin doctor. 
5.1 The socio-demographic profile of political public relations 
This section examines the demographic profile of the interviewees. The aim is to 
explore whether there is a common profile of a political public relations practitioner 
and, in that case, to determine its distinctive elements. The data gathered for this 
section combines interviewees’ biographical data with descriptions of their working 
experiences. At the beginning of each interview, each participant was asked to 
elaborate on what career choices lead them to become the Head of Media of a political 
party. 
As observed in Table 5.1, it seems clear that the most dominant profile is a male aged 
between 40 and late 50s.  Regardless of the political and the national context, these 
practitioners are senior professionals in the sense that they all have long previous 
careers in the fields of media and/or politics. According to these descriptions, most of 
the interviewees developed large or substantial professional careers before joining 
their position as communication directors. They all describe periods of 7-20 years of 
previous experience in related fields before they moved to work as political public 
relations professionals. 
Table 5.1 Professional background of interviewees 
NATION PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE GENDER 
FORMAL 
EDUCATION 
POSTERIOR 
JOB 
S
C
O
T
L
A
N
D
 
+5 years internal positions within the party 
+15 years internal positions within the 
party 
+10 years as a Journalist 
Male 
Male 
Male 
 
Political Science 
Journalism 
PR practitioner 
Lobbyist 
Still in the same 
position 
+20 years as a Journalist Male  Media 
pundit/lecturer 
+5 years internal positions within the party Male  PR practitioner 
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+15 years as a Journalist Male Journalism Director of 
newspaper trade 
body 
+10 years Journalist Male  Special advisor 
on Scottish 
affairs (UK 
government) 
+20 years internal positions within the 
party 
Male   
+20 years as civil servant/public relations Female   
+10 years Civil Servant/ public relations Male  PR practitioner 
+15 years as Journalist/ public relations Male No degree Still in the job 
+ 10 years public relations/internal 
positions within the party 
Male Anthropology PR practitioner 
+5 years internal positions within the party Male History Still in the job 
C
A
T
A
L
O
N
IA
 
+10 years internal positions within the 
party 
Male Law Consultant 
+ 10 years local politician and internal 
positions within the party 
Male Law Still in the job 
+5 years public relations Female Political Science Current head of 
comms for 
another party 
+ 20 years public relations Male Pedagogy Director of 
RTVE in 
Catalonia 
(Spanish 
broadcaster) 
+ 10 years Public Relations and internal 
positions within the party  
Male Journalism Media pundit 
+5 years internal positions within the party Male Law Not known 
+10 years as a Journalist Male Journalism Head of Comms 
for local 
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5.1.1  Formal education 
In general terms, 95% of the interviewees had a university degree connected with their 
previous professional experience. In both Scotland and Catalonia, these practitioners 
primarily hold university degrees in Politics, Sociology, Anthropology, Journalism 
and Law. According to the data, formal education, understood as a university or 
graduate degree, is not considered essential to obtain the job position and/or practice 
the occupation. However, two changes can be observed in this area: some practitioners 
in Catalonia and Scotland recognise that there is an increasing professionalisation as 
more university diplomas are ‘helping’ the profession; and in Catalonia it seems to be 
common practice to attend a short diploma course on Strategic Campaigning at George 
Washington University (USA) either before or after accepting the job position.  
Interviewees described the profession as not requiring a certified university title. They 
justified this professional norm because the knowledge required for the profession 
emerges from the daily practice of journalism or politics: 
 ‘My training back then was irrelevant – what they were interested in was my 
knowledge of the media scene and my understanding of personalities’ 
(Scotland, February 2014); 
 ‘I have no formal training in politics or communications, I was interested in 
politics. Actually I didn't find that [formal training] was an important element 
but I found the most useful thing was understanding politics’ (Scotland, 
February 2014). 
politicians (same 
party) 
+10 years internal positions within the 
party 
Male Philosophy Still in the job 
+ 10 years Public Relations and internal 
positions within the party 
Male Publicity PR practitioner 
+5 years as a journalist and internal 
positions within the party 
Male Journalism Still in the job 
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University degrees’ lack of relevance was a common feature in Scotland and 
Catalonia. However, two spin doctors in Catalonia and Scotland recognised that the 
occupation is becoming ‘professionalised’ in a positive way thanks to the emergence 
of new university degrees: 
‘There is an increasing professionalisation in political PR. I think a lot of 
courses at Queen Margaret University and Stirling and elsewhere are really 
helping’ (Scotland, February 2014). 
 ‘I think that nowadays in Spain there must be six masters and consequently 
there are lots of professionals with these diplomas. This is an increasing 
tendency and more and more political consultancies are being created’ 
(Catalonia April, 2014). 
Despite the strong similarities in terms of the academic background of the Scottish and 
the Catalan practitioners, as shown in table 5.1, the Catalan case has some singularities. 
During informal conversations I had with people connected to the Catalan political 
sphere, I was told that most Catalan practitioners before or after joining their 
employment usually attend a short diploma course in Strategic Politics at the George 
Washington University (USA).  Only two of the interviewees admitted their parties 
had paid for the short course, but it was quite relevant the way they described the 
course as the ‘famous forum’ where all the spin doctors met. One of the spin doctors 
not only had attended the course but he spent several months in the USA following 
Obama’s 2009 election campaign to ‘learn and observe some of the most modern 
election campaign technique’ (Catalonia April, 2014). 
5.1.2 A male-dominated occupation 
The data demonstrates that political public relations is a male-dominated occupation 
both in Scotland and Catalonia. There are two elements in the data that indicate the 
existence of a male-dominated occupation: the number of male practitioners is 
overwhelmingly superior to female practitioners (see Table 4.1); and interviewees 
describe sexist attitudes as something common in the occupation.  
Table 5.1 clearly shows that Communications Directors are usually male practitioners. 
Female practitioners have been the exception in both nations. Gender imbalance is not 
only a matter of numbers but it is also characteristic of the nature of this role. For 
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instance, interviewees admit that there are fewer women than men practising the 
occupation: 
‘In this profession, there are few women and a lot of men’ (Catalonia April, 
2014). 
Some interviewees, specifically female practitioners, went beyond the debate on 
numbers and associated the occupation of spin doctor with a series of masculine 
attitudes. As recognised by the only Scottish female spin doctor interviewed, there are 
a series of male attitudes and behaviours that have been traditionally accepted in the 
occupation: 
‘I think that the political spin doctor has been very much a male dominated 
domain. I think that is worth examining in terms of the conduct of the debate 
and the way we treat each other’(Scotland, February 2014). 
Male-dominated attitudes are associated with managing relationships with colleagues 
and journalists. This interviewee describes the profession as a ‘contact sport’, making 
a clear reference to rugby as a sport associated with roughness, brutal force and non-
feminine attitudes. Similarly, another interviewee describes these ‘macho’ attitudes as: 
‘You know, the best kind of spin doctors was the kind that shouted out people 
in a really aggressive and macho manner’ (Scotland interview data, February 
2014). 
Aggressive language and manners are described as the ‘macho’ spin doctor attitude. 
These ‘macho’ attitudes and conducts were also recognised by the Catalan female 
counter-part, though from a more personal perspective. It is worthwhile pointing out 
that the Catalan female practitioner, when asked about the gender imbalance situation, 
requested an off-the-record statement. However, as the conversation developed and 
we changed the topic, she again approached the imbalance from the perspective of the 
personal obstacles she faced everyday at work. She connected her feminine physical 
appearance with her struggle to obtain professional prestige due to a series of typically 
masculine attitudes: 
 ‘I am a reactive person and I need to be more aggressive than the others to get 
people’s respect… If people believe that because I am blonde or because I am 
a woman, then I am more stupid I can play with that and surprise them. That is 
an opportunity for me’ (Catalonia April, 2014). 
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As also shown in the previous quote, the issue of aggressiveness emerges as a 
necessary attitude for the occupation. Interviewees considered aggressiveness as 
something related to male practitioners or something female practitioners need to 
demonstrate more than their male counterparts, as observed in the quote above. Gender 
imbalances have been reported in those professions that serve as entry careers for 
political public relations practitioners, such as public relations practitioners working 
in corporate settings (Grunig, Hon and Toth, 2013); politicians (Folke and Rickne, 
2016; Greene and O’Brien, 2016); and journalists (Byerly, 2013).  
 It is worthwhile to note that in some of the informal conversations that took place 
during the fieldwork, some of the people that are working or worked for political 
parties also pointed to the existence of a ‘macho’ spin doctor culture. In a very casual 
way, the ‘macho’ spin doctor culture was described as a working environment 
dominated by elevated levels of alcohol consumption, as a normal practice to formalise 
some of the agreements and encounters with journalists; and also as a working 
environment where impoliteness and strong reactions that included harmful language 
happened quite often. However, as is explained in chapter 7, when the interviewees 
were asked about these attitudes in their daily relationships with journalists, these 
experiences were constantly denied and they accused other practitioners of behaving 
in such inappropriate ways. 
5.1.3 Experts in Scotland and Catalonia 
According to the data, political public relations practitioners developed their previous 
careers within the political and media spheres of each small nation. Amongst the data, 
there are no cases of former London-based journalists that are offered positions as 
Head of Communication in any Scottish political party in the sample. Equally there 
are no former Catalan journalists that obtained their media expertise in Madrid-based 
media. Similarly, those practitioners that are former party employees described their 
previous positions as always being related to Scotland and Catalonia. For instance, 
they would work in Madrid or London parliaments but dealing with Catalan or Scottish 
issues.  
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5.1.4 Career-paths 
This section combines the demographic data described above, along with 
interviewees’ descriptions, to describe the two main career paths that exist in the 
profession. The aim is to explore whether these two career paths have wider 
consequences for the profession or whether they are just established routes of access. 
As demonstrated in Figure 5.1, political public relations are either former journalists 
or PR practitioners (media route); or they are former party employees (political route). 
 
The number of interviewees that came either from a political or a media route is quite 
similar in Scotland and Catalonia: 
Table 5.2 Interviewees’ career routes 
 Political route Media Route 
Scotland 39% 61% 
Catalonia 40% 60% 
 
Formal 
education 
Professional 
background 
University 
degree  
Journalism 
Public Relations 
Public Affairs 
Party employee 
Internal 
promotion 
Media route 
Political route 
i. e Political 
Science, 
Law, 
Anthropolog
y 
5 to 10 years of  
experience 
Professional 
/personal 
contacts with 
the party 
Reasons for 
appointment 
Figure 5.1 Career paths 
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As it can be observed in Table 5.2, practitioners coming from the media route seem to 
be the dominant in Scotland and Catalonia. However, as a word of caution, the 
dominance of one route over the other might just be because of this specific sample of 
professionals. Practitioners refer to these two routes as the traditional path to access 
the profession: 
 ‘Most people would obviously come through either journalism or politics as 
their career to end up what I am doing, that would be far more traditional. A 
lot of my contemporaries might well be in journalism or something like and 
then cross the line to political communications’ (Scotland, February 2014). 
By describing these two routes as ‘traditional’, the interviewee is indicating the 
existence of a established system of informal credentialism in the profession –similar 
quotes were found in almost all interviews. The system would require the practitioner 
to have a career in media or politics as his or her credential to then, as the interviewee 
above describes, cross the line to the new profession. Despite both routes being 
described as traditional, there seems to be a significant identity variation between the 
two routes. Practitioners defend their professionalism as being better because of their 
background either in politics or media. Edwards (2014) identified similar systems of 
informal credentialism in the UK’s public relations industry. In this case, public 
relations trade publications create a system of informal credentialism by promoting 
ideal models of professionals that exclude working class practitioners and members of 
minority communities. The following sub-sections examine the differences found 
amongst practitioners in each route.   
5.1.4.1 Political career route: working for the party 
The so-called ‘political’ route is one of the two ways of achieving the expertise and 
knowledge regarded as essential to become part of the political PR professional group.  
In this case, political means that the professionals that are hired as communication 
heads of a political party have previously developed their careers working in different 
positions within the same party. Commonly, following this route implies that the 
practitioner starts working for the party from a low level position –compared to the 
management position of a head of communication- such as researcher for an MP or 
MSP; campaign manager; aide to ministers; or, in some cases, they start working for 
their juvenile or student branches. According to their descriptions, being appointed 
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Head of Communication was similar to an internal promotion that in most cases 
happened because of a combination of different circumstances. There are two main 
circumstances that were described as catalysers of the promotion: changes in the 
leadership of the party and electoral outcomes.   
The notion of a political route is firmly recognised by the same practitioners:  
‘It was kind of a political route...So it wasn’t that long going ambition of mine 
thinking one day I will work in Scottish politics but I just like the way things 
have turned out.’ (Scotland, February 2014); 
 ‘I think that my background was not from a professional communication 
background, it was from a political background’ (Scotland, February 2014). 
As can be seen in the quotes above, practitioners label themselves as belonging to one 
of the two routes. The step towards achieving the Head of Communication position 
usually relates to changes in the leadership of the party: 
‘I went to work with the Catalan Economy Minister and he named me his Chief 
of Staff. I started doing communication stuff when there is a change in the 
minister’s political career. He was named party’s spokesperson and he named 
me Director of the Office of the Spokesperson’ (Catalonia April, 2014). 
Being promoted to the position of Head of Communication is also connected with 
electoral outcomes: 
‘At the end of 2006 I got asked to go back to work for the SNP for the next 
year’s election… When we won the election I went to work in the Scottish 
Government as the First Minister’s Special Advisor focusing on the media’ 
(Scotland, February 2014). 
In the above case, the interviewee was promoted from campaign manager to 
Government Special Advisor because of a successful campaign. One of the 
peculiarities of the interviewees that followed this route is that they felt in the need to 
justify that they had good knowledge of the media environment despite being an 
internal party employee: 
‘I didn't have a media role directly but it was largely about generating 
information, briefing documents. Those things would be useful in a media 
context ideally, in terms of an argument that you want to pursue in a press 
release’ (Scotland, February 2014) 
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As it can be observed, some of the practitioners felt the need to justify the legitimacy 
of their career path. One of the interviewees explained that practitioners that come 
from a political route are sometimes questioned: 
 ‘Sometimes journalists think that I am a shit and lazy because I have always 
worked in politics and I don’t have the capacity to work outside my party doing 
something else. You can say that when you know it’s true. However, the 
journalist doesn’t know that I have worked in a bar for many years, also at the 
university, I was an intern, I worked as a lawyer’ (Catalonia April, 2014). 
The perception of why they are promoted is a sensitive point. Practitioners feel they 
are accused, in this case by journalists, of being promoted because of their political 
alliances and not their communication expertise. Trying to challenge these accusations 
of a lack of professionalism, another interviewee argued that spin doctors who 
followed the political route have better skills than the ‘others’ that are former 
journalists and PR practitioners: 
‘The best ones were the ones that came from a political background, the ones 
that came from a journalistic background might have some technical skills or 
some interesting insights to the production process. But the most valuable thing 
was just a good political sense of what it is wrong or right, what people want 
to know and if you don’t have that, you better don’t work in politics then’ 
(Scotland, February 2014). 
Their main argument is that they possess better knowledge of the internal functioning 
of the party than those who come from an external context. The underlying idea is that 
of transferable skills from one position to another. As demonstrated in the next section, 
media route professionals also justify their role because of their transferable skills. The 
next section demonstrates that, despite the apparent differences between the two sets 
of professions, these two career paths signal very similar elements.  
5.1.4.2 Media career path: journalism & public relations 
Having a career in journalism or public relations is also an access route to the 
profession of political PR. Table 5.3 shows that more than a half of the practitioners 
interviewed for this research who were hired as heads of communication were 
previously journalists or public relations practitioners. Practitioners who followed this 
route of access to the occupation identify themselves as different and better suited for 
the occupation because of their media skills. However, the data also points out that 
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personal networks between these practitioners and politicians play a very significant 
role in the selection process.  
Former journalists and PR practitioners contend they have the right set of skills to 
generate messages, as well as useful personal connections with journalists and 
newspapers editors: 
‘What they were interested in was my knowledge of the media scene and my 
understanding of personalities. Journalists understand more what is going to 
work as a story and not going to work, how things are going to play out in the 
media or not. So they are basically buying media expertise when they appoint 
people like me’ (Scotland, February 2014);  
‘I would never hire a spin doctor that has never worked before in news media. 
There are plenty of reasons: firstly, because you know people; secondly 
because the profile is less aggressive for journalist; and thirdly you are an 
outsider and you have external points of view – this is quite important because 
when you have been in a party for a long time you only see the internal point 
of view’ (Catalonia April, 2014). 
They consider themselves to be external experts that can bring specialised skills and 
contacts to the party. Interviewees describe how they transfer skills from journalism 
to political public relations. As previously explained, those experts coming from a 
political route also referred to their capability of transferring skills from party politics 
to political public relations. Therefore, it can be assumed that political public relations 
is a profession partly constituted by knowledge generated in other professions, namely 
journalism and public relations.  
Practitioners coming from a political route transferred to political public relations 
because of internal promotions. However, personal networks with the party seem to 
be the key for former journalists to enter the political public relations profession: 
‘I had a lot of contacts in the political world from all sites of the political 
spectrum. I had very good contacts with the Conservative Party, particularly in 
Scotland’ (Scotland, February 2014); 
 ‘I was not very keen on the Catalan Socialist Party. I did not plan to make a 
career in political communication. It was not an ideological decision, I was just 
thinking in my professional career… But I ended up accepting the job offer, 
the conditions were good and I am good friends with the person who made the 
offer. I knew we were going to get along’ (Catalonia April, 2014). 
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These two quotes explain that ideological affiliation was less significant than personal 
and professional connections for employment. Interviewees also explained that job 
offers came at a moment that they were not necessarily looking out for new 
professional opportunities. Job offers reflected parties’ communication needs and were 
not formally advertised. This feature indicates the profession’s system of double 
closure: practitioners need a personal network of contacts, and a previous career in 
politics or media to access the profession.  
Personal networks and political affiliations seem to be key not only in Scotland and 
Catalonia, but also in the US political consultant market (Bohne, Prevost and Thurber, 
2009). Amongst all interviewees, only three former journalists or PR practitioners 
admitted they had joined the party as members or activists one or two years before 
being offered the job. However, almost all former journalists and PR had joined the 
party or became ideologically affiliated with the party after starting their job. There 
were some exceptions in Catalonia’s case. Section 5.3.2 explores in detail the role of 
political ideology in the political public relations profession.  
5.1.4.3 The timings of the profession 
According to the data, political public relations professionals get in and out of political 
public relations positions. The high demands of the job, in addition to political tempos, 
as explained by interviewees, make it almost impossible to remain in the same position 
and in the profession for a long time. The analysis of the data shows that both Scottish 
and Catalan practitioners become media pundits, lobbyists, news media directors or 
public relations professionals in big corporations (see table 4.1). Practitioners explain 
one of the main difficulties of the profession is the 24/7 work routine and the 
subsequent feeling of burn out:    
‘The thing is that you burn out. It’s literally seven days a week, the only time I 
switched off my phone is when I was on an airplane. Sometimes even at half-
past six in the morning until midnight seven days a week, that was what it was 
like. Even at weekends, Saturday is actually really busy because all the Sunday 
papers were preparing their stories and Sunday was really busy because all the 
Monday newspapers were following up what was on the Sunday newspapers. 
You can’t do that forever. I did it for five years and it was a long time and most 
people probably do it for less’ (Edinburgh, February 2014); 
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‘I can completely understand why people do certain things. After the campaign 
I was exhausted, it was three years non-stop specially the last three months so 
it’s tiring. So you understand why people would do big campaigns or one term 
of government and then leave and do something else’ (Edinburgh, February 
2014). 
The political public relations profession is highly demanding; however, these former 
journalists and party employees are the only ones that handle the pressure of 24/7 news 
cycle. Therefore, the difficulties of the job are, at the same time, the reason why these 
professionals are needed. The underlying idea is that only an exclusive group of 
people, with the right skills, can handle the high levels of responsibility, pressure to 
perform and manage critical or tense situations: 
 ‘It’s a difficult job because you are constantly under pressure to perform so 
people will always look to you to fix it’ (Edinburgh May, 2015); 
 ‘The job implies a lot of activity; many worries, a lot of pressure and a lot of 
critical moments. If you let yourself go with all that, then you have a bad time 
and you are in a very tense situation that doesn’t let you think properly’ 
(Catalonia, April 2014). 
The above quotes start to outline the performance of the political public relations 
identity. Practitioners see themselves as the ‘fixers’ because their role is to provide 
creative solutions to communication issues.  
5.1.2  Key findings 
The analysis of the interviewees’ socio-demographic characteristics indicates that: 
- The profession has a system of closure based on two elements: personal 
networks and a previous career in politics or media. Classic credential 
elements such as university degrees are not required.  
- Professionals’ careers are usually restricted to the boundaries of the sub-state 
dimension. 
- The profession is associated with aggressive male attitudes and female 
practitioners are the exception.  
- The two routes of access to the occupation –media and politics- show 
practitioners diverging on what skills are mostly needed for the occupation. 
These disputes indicate that the profession is based on a constant balance 
between party politics and media services. 
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-  The profession’s knowledge is based on transferable skills from politics, 
journalism and public relations. 
5.2 The principles of the professional political public relations: the ideal 
practitioner 
This last section of the chapter is focused on examining the portrayal of the ideal 
political public relations professional. This section focuses on  ‘the constellation of 
attributes, beliefs, values, motives, and experiences in terms of which people define 
themselves in a professional role’ (Schein, 1978 in Ibarra et al., 1999 p.764). This 
section explores professionalism in the political public relations profession by looking 
into what norms and occupational behaviours characterise the ideal practitioner.  To 
that point, four elements are analysed in this section: ethical norms; sense of public 
service orientation; ideological identification with the party’s principles; and public 
notoriety. 
This section demonstrates that despite the absence of formal institutions that dictate 
professional norms and ethical codes, practitioners share common perceptions of what 
norms and occupational behaviours are to be expected within the occupation. It also 
reinforces the idea that the political public relations profession is constantly framed by 
the tensions occurring between the media and the political sphere. Practitioners 
consider the space between the media and the political sphere their professional 
jurisdiction.  
5.2.1 The negotiation of the professional identity in the public forum 
Public exposure seems to be key in crafting the identity of the political public relations 
professional. The professional practitioner remains in the shadow of the party or 
political leader. The good professional should never be more visible than the politician 
either in the media or inside their own organisation. This is certainly important because 
it emerged in both cases, considering that Catalan practitioners have never been in the 
media’s focus as the Scottish ones have. There is no tradition in Catalan media to 
portray political PR practitioners or use the term ‘spin doctor’: they might appear as 
unattributed sources, but they do not have the media visibility that, for example, 
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Scottish practitioners have. Despite this, the data shows that the idealised image of an 
invisible practitioner can be found in the two cases. This conceptualisation of 
professionalism is linked to the debates that surround the figure of ‘spin doctor’ (see 
also section 5.3.2). 
Interviewees argued that the ideal practitioner remains behind the scenes, 
understanding that his or her role is always to generate visibility for the political leader 
or the party and not for his or her own interests. The underlying idea is that the 
professional practitioner understands his or her role is not a political one. Politicians 
need public visibility to gain electoral support and to construct their role as party 
leaders. However, political PR practitioners do not need public visibility to succeed in 
their workplace, and they do not need to be considered party leaders. Consequently, 
the professional practitioner is someone ‘humble’: 
 ‘I think the best spin doctors remain in the shadows… You need a spin doctor 
because there are a lot of news media, but if you are a good politician you will 
be really dictating what is being -- it’s not the spin doctor telling you what to 
do… It’s not your own ideas and your own policy. You have to work with the 
politician and it’s they who are supposed to deliver what the policy is and you 
have to craft out the best way to deliver that through the media’ (Edinburgh, 
April 2014); 
‘The success of my work would always be for the party, not for myself. It is 
not in my interest to be publicly known as the person who made the party 
succeed because one day I won’t be there’ (Catalonia, April 2014). 
Catalan practitioners reflected on the need to remain ‘in the shadows’ in the sense that 
they should not take ownership of the party’s success. In a very similar way to Catalan 
practitioners, Scottish practitioners affirmed that the spin doctor is a managerial 
position in the shadows to deliver what the politician demands. In that sense, those 
practitioners that seek public visibility are criticised: 
‘Such spin doctor [names a specific person] is the anti-spin doctor. If you look 
closely to any of the President’s television shots he is always at the back 
wearing this unique glasses, you can always identify him. They are people that 
are looking for media attention’ (Catalonia, April 2014); 
‘You are dead if you become the story in the news. Spin doctors should never 
become the story; there are too many big egos who want to be the story’ 
(Edinburgh, February 2014). 
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As it can be observed, seeking media exposure is regarded as lacking professionalism. 
However, in the Catalan case media exposure is limited to being physically in a photo 
opportunity, whereas in the Scottish case media exposure refers to the spin doctor 
becoming the story. The main difference between the two cases is that of the dangers 
of media exposure. In general terms, Scottish practitioners were much more assertive 
when analysing the implications and consequences of media exposure because it is 
common practice for them to become the centre of a news story.  
‘It was career damaging if you become the story -- that is fatally how it can go. 
So it is really important not to. But you really try and work in the shadow sense 
sinister. Your job is to get a story for the politicians and if you can’t do that, 
and if you are getting into the story, then you are getting into your own way, 
so it was really dangerous to do. We would try not to do it’ (Edinburgh, 
February 2014). 
They consider that being exposed in the media is career damaging because the reason 
for becoming a news story is usually a negative issue that will eventually damage the 
politician’s public image: 
‘I wouldn’t see a spin doctor in the news for a very positive story. I think the 
best is not to be in the news and, if you are in the news, try and get out very 
quickly. The reason is because you are not there to be in the news – that is what 
politicians or politicians are there for.  I think there is something going wrong 
basically if you are in the news. It has happened in one or two occasions and in 
my case as well. The best thing is to not basically feed whatever has caused 
that and if there is a problem, try and solve that, but basically to come out of 
that public domain’(Edinburgh, February 2014) 
One of the most revealing things, when talking about media exposure with some of 
the interviewees, is that this is not only a matter of journalists quoting them or using 
them as a news story; it is also a strategy that the same practitioners use to diminish 
and attack political opponents: 
‘One of the things we were trying to do, when they were doing that to us, then 
we would try and get other spin doctor from other parties named in the news. 
We would always demand investigations on what the spin doctor has done or 
things like that or we had FOI direct correspondence between special advisors, 
so with everyone working in the government there. And likewise, they did the 
same to us. I lost track the number of times people demanded my resignation 
from other parties’ (Edinburgh, February 2014). 
 130 
This reinforces the idea that is an occupational principle not to be exposed to the 
media: it is not a consequence of misunderstandings with journalists, but it is regarded 
as an occupational duty. Overall, Scottish practitioners were reluctant to use any of 
their personal stories to exemplify the consequences of media exposure; instead, some 
of them referred to what happened to their colleagues. There was one case that 
constantly emerged because it had happened around the same time the interviews were 
being conducted: 
‘But you cannot afford to become the story. Two weekends ago Paul Sinclair, 
who works for the Scottish Labour, he is in the press because he is on twitter 
saying ‘we have a cancer diagnosis’ relating to the independence referendum 
outcome and parodying the SNP. He became the story and that is ridiculous, it 
is so stupid. You can’t afford that for the case. Howeve,r as soon as he does 
that, he is legitimate to argue it. I thought the SNP were entirely in their right 
to have a go with it because he said something properly insulting, weird and 
inappropriate. Then if you can make him the story and destabilise them when 
he is done something that stupid in public, then go for it.  You are fair game 
but you have to be aware that even someone says it’s just background and it is 
off the record, everything you do, you are accountable for’ (Edinburgh, 
February 2014). 
In this case, a spin doctor, at that time for the Labour Party, tweeted comparing the 
independence movement with cancer. He was reported in the media as the Labour spin 
doctor, not as a member of the party or an individual citizen. The underlying idea is 
that their professional status should not be discussed in the public sphere. Following 
this assumption, another Catalan interviewee compared himself to a football coach that 
does not play in the field:  
‘I am like a football coach…I am not the one who gets out there to score goals, 
I have a team… But in the end I don’t go out there to play, it’s my team and 
my team in this case are the two leaders of the party’ (Catalonia, April 2014). 
It could be assumed that the lack of a formalised code of practices or any kind of 
professional regulation ‘forces’ practitioners to constantly compare themselves to 
other colleagues as a way of defining what practices are accepted or not within the 
occupation. In that sense, this is linked to the public image of the ‘spin doctor’. 
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5.2.2 The spin doctor’s collective identity 
The starting point for the analysis on professionalism is the debate that surrounds the 
figure of the spin doctor. Chapter 2 explained that there is an extensive body of 
academic literature dedicated to examining what Anglo-Saxon media named the ‘spin 
doctors’ (Sumpter and Tankard, 1994; Franklin, 2003; Charon, 2004; Ribeiro, 2015c). 
However, the important element for this analysis is the public debate that emerged 
after the public exposure of political public relations, mainly in USA and UK media 
(Jones, 1994; Marr, 2001), and  television series (Holbert et al., 2005) that were later 
exported to other contexts such as Catalonia. In a context where there are no 
institutions regulating practices and identities, these media representations and public 
debates seem relevant to explore professionalism and professional identity in political 
public relations.  
The analysis of the data indicates that the concept of spin doctor is an informal identity 
label contested by practitioners and understood differently in Scotland and Catalonia. 
In Scotland’s case, the term ‘spin doctor’ still goes back to Tony Blair’s media advisor 
Alastair Campbell, though some practitioners argue this understanding of the term is 
fading away. In Catalonia, practitioners connect the term ‘spin doctor’ to famous US 
experts and politicians. Catalan practitioners explain the term denotes a sort of 
prestigious status.  This is strongly influenced by the fact that Catalan practitioners are 
not publicly exposed in the media. The spin doctor label also indicates the existence 
of a sense of community common to practitioners in both contexts. Practitioners use 
the label ‘spin doctor’ to informally designate their colleagues and to describe the 
profession – but never to introduce themselves. These are some of the examples found 
in the data: 
‘Somebody like [name of individual] very much wanted to be a Spin Doctor 
but they approached me because they had a minor crisis at the time’ 
(Edinburgh, 2014); 
‘In the end they [the spin doctors in Catalonia] are [name of spin doctors]; 
[name of a spin doctor I am not sure if he is a spin doctor because he does more 
analysis; [name of spin doctors is a spin doctor as well; [name of spin doctor] 
is also one of them but he is an idiot; and [name of spin doctor] was clearly 
one’ (Catalonia, 2014). 
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The term ‘spin doctor’ is linked to how practitioners construct the image of their 
profession. For instance, Scottish practitioners were able to build on a sort of 
professional history distinguishing between a past where they remained in the shadows 
and the current context where they are publicly exposed: 
‘I would actually argue that the role has always existed. It is perhaps more in 
the public eye than it was before… I think actually that spin doctors have 
become more important in recent times. There have always been people that 
carried and delivered the message when that was in the gentleman’s clubs in 
London when you were surrounded by people dinning with editors of 
newspapers as it might have been done by then. Now it is by telephone, it is 
always going on quite frankly’ (Edinburgh, February 2014). 
Practitioners are able to differentiate between public discourse regarding their 
occupation and the practice of their occupation. Section 5.4.1 demonstrated there is a 
connection point between Catalan practitioners and American campaign techniques. 
This connection also emerges when Catalan practitioners reflect on the use of the ‘spin 
doctor’ term: 
‘There is some kind of magic discourse surrounding spin…they just use four 
strategies from some book and use four of Obama’s slogans and there you go, 
the big strategy of the spin doctor’ (Catalonia, April 2014). 
The interviewee criticises precisely those Catalan practitioners that had attended 
campaign strategy courses in the USA (see section 5.4.1). However, he is also 
indicating that the term ‘spin doctor’ has an element of prestige for some Catalan 
practitioners. The data also shows that the meaning of the term ‘spin doctor’ has not 
been fixed yet and some practitioners question the applicability of the term. There were 
two interviewees, one in Catalonia and one in Scotland, that questioned if they ought 
to be labelled as spin doctors: 
‘I didn’t sell day to day stories. I remember I never saw myself as a spin doctor 
because I never tried to sell stories, which is what spin doctors do. I was more 
of an adviser to the leader’ (Edinburgh, February 2014);  
‘I don’t consider myself a pure spin doctor, I have never been and I have never 
pretended to be one of them. My role is more in the front line answering the 
phone and spend the day talking to journalists… I don’t know if my profile is 
that of a spin doctor per se. I say that because I remember when they were 
printing my business cards and Gemma wrote ‘Deputy Director’ and I told her 
write down journalist or public relations but she said no, only your position she 
said...In the end the spin doctor are the big brains behind all this but I was the 
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one in the first line trying to put out the fires they had started with the news 
media’ (Catalonia, April 2014).  
One could argue these two quotes might correspond to two different national views of 
the term ‘spin doctor’. However, that is not the case. Other Catalan and Scottish 
practitioners described the two above interviewees as spin doctors and equally labelled 
other practitioners playing similar roles to the ones described in the two quotes as spin 
doctors. The two quotes above indicate two things: one, that the term ‘spin doctor’ has 
no fixed meaning, and, second, the existence of different types of professionals (see 
Chapter 5).  
5.2.2.1 Scottish professional identity and the figure of Alastair Campbell 
One of the main differences between Scottish and Catalan practitioners is that the 
occupational identity of the former is clearly influenced by Alastair Campbell as the 
most famous spin doctor in the history of British politics (Gaber, 2004). There is no 
such strong cultural and political figure in the Catalan context. Catalan spin doctors 
have always remained outside the media focus and therefore these kind of popular and 
demonised figures never emerged. Nevertheless, in the Scottish case, because of its 
proximity to British politics, the influence of the popular and demonised Alastair 
Campbell is quite strong, as the data shows. This influence is due to the fact that 
Campbell was part of the Labour Party that dominated the Scottish political scene for 
many decades (Keating, 2010) was the first elected Scottish government for two 
legislatures.  Consequently, that implied a strong influence on coetaneous Scottish 
Labour spin doctors and to any practitioner that entered British or Scottish politics 
after him. One of the former Scottish Labour spin doctors describes Campbell as a 
mentor: 
‘But from the way that I know what he did (silence) he was a good mentor to 
us. He was asked to come and talked to our staff in Scotland and discuss needs 
and tactics…He invented the grid (media planning tool) and we are still using 
it…. He also had a clear sense that you have to be in touch with what real 
people were thinking’ (Edinburgh, February 2014). 
 Former Scottish Labour spin doctors regard Campbell as a very good strategist that 
created some of the basic strategic and tactical tools used in Scottish politics. However, 
not only Scottish Labour spin doctors used Campbell as a professional model. With no 
exception, the name of Alastair Campbell and the influence that he had and still has 
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on spin doctors emerged in all the conversations with Scottish practitioners. Alastair 
Campbell has become the referential figure against whom Scottish spin doctors 
compare themselves. Campbell’s figure is used by interviewees to reflect on how they 
perceive the consequences of being exposed in the media; the tone of their relationship 
with news media; and detrimental professional behaviours. 
Campbell’s media exposure caused a demonised image of the profession to emerge 
that practitioners feel needs to be avoided. Practitioners recognise the dissonance 
between the media discourse and the ‘reality’ of an occupation that existed long before 
these discourses emerged. Almost all Scottish interviewees affirmed that the media 
created the myth around Campbell by misunderstanding his role and exaggerating 
some of his traits: 
‘I think that some people make the mistake of thinking that the only thing that 
Alastair Campbell ever did was to shout at people and that is misunderstanding 
his role, and that is a big mistake because that is not the way you work’ 
(Scotland, February 2014); 
 ‘I think Alastair Campbell and the consequence of that such as ‘The Thick of 
It’, like everything else a situation tends to get exaggerated beyond what it 
really is… I think in some of the caricatures, in some of the spin offs, they 
showed some personal things and I don’t think that was actually the case’ 
(Scotland, February 2014). 
They recognise the dissonance between the media discourse and what they perceive to 
be the reality of an occupation that existed long before these discourses emerged but 
had never been exposed before. Therefore, Campbell’s myth reinforced the idea that 
avoiding media exposure should be one of the strongest principles amongst all 
practitioners because of the dangers that it implies:  
‘Campbell became a victim of his own success. He became the story whereas 
as a spin doctor you really want to be in the background’ (Scotland, February 
2014). 
Campbell is an example of how aggressive media relations are not useful. Conflictive 
relationships with journalists are considered self-defeating. Campbell was constantly 
used by Scottish interviewees to reflect on the dangers of media exposure. In addition, 
he was also presented as the counterexample for how relationships with journalists 
should be managed. In some cases, not only was Campbell used as an example for 
 135 
having aggressive manners with the media, but he is seen as the cause for some spin 
doctors behaving in obnoxious ways:  
‘A lot of less able spin doctors are kind of modelling themselves on Alistair 
Campbell or in the comedy ‘The Thick of It’. People walking about thinking 
that they are Malcolm Tucker and behaving in a similar rude and obnoxious 
kind of way, especially men’ (Scotland, February 2014);  
‘But basically what he was saying and I strongly believe and I see a lot of 
younger people, I am not going to mention any names, I have seen younger 
spin doctors working not for Labour but for other parties and they think they 
are players. They want to think of themselves of an important figure and they 
watch programs like ‘The West Wing’ and things like that. And Campbell 
becoming such a figure in the media and they think they are more important 
than they are. Like the media is the message not their own market. They think 
they are players at a very much large degree’ (Scotland, February 2014). 
As it can be observed, in this case the behavioural influence is not only attributed to 
Campbell but also to fictional characters such as Malcolm Tucker and the American 
television series ‘The West Wing’. The underlying idea is that, in general terms, the 
media’s portrait of spin doctors is not accurate and it can reinforce attitudes that are 
regarded as detrimental for the occupation. These two quotes draw a model of an anti-
spin doctor by criticising existing occupational attitudes that, in the first quote, are 
associated with men specifically and, in the second quote, to younger generations of 
spin doctors. Those detrimental attitudes are an overstated, self-perceived importance 
and rudeness.  
5.2.3 Consequentialist ethical principles 
The data shows that one overarching and utilitarian principle was described by all the 
interviewees as the ethical principle of the profession: the professional practitioner 
should never lie to journalists. Practitioners described this norm as the ethical principle 
of the occupation. However, the norm is rather a mutually-beneficial, non-written 
contract between the journalist and the practitioner. Practitioners in Scotland and 
Catalonia claim this norm guarantees and protects their relationships with journalists 
and eventually their jobs:   
 ‘You can never lie to the media and if you are caught up lying, then you are in 
big trouble. I know personally myself never did it but people, yes, I have seen 
them being dishonest’ (Scotland, February 2014); 
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‘You can never try to lie to a journalist, they are smart people! You lose your 
credibility, here they try to fool journalists. I have never lied to the media - I 
might not say the whole truth. I would never do that, not because of my client 
(the politician) but because when I phone a journalist if they don’t trust me, I 
am professionally dead. I don’t do it for them [politicians], I do it for myself’ 
(Catalonia, April 2014). 
Practitioners affirm they are obliged to follow the no-lying principle because otherwise 
it puts their credibility and their job at risk. However, they never mention that 
politicians are also part of this equation. If professionals are caught lying to the media, 
this damages the politicians’ credibility. Practitioners accuse journalists of imposing 
their concept of truth: 
‘I always complain a lot about that. Journalists always tell me that I should not 
lie to them, fine’ (Catalonia, April 2014);  
‘The rules of the game are: don’t lie and that is the most important rule for 
journalists. However, the most important rule is that you cannot lie and expect 
to get away with it’ (Scotland, February 2014). 
As observed in these two quotes, not lying to journalists also forms part of the 
normative dimension of the profession. Not lying to journalists is part of the rules of 
their daily exchanges with journalists. Almost none of the practitioners admitted they 
ever breached this supreme norm but they were eager to point out fingers to those who 
have. They only admitted they use the concepts of lying and truth to their own 
advantage: 
 ‘I don’t lie, I might not say something because it’s not in my interest and then 
just say it whenever it’s best for me. Not lying it’s a very important thing 
because the day you lie to a news media then you have lost all your credibility 
in front of that specific news media or journalist’ (Catalonia, April 2014); 
‘The political culture here in Scotland and in the UK for politicians and for 
those who speak on behalf of them is that you never ever say anything but the 
truth’ (Endiburgh, February 2014). 
For the above interviewees, withholding information is not lying. In this context, lying 
means releasing false information and getting caught doing so. It was difficult for the 
interviewees to articulate any other ‘ethical’ principle beyond the attitude of not lying 
to the media. These results seem to be in line with existing research that demonstrated 
that professionals working in persuasive communication areas have difficulties 
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expressing their ethical perspectives and they constantly assume means and end are 
the same thing (Baker and Martinson, 2001).  
The no-lying principle is based on consequentialist and self-interested approaches to 
the profession. It reinforces the idea that ethical principles are ‘better seen as a 
symbolic vehicle which supports the political interests of the profession’ (Alvesson, 
1993 p.999). In this case, the no-lying principle serves to maintain a good relationship 
with journalists and eventually to influence the outcome of the news cycle. These 
results also point out that the considered ethical principles of the occupation are 
determined by media routines and journalistic professional ideologies (Deuze, 2005; 
Hanitzsch, 2007; Sanders, 2011) that go beyond specific national contexts.  
5.2.4 The public service approach 
This section focuses on practitioners’ reflections about the public service of their 
profession. Two elements are analysed here: the role practitioners believe they play 
for the democratic system, and how they establish connection with the voters and the 
wider public. 
Despite describing a very consequentialist approach to professional ethics, 
interviewees were able to articulate and reflect on the implications that their daily job 
has on the democratic system and on the wider society. Interviewees describe idealised 
conceptions of the public sphere wherein political public relations professionals 
guarantee the flow of ideas between parties, news media and citizens. These reflections 
are important because, according to the functionalist perspective, a sense of public 
service is one of the traits of a classic profession (Wilensky, 1964). As previously 
mentioned, there are no formal ethical codes in the profession but, based on the data, 
that is not an obstacle for practitioners to reflect on their contribution to the society. It 
is also important to examine these public service-orientated reflections because 
previous studies questioned the role of political PR practitioners or spin doctors in the 
democratic system (Gaber, 2004). 
According to the data, both Catalan and Scottish practitioners understand their role as 
making sure political parties have the right tools to communicate their ideas to the 
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voters. Therefore, they see themselves as the ones who guarantee the existence of an 
informed citizenship: 
‘It is an important part of the democratic process. You want the public to be 
informed and make informed decisions. That means the public needs to know 
what parties stand for’ (Edinbugh, February 2014); 
‘It is not an NGO but I think they contribute with some kind of benefit for the 
society. You have that interruption (the media) and we help, if we do it right, 
to communicate the political action. Therefore, we contribute to make the 
system stronger…I think within the democratic system it should add 
transparency. In the end the practitioner is the person that bridges the 
relationship between news media and the society, so doing a good job is being 
able to communicate your message’ (Catalonia, April 2014). 
Practitioners find the role of professional political public relations within the 
democratic system is to connect news media, the larger society and political parties. 
They argue that an informed public happens when citizens are aware of what parties 
stand for and it is the role of the spin doctor to communicate what this is. They consider 
the good professional to be one who bridges the gap between the politician and society: 
 ‘A good strategist or a good spin doctor is the one that brings politics closer to 
the social reality as a result of his or her work because he is translating it and 
packaging it in the best way possible’ (Catalonia, April 2014). 
None of the interviewees reflected on the fact that having a communications director 
as a member of staff requires having large party budgets that are not available to all 
political organisations. Therefore, it can be argued these conceptualisations are based 
on liberal ideals of a public sphere where all actors can freely access the public debate 
(Habermas, 1991). However, in spin doctors’ conception of the public sphere, citizens 
are just the passive receiver because, in the end, their client is the party or the 
government. During the interviews I asked practitioners whether voters or citizens had 
any relevance in their daily tasks. Responses ranged from some practitioners affirming 
the news media is the party’s communication channel with voters to some practitioners 
claiming they had informal systems to connect with voters’ views and opinions:  
‘I don’t have a direct communication with the citizens; normally that contact 
is done through the opinion I generate through published opinion and through 
news media’ (Catalonia, April 2014); 
‘Yes, you have to (incorporate any feedback). You engage, you take into 
account what the media are saying about you. Something I used to do in 
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government was to go to the press tower on a fairly regular basis. You will get 
some feedback there because those visits will help inform what you say or 
sometimes even it will help you inform how to say it. If you know that saying 
a particular thing in a particular way would generate negative audience, they 
will dismiss it or laugh at it. It will influence how you say things’ (Edinburgh, 
February 2014).  
The above interviewees consider the news media to be representative of the views and 
opinions of the wider society. Therefore, the news media provides a channel of 
communication with citizens and voters. However, some interviewees explained news 
media is not their only channel of communication with voters. They described informal 
systems of gathering opinion using party members and party activists around Scotland 
and Catalonia:  
‘What really matters to us is the opinion of our party members that are out 
there. The party’s viewpoint, our people, the people that are in little towns and 
villages. They tell us ‘be careful what you are doing is not ok with people, 
people tell me that is not going well’. The fact that our people tell us those 
things is really important because that means we are in contact with the day-
to-day reality’ (Catalonia, April 2014); 
‘We have a wee analysis of what kind of media coverage we are getting; 
feedback that we get from our constituents; what the wider party is saying, and 
then we think if we focus more on one thing or less on other things. We have 
that kind of adjustment every now and then’ (Edinburgh, February 2014). 
As it can be observed in these two quotes and the ones above, practitioners do not 
mention social media or political marketing techniques (polling, focus groups) being 
their main channel of communication with voters. It can also be observed that 
networking is a very important tool of work for political PR practitioners. They 
network with journalists and party activists to evaluate the impact of their work. 
Chapter 6 explores in-depth the relevance of networking and the role that new media 
and social media platforms play in the political PR profession. 
Findings in this section are in line with a previous study on Australian journalists 
moving into political public relations (Fisher, 2015). Fisher (2015) found that 
Australian journalists moving into political public relations shared with journalists 
their concern for ‘whether their practices are helping to facilitate or restrict the free 
flow of information to the public’ (2015 p.1). Practitioners in Scotland and Catalonia 
operate without codes of ethics that dictate how the profession serves the public 
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interest. In that sense, it can be assumed that the public service conceptualisations 
found in Catalonia and Scotland also relate to journalistic influence. This journalistic 
influence is not only due to their past as journalists, because not all of them are, but 
likely to their constant daily exchange with journalists. However, political public 
relations practitioners do not work for journalists; their employers are political parties 
and governments. The next section examines the relationship between practitioners 
and political parties in terms of professional identity. 
The idea of a dominant, unilateral model of communication amongst political parties 
has also been confirmed by a previous study that tested the suitability of public 
relations models to understand communication strategies within Spanish political 
parties (Xifra, 2010). In his quantitative study based on questionnaires to the 
communication directors of each Spanish political party, Xifra confirmed that 
‘political parties did not use the public relations tools to increase dialogue between 
parties and citizens’ (2010: 181), but they understood communication as a rather lineal 
and one-way process.  
5.2.5 The ideological dimension of the profession 
The findings of this section indicate that ideology plays a very relevant role in the 
political public relations profession. In general terms, both Catalan and Scottish 
practitioners consider being ideologically identified with the party’s core principles to 
be a positive element that indicates professionalism. Nevertheless, the data indicates 
that, in Catalonia’s case, there is a small but significant change of pattern in the 
relationship between ideology and the political PR profession. While none of the 
Scottish interviewees had ever worked for more than one political party, two 
practitioners in Catalonia had worked as heads of communication for more than one 
party. Only the two Catalan practitioners that had worked for several parties regarded 
ideological identification with the party as a barrier to their professionalism.  
These findings are of relevance for two reasons. Firstly, it could be assumed that 
because of a stronger tradition of advocacy journalism in Catalonia, where journalists 
are ideologically aligned with the editorial lines of the newspaper they work for 
(Humanes, Martinez and Saperas, 2013), Catalan spin doctors would have a similar 
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ideological bond with their parties. Similarly, it could be assumed that because of a 
tradition of gatekeeping journalism amongst UK journalists (Deacon, 2004), it would 
be easier for spin doctors to feel detached from their party’s principles. Nevertheless, 
the data indicates that ideological bonds between the spin doctor and the party are 
equally strong in both cases, and even less intense in Catalonia’s case.  
Secondly, the findings of this section are also relevant because they demonstrate that 
ideological identification with the party’s principles is equally strong in those 
practitioners who followed the media route as it is in those who are former party 
employees. Being a former journalist is not related with lack of party membership or 
ideological identification. There are former journalists that became party members 
before or after they started working as the head of communications.  
According to the data, interviewees regarded a spin doctor’s ideological identification 
with the party’s principles as something positive and helpful for their daily tasks. They 
consider that it is essential to believe in the core messages of the party to be able to 
give accurate responses to media requests: 
‘I would argue that actually you have instinctively agree with the political stand 
of the party you are working for because something I find about the job is at 
one side of the stage is the basic principles of conservativism as it applies to 
Scotland. Then when I got a query from a journalist, the right response to that 
answer is actually very simple to find - ‘‘does this tax burden? Does it attack 
the freedom of the individual?’- ‘ these sorts of principles made it very easy to 
know the right place to respond’ (Scotland, February 2014). 
If the practitioner is ideologically identified with the party’s basic principles, it is 
easier to design better messages that are in line with the party. The overall majority of 
interviewees considered that because of that ideological link between the practitioner 
and the party’s basic principles, they could not work for other political parties: 
 ‘I could not be the campaign manager for another party. I think communication 
managers are still pretty much bonded to very precise ideological approaches’ 
(Catalonia April, 2014); 
 ‘I don’t think I could work for another party. One of the reasons I first applied 
for my first internship at the party was because I have always voted for the 
party.  I believe you need to work for a party you believe in. If you don’t believe 
in the party or if you spend your time promoting policies you disagree with, 
you’ll end up burned out’ (Scotland, February 2014). 
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Both quotes remark that the spin doctor occupation has a strong ideological dimension. 
To further investigate this dimension, interviewees were asked whether they were 
active party members. The results show that all practitioners that developed their 
career within the party admitted they were party members and some former journalists 
or PR practitioners had joined the party before or while working for it. This is how one 
former journalist explained his process of becoming a party member after being 
appointed Head of Communication: 
‘I have never been a member of any political party, I was never affiliated before 
I did this job. I had no party membership until 2008 when I started this job’ 
(Scotland, February 2014). 
In this precise case, the interviewee admitted he was not opposed to the party’s core 
principles before starting the job, but it was not until the appointment that he decided 
to make his affiliation official and become a party member. This indicates that the 
political public relations profession is linked to political motivations. For instance, 
Bohne, Prevost and Thurber (2009) found that over 60% of US communication 
campaign consultants ‘cited an ideological or partisan reason for becoming a 
professional consultant’ (Bohne, Prevost and Thurber, 2009 p. 500). This is not to say 
that the profession is political activism, but certainly the data shows ideology and 
political motivation play a role in it.  
5.2.5.1 Working for more than one party: Catalonia’s case 
One of the main differences between the Scottish and the Catalan case is that two of 
the practitioners interviewed in Catalonia had worked for two or more political parties 
as media experts, whereas none of the practitioners in the Scottish case had worked 
for more than one political party. It is not clear to what degree Catalan political parties 
are moving towards a context in which media practitioners are hired on the basis of 
their expertise and independently of their previous work for other parties, or if those 
two cases were exceptions. In the first of the two cases, the change from one party to 
another was not immediate, and in the second case, the spin doctor had created a 
Political Public Relations agency and had been working as an external freelance 
advisor for different Catalan parties.  
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The former case is Eladio Jareño, who has worked as a spin doctor for both the 
People’s Party and the Socialist Party in Catalonia, right-centre and centre-left 
respectively but both anti-independence. He initiated his career in the political public 
relations world with the Socialist Party, where he occupied positions such as press 
officer for the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games and press officer at the Spanish Office 
in Catalonia. Then he became the Regional Director of the Spanish Public Broadcast 
Enterprise in Catalonia, a politically-appointed position. During this period, he became 
quite famous for creating a very successful children’s television show. It was after this 
position that the People’s Party in Catalonia requested his services as Head of 
Communication. He recognises the uniqueness of his career path: 
‘I come from a non-traditional route. It is not common that a communication 
professional worked 5 years with one Government and then 7 years with 
another one. I think that my professional profile helped because I was not 
affiliated with any party. Also the people that work in those institutions, they 
demand professional solutions’ (Catalonia April, 2014). 
He considers his career to be unique because he is not affiliated with any party. The 
second case is Veronica Fumanal, the only Catalan female spin doctor interviewed. 
Her career path is unique in this research sample. She became the Head of Media for 
Ciutadans of Catalonia, a centre-right wing unionist party, because they hired her 
services through her public relations agency. She had created her agency a few years 
ago and she had been involved in the design of political campaigns for Republican 
Left Party, Convergència i Unió and the Socialist Party in the Balearic Islands. 
However, Ciutadans was the only party that hired her services full-time and not only 
for one specific campaign. She is the youngest of all the interviewees and, unlike the 
rest of the sample, she had not developed a career in media or politics before creating 
her own political public relations agency.  
 It is worth mentioning that nowadays she is the Head of Communication for the 
Spanish Socialist leader Pedro Sanchez. She is also aware that her situation is unique 
in Catalonia, but she recognises that there is a growing market for political public 
relations agencies being hired by political parties to fully take charge of 
communications and not only small or eventual campaigns. In a similar way to Eladio 
Jareño, she claims that it is her expertise, professional values and the success of her 
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campaigns that ‘validate’ her to work with different parties, no matter their ideological 
position:  
‘Political parties demand my services and I accept on the basis of a minimal 
ethical standards that are non-negotiable. Those principles are: any idea can be 
defended as long as it is within the human rights framework… I don’t care if I 
believe the party manifesto or not, from my point of view the most important 
thing is that the candidate trusts me in the sense that I can do whatever I think 
it’s best and we have a good connection. If they think Spain is left or right, I 
don’t care’ (Catalonia April, 2014). 
She considers her job needs to be a good personal connection with the leader rather 
than ideological identification with the party. However, her views, along with those of 
the previous case, seem to be an exception within the Catalan political sphere. When 
other Catalan spin doctors were confronted with these two cases during the interviews, 
they questioned if this could become a bigger trend in Catalonia because: 
 ‘The Anglo-Saxon model is more professionalised, here (Catalonia) and in 
Europe the spin doctor figure is still very much connected to the political party 
or to its ideology...Within the American context, that I know quite well, you 
have spin doctors in the Republican and the Democrat party but that is not 
fixed. The republican spin doctor might as well do the democrat campaign’ 
(Catalonia April, 2014). 
The influence of American political communication campaigns in Europe is a 
contested issue in the literature as it is not clear whether changes in political campaign 
models are the result of an ‘Americanisation’ or part of a global process of change 
(Xifra, 2011). Certainly, the model of external consultants is a US campaign feature 
(Plasser, 2001) and it is similar to Veronica Fumanal’s political public relations 
agency. However, similarities with the American context need to be put in place as the 
assumption that American political consultants can easily work for different parties 
has been challenged by some studies (Kolodny and Logan, 1998; Bohne, Prevost and 
Thurber, 2009). These studies demonstrated that almost 40% of political campaign 
consultants had previously worked as external consultants for the same party that now 
employs them and 60% of all consultants considered their careers to be driven by their 
own ideological motives. The two cases analysed here are slightly different from the 
so called American model; however, the examination of this phenomena exceeds the 
limits of this thesis. 
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5.2.4 Key findings 
The examination of the constellation of attributes, beliefs, values, motives and 
professionalism of political public relations in Scotland and Catalonia indicates that: 
- There is a sense of collective ethical norms and sense of public service in 
Catalonia and Scotland despite the lack of international or national 
professional institutions –i.e., codes of ethics. Both ethical and public 
service notions are related to practitioners’ daily interactions with 
journalists. Ethical practitioners never lie to journalists, and the 
professional practitioner facilitates the flow of information in the public 
sphere. 
- The profession is related to a certain degree of identification with the 
party’s principles. However, some Catalan practitioners challenge this 
notion of professionalism and there are examples of Catalan practitioners 
working for more than one party. 
- Professionalism is also linked to levels of public exposure. The 
professional practitioner avoids public exposure of his or her professional 
status. Unprofessional attitudes include an overstated, self-perceived 
importance and rudeness.  
 
5.3 Conclusions 
The aim of the chapter was to explore the main characteristics of the individual 
political public relations professional and the core elements of their professionalism. 
The main finding is that there are a series of basic professional structures and identity 
features that travel across Scotland and Catalonia. These professional structures and 
identity features outline a profession constantly shaped by the influence of journalism 
and politics.  
This chapter finds the existence of informal professional structures in political public 
relations. Political public relations in Scotland and Catalonia has a defined system of 
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credentials based on identifiable patterns of employment practices (media and political 
route). The profession is restricted to former journalists or PR professionals and former 
party employees. The required knowledge to practice the profession is not a certified 
body of academic knowledge. The core knowledge of the profession is transferred 
from expertise in politics and journalism or PR.  
Their professional identity and professionalism is constantly shaped by the need to 
serve the demands of the media, and the need to ensure the principles and aims of their 
political organisation are fulfilled. Practitioners see themselves as key players in the 
democratic debate, but their understanding of professional ethics is limited to 
utilitarian and consequentialist values. While overall professional identity and self-
presentation of these practitioners seems to be quite similar in Scotland and Catalonia, 
a minority of Catalan practitioners seem to differ from the overall pattern as they have 
started working for more than one party. This is a significant finding in highly 
polarised media and political contexts such as Catalonia, where it might be expected 
that practitioners had a stronger ideological attachment to their political organisation.  
The following chapter considers these professional structures and identity features in 
relation to their role and daily activities in political parties and governments.  
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CHAPTER 6 THE POLITICAL PUBLIC RELATIONS PRACTITIONER IN 
THE POLITICAL INSTITUTION: ROLES AND FUNCTIONS 
 
This chapter focuses on analysing the practice of political public relations inside the 
political institution. It explores the influence of the political system and its political 
institutions on the practice of political public relations.  This chapter examines 
practitioners’ sense of what their work is about, focusing on the roles, position, tasks 
and functions they claim to play within political organisations. These roles, functions 
and tasks are also placed in relation to the performance and identity elements identified 
in the previous chapter. The analysis is now situated at the level of the relationship 
between the individual practitioner and his or her most immediate institutional context: 
political parties and government. The subsequent chapter amplifies the focus of 
analysis by looking into the relationship between the occupation and the larger 
structure of the media system. 
The aim of the chapter is to outline the role and position that political public relations 
practitioners have in the organisations they work for.  One of the blind spots in the 
existing literature on spin doctors and political public relations practitioners is the 
position that these practitioners hold within the organisational structure of political 
parties and governments. As explained in Chapter 2, several studies describe what they 
consider to be the main activities and tasks of the spin doctor (Sumpter and Tankard, 
1994; Gaber, 2000a; Ribeiro, 2015a). Nevertheless, most of these studies do not use 
practitioners’ testimonies to inform their descriptions. This chapter provides the 
empirical basis to overcome the described limitations. 
The argument of the chapter is as follows. The role and position of political public 
relations results from the combination of political-related and communication-related 
functions and tasks. The balance between political and communication tasks generate 
variations in the managerial position and power that these practitioners claim to have 
in their organisations. There are significant differences between Scottish and Catalan 
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practitioners in government. Practitioners claim to be the experts in understanding and 
managing the balance between the political and the communication spheres.  
The structure of the chapter is as follows. The first section presents the basic 
characteristics of the three different roles played by political public relations 
practitioners in Scotland and Catalonia. Subsequent sections connect these three roles 
with their assigned tasks and functions. The second section focuses on the two roles 
restricted to the communication strategy area: the Head of Communication and the 
subordinated role of the press officer. This section provides in-depth detail of how 
practitioners understand communication strategy and its most relevant tasks. The third 
section explores the combined figure of the Head of Communication and the Chief of 
Staff. The final section gives account of some differences encountered in government 
communications in Scotland and Catalonia.   
6.1 The relationship between roles, functions and organisational position 
This section examines the main roles and tasks of political public relations 
practitioners. The data demonstrates that the assignment and distribution of tasks is 
key to understanding the three roles identified in the data. There is one basic role, that 
of the Head of Communication, and the other two are variations of it: the subordinate 
press officer, and the Chief of Staff (see figure 6.1). They are all referred to as spin 
doctors.  
Figure 6.1 Job positions and distribution of roles 
 
Communication 
strategy (only 
execution)
Communication 
strategy (design+ 
execution)
Communication + 
Political strategy
Head of 
Communication (+ 
Chief of Staff)
Head of Communication
Press 
officer
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As observed in figure 6.1, related to the three roles are two different sets of tasks 
(communication and political strategy), plus two levels of practice (design and 
execution). On the basis of interviewees’ descriptions, it seems clear that the core role 
of the political public relations practitioner is to manage the party or government’s 
communication strategy. However, practitioners explain that, in some cases, they are 
also in charge of political strategy. These two areas of work relate to two types of 
organisational positions: Head of Communication and Chief of Staff. According to the 
data, there are practitioners who maintain the official position of Head of 
Communication despite also managing political strategy –usually within small parties. 
There are also professionals who identify themselves as both the Head of 
Communication and the Chief of Staff.  
In addition, practitioners distinguish between the Head of Communication and the 
subordinate press officer. The Head of Communication designs the communication 
strategy and directs the Communication Department. The Press Officer executes the 
communication strategy –i.e. writing press releases- and he or she is a staff member of 
the Communication Department. However, these two roles can easily overlap in small 
parties because of lack of resources to hire more personnel – which was the case for 
most of the parties in the sample. The data also indicates that the roles also overlap 
when the Head of Communication feels he or she needs to intervene or control 
problematic issues.  
As will be explained in the following sections, these three roles are linked to two 
different organisational functions and two different understandings of the 
communication strategy –see Table 6.2.  
Table 6.2 Relationship between roles, position and strategy 
Role Position Function 
Understanding of 
communication 
strategy 
Manager of the 
communication 
strategy 
Head of 
Communication/ 
Press officer 
(subordinate role) 
Organisational-
based 
The 
communication 
strategy is about 
the form and 
channel of the 
message 
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Manager of the 
communication 
strategy + political 
strategy 
Head of 
Communication (+ 
Chief of Staff) 
Leader-based The 
communication 
strategy includes 
the content of the 
message 
 
 
One might question whether these types of positions, orientations and understanding 
of strategy are related to the practitioner’s career path. However, there is no apparent 
relationship between these elements and career paths.  The differentiation between 
leader-based and organisational-based positions can be related to Panebianco’s (1988) 
classification of party bureaucracy into the executive model of party-bureaucracy and 
the model of representative bureaucracy. In that sense, those cases of leader-based 
positions can be linked to the executive model of party bureaucracy – practitioners 
form part of this bureaucratic body as experts and staff professionals- as their tasks are 
designated directly by the political leader. Representative bureaucrats, by contrast, 
‘must respond to his or her superiors for his actions and decisions but is also 
periodically judged by the rank and file’ (Panebianco, 1988, p. 225). This role is more 
coherent with those practitioners who work for the whole party organisation and, 
therefore, their performances are subject to the evaluation of the party’s committees 
and they do not only respond to tasks designed exclusively by the political leader. 
 Panebianco (1988) recognises that representative and executive bureaucracy models 
are often ambiguous and can be found interchangeably in the same party at different 
times. This could explain how the same party might appoint a leader-based political 
PR practitioner and, in the next electoral period, opt for a more organisational-based 
expert to deal with their communication strategy. The following sections will analyze 
each of the elements in Table 6.2, focusing on the tasks that are contained in each role.  
It is important to build explanations directly from empirical data to define the areas in 
which these experts are involved. One of the most important reasons is because there 
are a series of myths that surround the political PR practitioner figure in terms of what 
they actually do within the party’s decision-making machinery (Street, 2011).  In 
addition, existing literature has defined the spin doctor’s areas of work as media-
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related areas and not-directly media-related areas (Esser, Reinemann and Fan, 2000). 
However, the data shows that there is another important and more useful axis to 
consider, which is the degree to which their tasks can be included with the party’s 
political strategy or communication strategy.  
6.2 The role of the Head of Communication 
The role of the Head of Communication is to manage the communication strategy. He 
or she might do it alone or with the support of press officers who execute his or her 
orders. It is by far the most common role found in the sample, and one played equally 
by former journalists and former party employees. Managing communications strategy 
is perceived as the core role of the political public relations professional. Practitioners 
use the term ‘communication strategy’ to refer to the management of the 
communication tools available to the organisation: 
‘Communication strategy refers to the communication resources and tools that 
I have to work with. A big part of the job is to think how to react and how to 
do things proactively with those resources that I have’ (Catalonia April, 2014). 
Communication strategy is perceived as a management function over one specific area. 
According to the data, political public relations is involved in the design of the 
strategy, but always as part of collective bodies of the party and in coordination with 
party or government leaders who make the final decisions: 
‘When it comes to design the communication strategy I am not the only one. 
Firstly, because I have a team of people that support me: the press officers, the 
journalists and the people that do the online stuff. Secondly, because at the top 
political level I am not the only one deciding but everything gets contrasted, 
validated and we work as a team’ (Catalonia April, 2014); 
‘I don’t design the communication strategy by myself. Despite the appearances, 
the party is constituted by collegiate bodies. I am under the supervision of the 
general secretary – he is currently out of the picture because of a corruption 
scandal so there are two people who have inherited his responsibilities now. 
Therefore, the three of us decide things in a collegiate way. In that sense, I 
don’t design or define the strategy but it is done by the party’s governing 
bodies’ (Catalonia, April 2014). 
As observed in these two quotes, practitioners make a clear distinction between 
designing and executing or managing strategies. These quotes also indicate that the 
spin doctor, despite not having the power to design strategies, are part of the top 
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management bodies in their political organisations. Interviewees claimed the spin 
doctor ‘needs’ a managerial position to access privileged information and knowledge: 
 ‘During the last years here in Catalonia and in Madrid, since 1995 when 
Miguel Angel Rodriguez became the Communications Secretary of the 
Government, he demonstrated something: the Director of Communications 
needs a managerial position, he needs to have power’ (Catalonia, April 2014);  
‘Absolutely critical, and increasingly, communications person is in the top 
table when important decisions are made. I think that is true for all political 
parties.  I think that has changed fundamentally when Alastair Campbell was 
in the Labour government; that was the absolute turning point’ (Scotland, 
February 2014). 
These claims for power are similar to those of public relations practitioners that have 
historically claimed that excellent PR can only be achieved when practitioners occupy 
managerial positions within corporations (Grunig, Grunig and Dozier, 2002). Both in 
Catalonia and Scotland, interviewees justify their calls for power by comparing 
themselves to those they consider to be examples of well-known spin doctors. 
Practitioners whose scope of power was restricted to the management of 
communication strategy justified their role by claiming professionalism: 
 ‘It is well-known that one thing is politics and another thing is communication. 
It’s like when in government everyone gets pissed off with the Finance 
Minister because they want to spend money and he doesn’t want to and then 
there is a confrontation. Similarly, the Secretary of Organisation (Chief of 
Staff) is there to think according to political criteria and the Head of 
Communication has to apply those political ideas to the communication 
strategy but not think in political criteria. If that is the case, things get messed 
up….It is impossible to coordinate all that’ (Catalonia April, 2014); 
‘It was about putting a communication strategy alongside our manifesto. It 
wasn’t me saying this is what we should be doing. The government is deciding 
what should be doing and people have voted for that. The job is to sell that 
message. I think when the political spokesperson is involved in the actual 
creation of that message you can create problems’ (Scotland, February 2014). 
This practitioner defined the function of the professional as to applying political ideas 
to the communication strategy, but not vice-versa. There are some exceptions to this 
function. Section 6.5 explains that the civil service code regulates Scottish 
practitioners in government.  
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6.2.1 The subordinate role of the press officer 
One of the elements that emerged from the data analysis is the figure of the press 
officer as holding a different role from the Head of Communication. The press officer 
develops the technical side of the communication strategy. In other words, press 
officers write press releases, organise press conferences and respond to the daily 
requests of journalists. Some practitioners refer to the role of the press officer as being 
in the front line of the daily relationships with the news media:   
‘I didn’t sell day-to-day stories… I operated at the editor level because they 
were Chief executives because those were the people I knew rather than in the 
reporter level which we had other people [press officers] to do that. I didn’t 
deal directly that often with political reporters’ (Edinburgh, February 2014);  
‘My role as a press officer is more in the front line answering the phone and 
spend the day talking to journalists… In the end the spin doctor are the big 
brains behind all this but I was the one in the first line trying to put out the fires 
they had started with the news media’ (Catalonia April, 2014). 
The figure of the press officer exists both in Catalonia and Scotland with very similar 
characteristics as the two quotes above demonstrate. The role could be understood as 
doing the ‘dirty work’ of media relations. One of the significant elements is that this 
dirty work partly refers to social media. Interviewees describe press officers as the 
ones taking care of the social and online media communication: 
I also have a broad remit overseeing the whole range of communication tools 
web positioning, social media and so on…We have someone young in our team 
that deals with these things (Scotland, February 2014).  
Section 6.3 deals with the relevance of online communication for political public 
relations. Overall practitioners were quite sceptical about the use of these tools. The 
main variable that explains the existence of press officers is the party’s economic 
resources: 
 ‘There is a small number of people so actually I would write press releases as 
well. I would have a different leading role, as well as strategic role, but we 
didn’t have enough people to separate our office to say ‘you do the tactical stuff 
and you do the strategic stuff’. We all did a lot and the staff varied significantly 
over periods of time. There were times or periods when I was the only person 
employed by the party’ (Scotland, February 2014).  
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The interviewee uses the tactic-strategic dichotomy to explain the differences between 
the Head of Communication and press officers. However, public relations literature 
refers to this dichotomy of roles as the manager-technician division (Grunig, Grunig 
and Dozier, 2002; Diga and Kelleher, 2009). The figure of the press officer can be 
associated with the technician role, while the Head of Communication has some 
similarities with the manager role (Dozier and Broom, 1995). The technician executes 
tasks commanded by others related to ‘reading and writing, as well as producing 
photos and graphics’ (Dodd, Brummette and Hazleton, 2015, p. 471) in a similar way 
to the press officer in Scotland and Catalonia. The manager, as the quote above 
indicates, is instead a leading role, more involved in strategy and the decision-making 
process (Dozier and Broom, 1995). The following section explores the specific tasks 
associated with the communication strategies of political parties and governments.  
6.3 Communication strategy management 
 During the interviews, I questioned practitioners on the specific tasks involved in 
communication strategies to clarify their distinction between political and 
communication strategies. The following Table 6.3 is the result of the compilation of 
all the responses given by the interviewees when they were asked to describe the tasks 
and roles involved in communication strategy management. It includes the common 
elements identified between Catalan and Scottish practitioners. There are a series of 
tasks that, because of the nature of the media system, are only related to the Catalan 
context and I have examined those separately in Chapter 7. 
Table 6.3 Communication strategy: roles and tasks  
Media relations 
Media intelligence briefing 
- Prepare and rehearse interviews with the 
candidate 
- Control and report about other parties’ media 
activities 
- Report on the latest changes and trends in the 
media sphere 
Daily relationships with journalists and editors 
- Acting as a liaison 
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- Responding to daily media requests (press officer) 
- Generating content and messages for the media 
(press officer) 
- Generating events for the media 
Coordination of the 
communication strategy 
Coordinating 
- media events and parliamentary or government 
actions 
- media messages with the party federation or party 
coalitions  
- party manifesto with media messages 
- electoral campaigns  
Elaborate on the party’s brand or 
Government’s public image 
Marketing research Coordinating the use of polls and focus groups 
Online communication 
Coordinating and managing online 
communication tools (press officer) 
Speech writing  
 
As outlined in Table 6.3, political public relations practitioners develop five core roles 
related to managing the communication strategy:  managing media relations; 
coordinating online communication; planning marketing research; speech writing; and 
coordinating the communication strategy. However, the data demonstrates that these 
five roles are not perceived as equally important occupational elements. The perceived 
relevance of each of these functions is influenced by what communication channels 
the practitioner considers more convenient for the overall strategy. To that point, the 
following subsections demonstrate that managing media relations is perceived as the 
core function of this occupation. By contrast, marketing research is perceived as 
underdeveloped in most parties, yet is also portrayed as an indicative factor of 
professionalism. The management of online communication tools is regarded with 
scepticism, and is considered a necessary but minor function of the occupation by the 
majority of interviewees.  
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Practitioners had a very clear conception of what is involved in the management of the 
communication strategy: 
‘It is my responsibility, I have the press relations office, where we have a press 
relations officer. I am responsible for the corporate image of the party and the 
general communication area of the party. In this last part, my role goes from 
managing current corporate image campaigns, precisely election campaigns, to 
the party brand and the campaigns that the party can do. The area of 
communication is: the relationship with the media on the one hand; and 
corporate communication on the other’ (Catalonia April, 2014); 
‘I had responsibility for a sort of different things: the classic media relations, I 
was in charge of that; also the marketing digital and online; I was responsible 
for organising polling and messaging, those kind of things’ (Scotland, February 
2014). 
As found in the quotes above, Catalan and Scottish practitioners share very similar 
conceptions of the core tasks involved in managing communications strategy. These 
tasks are media relations, online communication, marketing and branding.  
6.3.1 The relevance of media relations 
The relevance of media relations in the political public relations profession can be 
observed in the descriptions offered by interviewees about the main characteristics of 
their jobs, and in the fact that occupational conceptions of professionalism are linked 
to the management of media relations (see Chapter 5). Practitioners perceive media 
relations to be their main role: 
‘My job was basically dealing with the news media, managing the relationship 
in behalf of the party’ (Scotland, February 2014); 
 ‘I was there, I suppose, for selling the interface with the media in behalf of the 
party’ (Scotland, February 2014). 
The importance of media relations as a function within the communication strategy is 
justified by interviewees for two reasons: it is the most demanding and time-
consuming function; and news media are still considered to be the most important 
communication channel between political organisations and voters. According to the 
data, both Catalan and Scottish practitioners point out that, despite their ‘efforts’, the 
needs of the media can dominate most of their time and they are forced to adapt to the 
media’s needs: 
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‘Most of our activity is still dominated by traditional media. Newspapers 
dominate my day’ (Scotland, February 2014); 
‘We are very conscious of media and we have to be because we have no option. 
We have to be both because we are in the hunt for opportunities and that is the 
nature of the media; it’s 24/7 you know, satellite channels, news, BBC 
channels, Sky News, Aljazeera’ (Scotland, February 2014).  
As it can be observed, news media are regarded as some sort of ‘eye of the hurricane’ 
that absorbs their daily activities. However, managing relationships with news media 
is also their main activity because their communication strategies are strongly centred 
on broadcasters and newspapers. These are still regarded as the most important, 
effective and valid channels to disseminate their messages: 
 ‘In the end, politics is pretty much communicated through news media. 
Electoral campaigns are designed to go on television, specially television’ 
(Catalonia, April 2014); 
‘Our strategy is to concentrate on broadcast, broadcasting is much more 
important for us – but having said that, much of our time is consumed by 
dealing with newspapers’ (Scotland, February 2014);  
 ‘I think you still need good, positive coverage in the more traditional media. 
You need to have a strong profile on television and on radio. You need to do 
the best you can with the newspapers’ (Scotland, February 2014).  
It seems quite clear that despite the differences between the two media systems in 
Catalonia and Scotland, mainstream media –specifically broadcasting- still occupies a 
very central and powerful position in regards to the communication strategies of 
political parties and governments. This particularity of political communication 
strategies can be related to the intensity of the relationship between political parties 
and news media: some of the practitioners are former journalists; and it is fairly 
common that political PR practitioners spend most of their time talking, trying to 
influence and dealing with journalists and editors. It can be assumed that it is quite 
difficult for these practitioners to escape an environment in which the importance of 
mainstream media is maybe overrated. To that point, during the interviews notions of 
professionalism emerged as related to the tone and management strategies of their 
media relations, demonstrating the relevance that media relations have in the political 
PR profession (for more detail, see Chapter 5).  
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6.3.2 Online communication 
The centrality of media relations as the main function of the political PR practitioner 
is also related to their skeptical perceptions on online communication. Practitioners 
explain that they were not directly involved in the tasks associated to the management 
of online communication. They only dealt with online communication from a 
supervisory role to ensure the convergence of messages, but mostly it was the 
responsibility of the press officer or similar subordinate employees:    
‘We had a Head of Digital as well who dealt with social media but he worked 
very close to me to make sure that there was convergence of messages’ 
(Scotland, February 2014).  
Practitioners oversee online communication to make sure the messages stay on the 
line. They do not seem to be involved in, for instance, updating twitter or facebook 
accounts. Some practitioners related their lack of involvement with the dominance of 
traditional media: 
‘Social media is something I don’t have much involvement with, and probably 
I should have more but the reality is that the job that I have is much more 
dominated by traditional media, by that I mean broadcast and print media. I 
would have no time to deal with it’ (Scotland, February 2014). 
Part of their lack of involvement seems to be related to an overall skepticism regarding 
the effectiveness of online communication as an alternative channel to traditional news 
media: 
 ‘Social media are just an extension of the departments of propaganda. Social 
media are not useful to make a different discourse about issues that citizens 
actually care about that do not appear on the newspapers…Some of the things 
that we did on social media had some repercussion but basically it was a 
platform for us to receive insults from all around; it’s a problem’ (Catalonia, 
April 2014);  
‘I think the influence of social media has been overstated…Probably the 
greatest influence that social media has is how the mainstream media reports 
it, how they would report twitter and facebook’ (Edinburgh, February 2014). 
Practitioners question the utility of these platforms because they do not perceive them 
to influence voters and perceive them as effective only when combined with traditional 
news media. They are regarded as ‘echo chambers’ in the political debate: 
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I think twitter is quite a big echo chamber which is why it’s full of people who 
are very committed on both sides and you don’t necessarily influence beyond 
that. I think twitter as a medium is dominated by media and political hypes who 
are already affiliated...but they are a good campaign tool’ (Edinburgh, February 
2014). 
Amongst the data, those practitioners that were involved in the management of the 
referendum campaigns in Scotland were less skeptical than their colleagues and 
showed a higher degree of involvement in the management of online communications. 
However, the vast majority of interviewees seemed reluctant to admit the management 
of social media or other online-related tasks was an important function in their daily 
routines. The quotes in this section reiterate the centrality of media relations as the 
core centre of the political PR occupation.  
6.3.3 Marketing research 
During the interviews, practitioners were eager to explain in detail how they used 
marketing research to inform their strategies: 
‘For instance, one of the strategies that we did was to organise a focus group, 
qualitative, to see how people perceived the political leader. He [the leader] is 
only 5 months older than me but he seems very old. People regarded him as 
some sort of gorilla, very ambitious and always talking about money. Then we 
made a strategy in which his economic profile was important but you could 
also see some of his social skills. Consequently, that conditioned a lot our 
public agenda’ (Catalonia, April 2014). 
 Practitioners portrayed themselves as the person who designs and supervises 
marketing research studies aimed at informing the communication strategy. 
Interviewees showed pride when explaining that they still managed to do polling and 
focus groups during elections despite having limited resources for market research: 
‘We would -particularly at election time- we wouldn’t have a huge amount of 
money so we couldn’t do this all the time.  A lot of the time we were relying 
on our gut instinct but at election time we tested very carefully the messages, 
the languages that we were using and the policies we were using in focus 
groups. So we would conduct focus groups in various parts of Scotland and 
discuss with people. We would say ‘here are ten policies, tell us the best three’, 
so certainly that approach very much informed the election time’ (Edinburgh, 
February 2014). 
The interviewee presents marketing research as the rational approach to manage 
communication strategies, as opposed to communication strategies that are managed 
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using perceptions and instinctive reactions. However, the vast majority of interviewees 
recognised marketing research is a very expensive tool that is usually restricted to 
election periods. Therefore, managing and designing marketing research appears as 
the function that the political PR practitioner aspires to achieve. Practitioners 
considered marketing and research functions as indicators of professionalism:  
‘We try to professionalise things. We do surveys, especially during election 
period. We do not focus only on voting preferences but we are interested in 
knowing what matters to our voters, what are they worried about and what 
media do they consume…’ (Catalonia, April 2014). 
Professionalising elements of the communication strategy is understood as doing 
marketing research. Consequently, marketing research is a central function in the 
management of the communication strategy because it is perceived as the professional 
thing to do.  
6.3.4 Communication strategy tactics 
Managing the communication strategy is not only limited to more technical tasks, such 
as responding to daily media requests, but also involves tactical thinking. Practitioners 
describe this tactical thinking in the design of long-term or short-term communication 
strategies. One of the elements that emerged during the interviews is that practitioners 
both in Catalonia and Scotland articulate communication strategy according to the long 
term/short term axis or as proactive/reactive. Independent from the characteristics of 
each national media and political system, interviewees affirm that their strategies are 
based on long-term proactive plans, such as disseminating messages in advance of 
future events to shape public opinion, and on short-term reactive plans that are 
dependent on the needs and demands of news media and unpredicted political events 
that occupy most of their day-to-day job: 
‘You need to react on the short term and try -even though it’s the hardest part- 
not to say something as a reaction, but to react proactively – that means you 
need to propose something, communicate something, influence the media and 
the political agenda’ (Catalonia, April 2014); 
‘I suppose there is the pro-active sort of plan and there is the reactive to this 
and that. I think that all of us who work in politics, we end up spending much 
more time reacting. Often we don’t spend enough time on that proactive plan. 
I think that is something that I have certainly heard, that you have to understand 
what is, it’s not just about the next twelve hours, it is actually often about the 
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next 12 to 24 months…sometimes it is really important to try and step back 
and set where you are going to so you can keep a focus on that longer term 
plan. So that is the longer term strategy’ (Edinburgh, February 2014). 
The so-called ‘short-term’ strategy refers to the daily media relations routines, whereas 
the long-term or proactive strategies are described as a function they would like to 
develop further. The distinction between long-term and short-term strategies, or 
proactive and reactive strategies, reflects how political parties tend to ‘adapt’ their 
routines to the demands and needs of the media –nowadays this also includes social 
media- that seem to compete with the party’s overarching goals or their manifestos.  
6.4 The additional role of the Chief of Staff  
In overall terms, there are some practitioners that work beyond the boundaries of the 
communication management areas. They are also involved in the design of the political 
agenda and leadership strategy. As previously mentioned, these tasks are sometimes 
recognised with the title of Chief of Staff or they are just incorporated in the list of 
tasks assigned to the Head of Communication. These practitioners tend to work in 
leader-based positions: they work directly for the leader and not the entire 
organisation. They also conceive the communication strategy that incorporates 
shaping the content of the message. They are the ‘political spin doctors’. 
The data indicates that in small parties with limited economic resources, practitioners 
tend (but it is not exclusive) to play the role of the Chief of Staff without being 
recognised as such. For instance, that was the case of Scottish Greens. Its Head of 
Communication was in charge of the communication strategy and, for instance, also 
supervised the parliamentary issues agenda that the party leader puts forward. 
However, this is not restricted to small parties. Similarly, the Head of Communication 
for the Scottish Conservatives (at the time, the ruling party in the UK’s government) 
also had tasks related to political strategy, such as managing relationships with other 
parties. In Catalonia, two of the then-biggest parties –CiU and PSC- used the title of 
Chief of Staff in addition to Head of Communication to recognise the official role of 
political public relations.  
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During the interview process, I also asked these practitioners to describe the tasks and 
functions that they considered to be included in managing political strategy. Their 
responses have been summarised in the following table: 
Table 6.4 Political strategy tasks  
Coordinating the political agenda  
Parliamentary activity 
- Briefing the candidate before meetings 
and committees 
Conference planning 
- Outlining events and speeches 
Liaising with political actors and 
institutions  
Act as liaison with the wider party 
structure, oppositional parties and/or 
government 
- Briefing on their activities 
- Coordinating actions and policies 
Managing election campaigns 
Coordinating messages and campaign 
events  
Policy briefing Advising on relevant policy issues 
 
As it can be observed in Table 6.4, these tasks include four roles: coordinating the 
political leader’s agenda; briefing on political intelligence and policy making; 
managing election campaigns; and coordinating relationships with other political 
parties and party federations. Practitioners that take part in these activities were 
referred to in the data as the ‘political spin doctors’ because they intervene in designing 
the political message: 
‘There were two kinds of spin doctors: the political ones that were more about 
the political message. This was basically Miquel Iceta, he is one the last 
brilliant minds in Catalan politics... Zaragoza is another political spin doctor; 
he also had a very clear media strategy but he was not always successful. These 
were the two spin doctors that designed the strategy with Montilla (former 
Catalan president). Then there are media spin doctors. There you have the 
trusted man of Montilla that back then was Bolaño. He was more of a similar 
profile to mine’ (Catalonia April, 2014). 
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The distinction between the media and the political spin doctor reflects the 
aforementioned distinction between the political and the media strategies. For 
instance, Catalan practitioners identify themselves as having two different roles: the 
Head of Communication and the Chief of Staff.  
‘Usually the communication figure is associated with a more functional 
concept. The Head of Communications or Director of Communications is quite 
similar to the press officer. I think my experience in this case is quite unique 
as in my case I was the Director of General Strategy [Chief of Staff] with the 
assigned role of directing the communication. From my point of view, that had 
many advantages because there was a correlation between the [political] 
strategy and the communication which is not always evident’ (Catalonia April, 
2014); 
‘I manage both things. I am the Chief of Staff and the Head of 
Communications… For instance, this morning we were preparing a draft for a 
parliamentary question for the control session. We have prepared a draft and I 
have been actively involved in writing the proposal that afterwards is modified 
by the leader… then as the afternoon came I started dealing with media 
requests’ (Catalonia April, 2014). 
In the first quote, the practitioner identifies himself as being primarily the Chief of 
Staff, with communication functions as a secondary role. He justifies his position 
because of the need to correlate the political and the media strategies. As seen in the 
previous section, this view is challenged by those spin doctors who only manage 
communications strategy, as they argue communications and political strategy need to 
be separate areas of work. The second quote reflects how a division of these functions 
operates in the daily routine of these professionals who manage both communications 
and political strategy.  
The underlying idea is that political spin doctors have a holistic role. In that sense, 
practitioners managing both the political and the communication perspective 
perceived their role as a catch-all function: 
‘My main task is to control everything that the leader does…The leader and I 
control his agenda… the agenda includes two things: communicating that 
agenda to the wider public and the content of those meetings and public 
speeches’ (Catalonia April, 2014). 
Those interviewees described their positions being restricted to the leader. They 
considered themselves as closer advisors to the party leader: 
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‘But it was mainly and basically being with her, providing her with advise, 
sounding bits and all kinds of things, writing speeches, preparing her questions 
for first minister’s Question Time on a Thursday. I suppose just being a pal’ 
(Scotland, February 2014); 
‘My main job is to control everything that the party leader does; everything 
that he does goes is in my hands first’ (Catalonia April, 2014). 
 They see their position as someone with close and direct access to the leader up to the 
point that they have some kind of ‘authority’ over his or her activities but not over the 
whole organisation. Despite the strong closeness to the leader, these interviewees 
recognised that their power is not absolute. Their role is to advise the leader, but it is 
always the politician who decides whether to follow their advice or not: 
‘The boss is the boss and one of the things I always tell them is ‘I am here to 
advice you, to help you and tell you my point of view’. But the one who gives 
advice is not the one paying the bill and what does that mean? It means that if 
something goes wrong I don’t lose my job; ‘you are the one who loses, I am 
here to help’’ (Catalonia April, 2014); 
‘Some advice she took, some other bits she didn’t but she is entitled to because 
she is the leader’ (Edinburgh, February 2014). 
It is not clear what elements determine whether one practitioner might have a limited 
role in communication strategy or not. What emerges from the data is that there are 
two main reasons why the Head of Communications is involved in the design and/or 
management of the political agenda: in smaller parties, due to a lack of resources, these 
tasks tend to be concentrated in one person; in some cases, it is the same spin doctor 
who decides to play a role in the political agenda as he/she perceives it as part of the 
communication strategy. For instance, this interviewee, who combines both roles, 
linked his position to his own views on how political strategy needs to be articulated 
nowadays: 
‘Modern politics is 80% communication and that is crucial element of this job. 
If you don’t disseminate your strategies then they remain hidden to the public 
eye. The challenge is to synchronise political strategy and communication. I 
believe this is the key to modern politics’ (Catalonia April, 2014). 
These personal reflections seem to indicate that the personal influence of the spin 
doctor plays a very important role in determining the scope of power they achieve. 
This precise interviewee has published a book with a very elaborate discourse on how 
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his innovative strategies and his modern conception of politics helped his party’s 
electoral success. 
6.5 The singularities of practitioners in government 
The roles and tasks described in the above sections apply both to government and party 
practitioners. However, there are a series of characteristics and, most importantly, 
differences between Scotland and Catalonia that only apply to government. The Head 
of Communication for the Scottish government operates in a context where political 
information is clearly separate from public information (which is managed by civil 
servants). However, in Catalonia, the Head of Communication manages both public 
and political information strategies.  
In Scotland, the government’s Head of Communication is attached to a series of 
regulations that the same figure in Catalonia does not have. The Head of 
Communication of the Scottish government is a Special Advisor in the area of 
communication that is appointed by the First Minister. Special Advisors need to follow 
the procedures and norms established in the Special Advisors Code of Conduct 
(Scottish Government, 2017). The role of the Head of Communication is to manage 
the communications strategy from a ‘political’ perspective, as opposed to the body of 
civil servants that manage the government’s communication from a ‘public service’ 
perspective: 
‘My job was to plan out the government’s communications. I had to work 
alongside with the press staff, who are exclusively civil servants. They are not 
politically-appointed; they are career civil servants, some of whom had worked 
for the previous administration. All of whom, if there was a change of 
administration, they will work for them as well’ (Scotland, February 2014). 
Despite they are political appointees, the code of Special Advisors limits some of their 
political activities. For instance, the code establishes special advisors cannot brief the 
media on purely party matters, neither they can engage in political controversy 
particularly in personal attacks (Scottish Government, 2017). Basically, the code of 
conduct aims to separate special advisor, in any of the four areas they belong to, from 
what they consider to be the party political machinery. One of the reasons that explains 
the existence of this regulation criteria is the constant conflict between special advisors 
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and the body of civil servants (Fawcett and Gay, 2010).The Head of Communication 
is in charge of the government’s communication plan; however, this plan has to be 
executed by a body of permanent civil servants.  
Civil servants dealing with government communications are considered neutral 
suppliers of information (McNair, 2000). According to the Civil Service Code, 
Scottish civil servants are obliged to remain politically impartial. They cannot ‘act in 
a way that is determined by party political considerations, or use official resources for 
party political purposes’ (Civil Service Code, 2010, art.14). Consequently, civil 
servants cannot take part in the promotion of press releases or messages whose content 
relate to political dimensions of the Scottish Government –i.e. disputes between 
political leaders.  The role of the Special Advisor is based on the distinction between 
political input and public service information. When these practitioners are asked to 
elaborate what it means to be political, they describe it as: 
 ‘We as special advisors are allowed to have public political stands.  We can 
say things that civil servants cannot say. We can add a political dimension to 
what the civil press officer or the civil service communication team comes up 
with’ (Scotland, February 2014); 
 ‘Basically taking the best positive coverage as you can for the government for 
all the different activities that are going on… You can be political within 
government but you can’t be party-political in terms of campaigning’ 
(Scotland, February 2014). 
Doing ‘political’ communication within the government means presenting information 
in the best possible way to eventually benefit the party and its leaders. Interviewees 
explained that when there is a conflict of interest between civil servant communication 
officers and the Special Media Adviser, the Advisor adds his or her own quote at the 
end of a press release. Interviewees explain that the line that separates these two roles 
can be blurry and sometimes questionable. This has also been reflected in previous 
studies (Eichbaum and Shaw, 2010; Gregory, 2012). The line that separates the 
political role of the Special Media Adviser and the neutral civil servant was one of the 
most important causes for the controversy surrounding Alastair Campbell in the UK 
(Gaber, 2000; Jones, 1990). Civil servants complained that Alastair Campbell 
compelled them to break the political impartiality rule.  
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6.5.1 Communication structures in the Catalan Government 
Government communication departments in Catalonia do not operate with the same 
restrictions as the Scottish ones. First of all, the Catalan Government has the power to 
appoint not only the Head of Communication but all press officers working in the 
government’s communication areas (Generalitat, 2016). Secondly, there are no 
regulations in terms of the political impartiality of civil servants in Spain and Catalonia 
(García, 2011). Thirdly, both political and public communication strategies fall within 
the functions of the Head of Communication (Generalitat, 2016). In some cases, such 
as in CiU’s last government, these functions also included managing institutional 
advertising and public subsidies to news media (Ridao, 2014). Finally, some 
practitioners explained the government’s Head of Communication can also be in 
charge of managing communications strategy for the government, the president, and 
the party, in addition to coordinating communications for any city/regional governing 
body governed by the party. One of the interviewees described his role as cross-
organisational: 
‘I coordinated from wherever the leader was either parliamentary groups, 
Barcelona’s Diputació and every centre of power of the party. With whom? 
With a team that reported to me directly, they had their bosses but I was the 
cross-section boss that I was in charge of communications’ (Catalonia April, 
2014). 
He presents himself as the person that was above press officers in each political 
institution controlled by the party. From his description, it seems that his access to 
exclusive knowledge in the party was one of the reasons for his elevated position: 
‘I had no specific post. My title was not Secretary of Communications, neither 
I was a formal member of the Executive Committee of the party. But I was 
present in all the executive meetings of the party. I was in the Executive 
Committee for the First Secretary, in the Ministerial Executive Committee and 
in the Executive Committee of the Catalan government. If you are not in those 
places, you cannot do proper communication. Who do you give orders to? How 
do you get your message across?’ (Catalonia April, 2014). 
Similarly, another interviewee depicts how he was hierarchically situated in a higher 
rank than some of the party and government members that had to follow his directions: 
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‘At the beginning [during his time in the government], it was just me designing 
the strategy from the government and then I would also give this strategy to a 
team of members of the party so they could execute it’ (Catalonia April, 2014). 
This quote indicates –as the ones above- that when parties are in government, political 
public relations practitioners can achieve top managerial positions. These top 
managerial positions are not formally labeled, but rather are determined by their 
capacity to dictate orders to other party branches and institutions and their access to 
privileged, top managerial information. As will be explained in Chapter 7, Catalan 
government professionals have access to a wider range of powerful tools to influence 
their relationship with the news media.  
6.6 Conclusions 
The aim of the chapter was to outline the role, tasks, positions and functions that 
political public relations practitioners have in the organisations for which they work. 
The main finding is that there is a body of tasks, roles and functions that are similarly 
reproduced across Scotland and Catalonia despite contextual differences. Practitioners 
claim their basic role is to manage the communication tools available to the 
organisation. These communication tools refer mostly to the task of managing the 
relationship between news media and the party/government. The role is enacted in 
three different positions within the organisation (Head of Communication, press 
officer, Chief of Staff) depending on the tasks assigned (communication versus 
political tasks) and on the function played (for the leader or for the organisation).  
These tasks, roles and functions outline a profession that is enacted in three different 
organisational positions: the Head of Communication, the subordinate press officer, 
and the additional position of the Chief of Staff. The three different organisational 
positions relate to the assignment of tasks along a communication-political strategy 
axis outlined by the same practitioners. This communication-political strategy axis 
reflects once again the tensions of a profession that is constantly shaped by both the 
media and the political spheres (see Chapter 3). An analysis of the tasks included in 
this axis also indicate the central relevance of relationship management and 
networking to the political public relations profession.  
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This chapter follows the constant tension and blurring lines encountered in Chapter 3 
between the political and the media sphere. However, it is not one’s career path that 
determines whether a practitioner is more involved in communication or political 
strategy. Regardless of the career path they followed, practitioners claim their basic 
role is the management of the communication tools available to the organisation. 
Those practitioners in the Chief of Staff role (although not always recognised as an 
official position) understand these communication tools also include managing the 
content of the message. This reflects the scope of their functions being directly related 
to the political leader. They manage the agenda of the political leader, write their 
speeches, and manage their relationship with the media sphere. Heads of 
Communication and press officers, by contrast, consider their professional role to be 
limited to adapting a pre-established political message within the communications 
sphere. Their scope of functions is usually oriented to serve the entire organisation. 
One of the main differences encountered between Scotland and Catalonia is the 
existence of regulations affecting practitioners in government. In both context, the top 
management figure in charge of government’s communication is politically appointed. 
However, the main difference is that Scotland regulates and limits the degree of 
political involvement that the Government head of communication can have. In 
Scotland, the government’s head of communication is a Special Advisor regulated by 
the Special Advisors’ Code of Conduct and the Civil Service Code(UK Government, 
2010; Scottish Government, 2017). These codes of conduct restrict Scottish political 
PR practitioners being directly involved in the management of the party’s 
communication strategy. In sharp contrast, Catalan practitioners can achieve higher 
scope of power because they can be at the same time the government’s head of 
communication and the party’s head of communication. There are no regulations in 
Catalonia’s case.  
This chapter strongly focused on the similarities encountered in both cases. However, 
as this last section on government communication indicates, there are a series of 
significant differences related to the wider context in which these practitioners operate. 
The following chapter offers an in-depth analysis of the differences and impact of the 
wider context on the profession of political public relations.  
 CHAPTER 7 MEDIA SYSTEMS AND POLITICAL PUBLIC RELATIONS 
 
This chapter explores how political public relations practitioners relate to the wider 
media and political system in which they operate. Previous chapters explored the 
abstract patterns and norms of the professional group (Chapter 5); and professional 
routines and roles (Chapter 6). This chapter explores the specific performance of 
political PR and how it relates to the macro-level dimension of media systems. 
The aim of the chapter is to understand how the interaction between the media and the 
political system influences the professional group of political PR practitioners in 
Scotland and Catalonia. This chapter is based on examining the different dimensions 
of the relationship between media and political systems through interviewees’ 
responses. These dimensions derive from a revisited version of Hallin and Mancini’s 
model (2004) outlined in Chapter 2 and applied to Scotland and Catalonia’s case in 
Chapter 3. Chapter 3 argued that there are four key dimensions in the relationship 
between the political and the media spheres in Catalonia and Scotland: sub-state 
intervention in media policies, the articulation of the nation-building project, levels of 
political parallelism and the structure of media markets. The basic argument was that 
different nation-building projects in Scotland and Catalonia have generated different 
configurations of the relationship between the media and political systems. This 
chapter uses the contextual framework described in Chapter 3 as the basis for the 
analysis. This chapter focuses on two dimensions of the relationship between political 
and media systems: sub-state intervention on media policies and levels of political 
parallelism.  
The main argument of the chapter is as follows. The context in which political PR 
practitioners work (the interaction between the media and political systems) generates 
a series of resources (tools of influence over the media system) that eventually relate 
to the practitioner’s degree of professional power and professional performance. 
Practitioners’ professional power is connected to their ability to overcome limitations 
and use the available tools to get their message across. The way practitioners perform 
political PR (i.e. design communication strategies) relates to the characteristics of 
political parallelism in Catalonia and Scotland, respectively. Catalan practitioners 
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have access to a larger number of institutional and informal resources to influence 
news media than their Scottish counterparts. The main reason is the existence of a 
complex and interdependent relationship between the political and the media spheres 
in Catalonia. Scottish practitioners have instead developed more tools to overcome the 
restrictions on political parallelism and political influence in their media system. In 
Scotland’s case, there are institutional and cultural elements that limit the degree of 
interdependency between the media and the political spheres. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. The first section explains how the concept 
of ‘tools of influence’ emerged from the data analysis. It outlines the main tools of 
influence in Scotland and Catalonia. The second section explores how these tools of 
influence relate to different patterns of professional performance and to different 
characteristics of political parallelism in Scotland and Catalonia. 
7.1 Tools of influence over the media system 
The analysis of the data demonstrates that the dimensions of the relationship between 
the media and the political spheres (Hallin and Mancini, 2004) can be also considered 
tools of influence that practitioners have over the media sphere. Both Scottish and 
Catalan practitioners have an instrumental view of the media and political systems in 
which they work. Practitioners see their relationship with the wider political and media 
systems in terms of barriers and enablers. These barriers and enablers are different in 
Scotland and Catalonia. However, all interviewees find the wider political and media 
system can facilitate their main goal (to get the political message across) or it can have 
barriers that impede their goal: 
‘One of the challenges of the government is to try and get their achievements 
covered. Sometimes the media doesn’t regard the good news as news… If you 
are dependent up on a journalist taking what you say and writing up, you might 
feel you are not written up very well or it doesn’t make it as a story that it gets 
edited out and it never appears in the newspaper… If you use social media, 
there is no risk of that’(Scotland, February 2014); 
‘I try to reach my voters through the news media that are willing to get my 
message across…Spanish media have set up a barrier against us, it’s obvious I 
cannot communicate with them…Anything I want to do with them, they sell it 
with a negative frame. If you look at the last three years we have done negative 
 172 
things but also positive ones, they would never talk about the positive things’ 
(Catalonia, April 2014). 
These two quotes reflect how news media and journalists can be seen at the same time 
as barriers or enablers. The main difference behind these two quotes is the tools of 
influence that each practitioner has (see the next section for more detail). The concept 
of tools of influence refers to those institutional features and established behaviours 
that allow political parties and governments to influence different actors within the 
media sphere. This concept is not usually found in public relations or political 
communication theory. Hallin and Mancini (2004) do not regard the dimensions of the 
relationship between the political and the media spheres as tools of influence. The 
concept of tools of influence results from examining the relationship between the 
political and the media spheres from the viewpoint of political public relations as a 
profession.  In that sense, the different dimensions of the relationship between media 
and politics become instruments, more specifically professional instruments. From this 
viewpoint, the relationship between the media and the political spheres is the field of 
work of political PR practitioners, and in this field of work there are different tools to 
work with.  
The analysis of the data shows that in the relationship between the media and the 
political spheres of Scotland and Catalonia, there are two tools of influence: a series 
of institutional features and a series of established behaviours and practices. 
Institutional features refer to what Hallin and Mancini (2004) describe as ‘the degree 
and nature of state intervention in the media system’ (2004, p.21), and the added 
characteristics of  political systems in sub-state nations: nation-building projects and 
the decentralisation of powers (Humphreys, 2012). Established behaviours and 
practices refer to influential dynamics that are not formalised but are accepted amongst 
media and political actors. For instance, Hallin and Mancini (2004) describe some of 
these practices as part of the features of political parallelism. Table 7.1 shows each of 
these tools of influence in Scotland and Catalonia. 
Table 7.1 Tools of political influence and barriers in Scotland and Catalonia 
 Elements that facilitate political influence over the 
media system 
Barriers to political 
influence 
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Scotland 
Internal 
pluralism in 
news media 
content 
Political 
parallelism 
in 
newspapers 
Personal 
relationship
s with 
journalists 
Emergence 
of 
digital/soci
al media 
Limited 
powers 
over 
media 
policies 
Impartialit
y 
regulations 
on 
broadcaster
s 
Cataloni
a 
Party 
representative
s in the public 
broadcast 
council and 
audiovisual 
council 
Subsidies, 
public 
advertising 
funds and 
newspaper 
subscription
s accessible 
to the party 
Politicians’ 
intervention 
on news 
editors’ 
appointment
s 
Networks 
of party-
controlled 
media 
pundits 
News 
media 
editorial 
polarisatio
n (yes/no 
axis) 
Parties 
with 
limited or 
no access 
to power 
 
Analysis of the data revealed that Catalan practitioners have access to more 
institutional tools and established practices of influence over the media sphere than 
their Scottish counterparts. However, Scottish practitioners enjoy a more efficient and 
powerful dynamic in their relationships with journalists. Catalan practitioners aim to 
use their tools of influence to control the editorial line of the news media as a whole, 
and also the structure of media markets –usually when they are in government. Scottish 
practitioners aim to use their tools of influence to control the content of specific news 
stories. The following subsections will examine how these tools of influence and their 
respective barriers relate to elements of professional power and performance. 
7.2 Professional power and performance  
Scottish practitioners work in a context where the degree of interdependency between 
the media and the political spheres is limited (see Chapter 3). In this context, the 
professional power of Scottish practitioners relates to their ability to overcome the 
barriers limiting political influence over the media system. These barriers relate to the 
configuration of political parallelism in Scotland’s media system. Political parallelism 
in broadcast media is limited by impartiality regulations (Ofcom, 2016): broadcasters 
cannot show political bias, but they need to reflect the plurality of political views. 
Open partisanship can be found in newspapers; however, this partisanship tends 
towards anti-independence positions (Mcnair, 2008; Hutchison, 2016). Consequently, 
this editorial imbalance is a barrier for pro-independence political parties. To 
overcome these limitations, Scottish practitioners claim to use their personal 
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relationships with broadcast journalists, to use social media, and to take advantage of 
the internal pluralism existing in Scottish news media.  
Catalan practitioners work in a context where there is a strong degree of 
interdependency between the media and the political spheres (see chapter 3). This 
interdependency can be seen through the large number of institutional structures and 
informal practices that allow the political sphere to intervene in the media sphere, and 
cause the media sphere to be dependent on the political sphere –including public 
subsidies to news media (Fernandez and Blasco Gil, 2005; Villarroya, 2012). In this 
context, a practitioner’s professional power relates to the practitioner’s ability to 
manage institutional and informal tools to influence news media. The focus of Catalan 
practitioners’ performance is not so much on overcoming limitations –as is the case in 
Scotland– but to feed and maintain existing ties of political parallelism with news 
media. Catalan news media’s (broadcasters, online and print) editorial lines mirror 
closely the ideological distribution of political parties. There are no restrictions to 
political parallelism in Catalonia, and almost all political parties have at least one or 
two supporting news media.  
7.2.1 Performance and political parallelism in Scotland 
The data demonstrates that the political debate between pro- and anti-independence 
parties in Scotland, along with Scotland’s political parallelism characteristics, 
influences political PR practitioners’ performance. An analysis of the data finds that 
there are two different patterns of professional performance corresponding to pro- and 
anti-independence parties, respectively.  
7.2.1.1 Non-interventionist media policies 
As explained in chapter XX, Scotland and the wider UK are characterised by a non-
interventionist media policy in which there are no public subsidies to private owned 
media as there are in Catalonia and other European countries such as Norway or 
Denmark (Philip Schlesinger and Benchimol, 2014). The very few tools of influence 
that Scottish practitioners had –government advertisement on local newspapers- have 
been eliminated because parties fear to be accused of trying to ‘buy’ news media 
content:  
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‘The Scottish Government and local authorities used to be the biggest source 
for advertising revenue in terms of job for the print media. There were 
allegations some years ago that the Labour Party tried to withdraw adverts after 
some hostile coverage. You cannot buy coverage in Scotland’ (Scotland, 
February 2014)  
 
‘In Scotland the role of the spin doctor is different because [in Catalonia] there 
are places where they will get the coverage no matter what because they have 
bought it already. It is the same as in America up to some extent with the 
broadcasters where you can buy commercial space which you can’t do here. 
Here it is different you could buy advertisement space in the newspapers and 
maybe that would work. 15 years ago maybe you could read more political ads 
in the papers but you don’t see them now’ (Scotland, February 2014)  
Scottish practitioners take pride in getting news coverage because of their personal 
management strategies and good relationships with news media. They consider any 
State intervention on media policy as a simple way of buying news content. Scottish 
practitioners might not have strong and powerful tools of influence such as a system 
of media subsidies but they have access to other tools such as personal influence over 
particular journalists to overcome editorial lines. 
7.2.1.2 Relationships with journalists 
Both anti and pro-independence practitioners claim they use personal relationships 
with journalists to overcome editorial lines and impartiality regulations. One of the 
main differences between Scotland and Catalonia is that Scottish practitioners consider 
themselves as powerful enough to counteract editorial preferences using their 
individual relationships with journalists as a tool of influence. This practice is based 
on the perception that journalists’ personal sphere of political interests is not 
necessarily aligned with the editorial line of the news media they work for. Therefore, 
this is an area open to the spin doctors’ influence. Scottish journalists are not regarded 
as public defenders of specific political ideologies as it is the case in Catalonia. 
Journalists are just like very ordinary you trying to do their job so they are just 
waiting for wages by selling copies of their newspapers.’ (Scotland, February 
2014)  
‘I don’t blame individual journalists for that (being hostile), they have their 
editorials and their owners’ agenda to pursue’ (Scotland, February 2014)  
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‘The idea that individual journalists working within should be seen as having 
a bias or consciously promulgating the X campaign I think it’s absolutely non-
sense’(Scotland, February 2014)  
Scottish journalists are not motivated by personal political interests but they just act as 
part of the organization they work for. These views relate to the dominant professional 
model of journalism in which journalists are seen as independent actors from political 
powers (Hanitzsch, 2007). Scottish practitioners explained that using their personal 
relationships with journalists and news editors were able to obtain positive coverage 
in ‘hostile’ newspapers: 
‘I think the press is largely hostile anyway so you would only probably succeed 
in alienating those that were at least on a personal level prepared to give you 
the fair treatment. My view is that you have to try to have a good 
relationship…On a one to one basis you can tell a journalist ‘don’t be 
ridiculous’ or ‘we are not engaging with that’. You have to be very sure that is 
on a one to one basis, on individual issues or individual stories.’ (Scotland, 
February 2014)  
The strategy of the practitioner seems to be clear only on a one to one basis he can 
‘convince’ the journalists to adopt the party’s position on a specific story. The above 
quote needs to be placed in a context where this specific political party did not have 
systematic support from any printed newspaper in Scotland at the moment of the 
interview. This tool of influence is not only used by those parties that have 
‘difficulties’ obtaining positive coverage, personal relationships are also used to 
overcome broadcast impartiality regulations: 
‘You know that there are journalists you might have a good relationship or 
some people might give it a better show that could get a front page splash or if 
it is a television broadcast you could get the story up in the bulletin’ (Scotland, 
February 2014) 
‘Even if a newspaper is hostile as a title or as a company, then the individual 
journalists you might have a good relationship with them so why waste that? 
You have to use whatever decent relationship you have with a journalist.’ 
(Scotland, February 2014) 
The last quote is a good example of the power that Scottish practitioners perceive to 
have in their individual relationships with journalists: they can overcome not only 
newspaper hostility but that of the news media group. These conceptualizations of 
power and media relations are opposed to those of Catalan practitioners. 
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7.2.1.3 Political parallelism and party power 
Scottish practitioners describe pragmatic tactics of media management aimed to 
maximize media coverage regardless of the editorial lines. This pragmatic reasoning 
is highly important because it is one of the most significant distinctions between 
Scottish and Catalan spin doctors that reflects the differences between the two media 
system models. In polarised media scenarios such as Catalonia, the data shows it is 
common to limit media relations or be more keen to those news media that are 
editorially favourable your organisation as media consumption reflects the cues of the 
political debate. However, there are differences between pro and anti-independence 
Scottish political parties. The less-advantageous position that pro-independence 
parties have in Scotland’s political parallelism landscape explains some of the 
differences encountered between Scottish political parties. 
Practitioners in Scottish anti-independence parties expressed different views and 
described different strategies than those in pro-independence parties. The main reason 
seems to be the editorial balance of news media that has historically supported their 
party’s political views –specially those of Scottish Labour (Hutchison, 2008). 
According to the data, anti-independence parties’ strategy was to feed and maintain 
supportive news media, but also to extend their influence to other areas such as 
broadcasters.  
‘Our job with those guys [supportive newspapers] was to continually feed them 
with stories and policies that would demonstrate that their point of view 
[sceptical against pro-independence movement] was the right one’ (Scotland, 
February 2014). 
Practitioners in pro-independence parties strategised their actions within the context 
of an overall media environment that was hostile to their political views. 
Consequently, they argued their strategy was make the most of any media coverage 
they received, even if it came from hostile newspapers: 
‘A lot of the media is editorially hostile, you have to deal with that but you 
would never give up on any bid of the media. You would always try to get the 
best coverage you can everywhere because in the end somebody will probably 
see it’ (Scotland, February 2014). 
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Practitioners in pro-independence parties claimed their strategy to overcome news 
media editorial hostility was to find stories that would attract the hostile news media. 
Their strategy was essentially to take advantage of the internal pluralism that 
sometimes emerges in Scottish news media: 
‘We tried to play the game ‘our strengths and their strengths’ as opposed to try 
and change their editorial line. So rather than saying you are wrong, you are 
right, support us or believe us we would go to the Daily Mail with just a story’ 
(Scotland, February 2014); 
 ‘The Daily Record, for example, it would be editorially opposed to 
independence but it is also editorially opposed to the Tory government in 
Westminster. The reasons for their opposition are topics such as welfare cuts, 
for example. Therefore, first the Daily Record will not support a Yes vote and 
not support the SNP but they can support announcements or policy initiatives 
that are about to mitigate the damage of welfare cuts or about what you could 
do in an independent Scotland with the welfare powers. The Daily Record can 
pick up some positive elements of the constitutional debate’  (Scotland, 
February 2014). 
These attractive stories were promoted through the use of personal networks with 
editors and journalists. Chapter 6 already demonstrated that networking is the main 
tool of work for political PR practitioners. 
 ‘I think the press is largely hostile anyway so you would only probably 
succeed in alienating those that were at least on a personal level prepared to 
give you the fair treatment. My view is that you have to try to have a good 
relationship…On a one-to-one basis you can tell a journalist ‘don’t be 
ridiculous’ or ‘we are not engaging with that’. You have to be very sure that is 
on a one-to-one basis, on individual issues or individual stories’ (Scotland, 
February 2014). 
One of the main differences between Scotland and Catalonia is that practitioners in 
Catalonia can use institutional tools, such as subsidies to news media, to influence 
editorial lines. One could argue the strategies described above relate to practitioners’ 
working ethics. Practitioners promote good stories that they know will increase the 
quality of information that citizens receive from the news media.  
Analysis of these parties’ strategies indicates a very significant element: maintaining 
editorial support is a task that goes beyond historical connections between the two 
organisations, and can be affected by the daily routines of press release distribution or 
negotiations for exclusives, both of which are in the hands of the political PR 
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practitioner. The data demonstrates that Scottish political PR plays an important role 
in maintaining the ideological ties between the party and its supportive newspapers. 
According to their descriptions, practitioners are expected –by a newspaper and its 
readers– to maintain newspaper loyalty beyond the traditional ties between the two 
organisations by feeding the paper exclusive stories:  
 ‘The Daily Mirror or the Daily Record would often get annoyed because they 
would say ‘we are your loyal backers so we want stories first’, so we had to 
keep happy our long-term supporters and at the same time other people, and 
that was always a difficult balance’ (Scotland, February 2014); 
‘Our job with those guys [supportive newspapers] was to continually feed them 
with stories and policies that would demonstrate that their point of view 
[sceptical against pro-independence movement] was the right one’ (Scotland, 
February 2014). 
These quotes challenge views that consider relationships of political parallelism as 
requiring less media management techniques (Brown, 2011). Practitioners describe 
their relationships with their supportive newspapers (more partisan environments) as 
needing as much media management effort as those with non-supportive newspapers. 
This idea is also reinforced by Catalonia’s data (see the next section).  
7.2.1.4 Impartiality regulations and broadcasters 
Practitioners in pro-independence parties considered that the impartiality regulations 
that forced broadcasters to represent plurality of views was an advantage:  
‘We tried to work harder with broadcasters to set some agenda stuff. The main 
reason is because I think we had a better chance because they had to balance 
that out’ (Scotland, February 2014). 
Pro-independence practitioners described having good and friendly relationships with 
broadcast journalists and broadcast editors. This contrasts with the fact that inside 
Scottish pro-independence parties are voices critical of the BBC and its perceived bias 
against the pro-independence movement (Lynch, 2009b). In addition, during the 
independence referendum campaign, pro-independence activists gathered outside 
BBC Scotland’s headquarters to protest against the BBC’s bias (Greig, 2016). 
However, pro-independence practitioners argued there was a line separating their 
friendly relationships with broadcasters and their criticism of the BBC’s structure: 
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‘I think we have a constructive relationship. We have friendly relationships 
with individual journalists and producers. We meet the BBC on a regular basis. 
I met some senior producers from the BBC just a few weeks ago and basically 
rehearse some arguments’ (Scotland, February 2014); 
‘There is no problem in terms of the relationship, is perfectly amicable. The 
problem is the structure of it because it doesn’t actually reflect the reality of a 
self-governing Scotland. It never did reflect the reality of Scotland because 
Scotland’s educational system, health service has always been different. 
However, post-devolution it has become even less satisfactory because Scottish 
politics have become very diverged from Westminster politics. For example, 
The Question Time is the flagship current affairs programme on the BBC, not 
quite but almost every week they have a representative of UKIP on and UKIP 
has no presence in Scotland at all’ (Scotland, February 2014). 
As previously explained, maintaining and creating good personal networks is the main 
tool of influence that Scottish pro-independence parties have. Practitioners in anti-
independence parties expressed different views and performance strategies. 
Practitioners in anti-independence parties considered impartiality rules limiting 
political parallelism in broadcasting to be detrimental to their strategies. They 
described feelings of frustration when they could not influence broadcasters’ editorial 
lines or complained about broadcasters’ editorial decisions: 
‘Broadcast was more of a challenge because it was really frustrating that they 
would just report whatever it was that both sides said rather than say ‘what they 
just said is totally mad’… So it was difficult and it was challenging because we 
spent a lot of time just going back to the BBC and saying ‘you can’t just let 
these things go on unquestioned, you got to question them’’ (Scotland, February 
2014); 
‘But I find really difficult to change the BBC’s mind…  The BBC seems to 
report the news that the government creates without questioning it or providing 
comment, so that was really frustrating. The reason the BBC used to say to us 
was ‘oh it is very easy in London, you have government and one opposition, 
but here in Scotland you have government, three opposition parties -Labour, 
LibDem, SNP- and we can’t put all of you on the television so none of you 
are’. That was really frustrating’ (Scotland, February 2014). 
The quotes have no direct references to impartiality regulations, but the critique has 
an implicit reference to it. The first interviewee wanted the BBC to express doubts 
about a statement from his party’s political opponent because that was part of his 
communication strategy. In a later quote, the interviewee explains his communication 
strategy’s main goal was to create scepticism around the policies promoted by the 
opposing party. Interviewees explained that one of the main tasks of political PR 
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practitioners is to scrutinise television coverage because their final aim is to influence 
news content:  
‘The scrutiny is on the television company and that is part of a job of a spin 
doctor: spending a lot of your time with thing like debates, you are trying to 
put pressure on the broadcaster to be as fair, but not only as fair, you want 
things to be much in your favour. It doesn’t matter if you are left, right or a 
nationalist’ (Scotland, February 2014).  
 Despite the above interviewee’s claim that all parties want to influence broadcasters, 
not all do it using the same tools. The data shows the political PR practitioner is the 
one designing the tactics and strategies to influence or overcome broadcasters. 
However, these tactics and strategies seem to differ between pro- and anti-
independence parties. Anti-independence parties (Scottish Conservatives, Scottish 
Labour and Better Together) claimed they avoided complaining about their frustration:  
‘You can’t just let these things go on unquestioned, you got to question them 
and that was a frustration that we had with the BBC in particular. Although we 
did not go public with it because I think that is the wrong thing to do. That was 
my decision. I think that you are in a very bad place if your argument is that 
the media aren’t treating us fairly and if that is where you are, then you are not 
in a good place’. (Scotland, February 2014).  
‘Bombarding BBC on a daily basis with complaints and about their perceived 
bias that is relentless.  We took a view that our best way forward was to not 
bombard them with complaints and only when absolutely pushed to raise issues 
with them but in a disappointed kind of way rather than being aggressive with 
them. So they felt we were reasonable people and not just having a go for the 
sake of it.  Our relationship with the broadcasters it was that of we are 
reasonable people’ (Scotland, February 2014).  
 
The first interviewee is making an implicit reference to pro-independence activists 
protesting outside BBC Scotland’s headquarters during the independence referendum 
campaign. Practitioners in anti-independence parties accused pro-independence 
parties of over-complaining about the media coverage they receive: 
They [SNP] complain about everything but that is the culture of the nationalist, 
it’s grievance…. Nationalists have a persecution obsession… My party I would 
say has possibly... has been more consistently attacked by the Murdoch papers 
than the SNP has.  (Scotland, February 2014).  
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These accusations reflect elements of the political competition dynamics between 
parties on the different communication strategies. Practitioners interpret the 
communication strategies of their counterparts in other parties according with the axis 
of the political debate.  
 
7.3 Performance and political parallelism in Catalonia 
The focus of the Catalan practitioners’ performance is not so much on overcoming 
limitations –as is the case in Scotland- but to feed and maintain existing ties of political 
parallelism with the news media. Different patterns emerge not between pro- and anti-
independence parties, but between parties that can access powerful government 
positions and those who cannot. One of the main differences between Scotland and 
Catalonia is that relationships of political parallelism in Catalonia are rooted in a series 
of institutional features –e.g. media subsidies- in addition to informal behaviours 
(these behaviours also differ in the two cases). Parties that achieve government 
positions can aim to control or modify the institutional ties between news media and 
the political system, whereas parties with less power see their strategies limited to 
informal practices of political parallelism.  
In addition, the data shows Catalan practitioners do not consider it necessary to invest 
their efforts in influencing hostile news media. All Catalan practitioners consider the 
news media on the other side (usually pro- versus anti-independence/referendum) are 
not useful channels to communicate with their voters. They regard news media on their 
side as sufficient tools to get their messages across.  The following subsections explore 
each of the institutional and informal practices of political parallelism in Catalonia, 
and how political PR practitioners are or are not involved in each of them.  
7.3.1 Public subsidies 
The system of public subsidies to news media –both broadcast and printed news 
media- is used as a tool of political influence, according to the interviewees, because 
they are used as a chain of favours: 
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‘I think news media depend too much on public subsidies, then they always 
have to return the favour. When you are not economically independent, 
sometimes it can happen that someone phones you. I don’t know how the 
British system works but here this happens. I cannot say that my boss has never 
done that’ (Catalonia, April 2014). 
In this case, the practice of phoning a news agency is a shortcut that refers to the 
existence of a demand from the side of the political organisation towards the media. 
These relationships are described as a patronage system: 
‘When I was working there, there was a right-wing newspaper that received a 
lot of public media subsidies from different public administrations controlled 
by the party because part of the party’s elite wanted the newspaper to be there. 
What happened in the end? They put in millions of euros and when the moment 
came, they [the newspaper] decided that our President was politically dead 
without any hesitation and they sided with ‘the enemy’. Then the system here 
is pretty much a patronage system. I don’t think there are any independent 
media, there are some but not a lot’ (Catalonia, April 2014). 
As it can be observed, public subsidies are regarded as patronage systems because 
political parties and governments use them in this way. However, as this case shows, 
such influence is not always successful. From the perspective of smaller and less 
powerful political parties, public subsidies are a barrier to effective media relations 
management and the cause for constant confrontation with ‘the other’ news media: 
‘That affects my job in a very serious way because the media are determined 
by that and that is part of the lack of critical spirit that I was talking before. 
Many news media, they survive thanks to public subsidies and institutional 
advertisement. Here in Catalonia, there are media groups that receive big 
quantities of money and that determines their messages in a very specific way’ 
(Catalonia, April 2014); 
‘How do I face that scenario [media subsidies]? Badly, because effectively 
news media, when they have an opinion they have it on the basis of certain 
subsidies that come from certain groups…There is no way of fighting that, you 
need to take advantage of the other’s strength and try to sneak some 
information whenever you can. Nowadays it’s true that we live in a country 
where you need either a lot of power or a lot of money to communicate well 
your message’ (Catalonia, April 2014). 
The fact that the economical ties between certain news media and the government are 
regarded as barriers from both sides of the political debate in Catalonia indicates the 
strategic or tactical significance that public subsidies have. One of the interesting 
elements found in the data analysis is that the political PR practitioner, when the party 
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is in government, can be involved in the management of public subsidies. Section 6.5 
in Chapter 6 demonstrated that during CiU’s last government, the Head of 
Communication was also in charge of the government department that deals with 
public subsidies.  
‘One of the explanations is that [one of the interviewees of this research] is the 
one managing the money that they gave to news media. The dircom [director 
of communications] is the one doing all that: he is the money delivery person, 
the one communicating and the one making pressure. It’s a little bit of 
lobbying, it’s not a dircom in strictu sensu’ (Catalonia, April 2014). 
Practitioners explained that the organisational structure that allows the political PR 
practitioner to control media subsidies changes with each government. However, it can 
be assumed that the structural features of the media system are the cause for the 
practitioner to have an additional role in Catalonia: they can be involved in the 
management of public subsidies to news media and that grants them higher levels of 
power. 
7.3.2 Networks of media pundits 
In addition to the tools of influence described in the previous sections, the data 
demonstrates that there are two additional tools of influence available to the political 
PR practitioner in Catalonia to maintain levels of political parallelism. These two tools 
are unique to the Catalan media system and are not found in Scotland’s case. 
According to the data, political parties in Catalonia reinforce and maintain levels of 
political parallelism by: intervening in the appointment of news editors; and by 
possessing a network of partisan media pundits. While the first is usually practiced by 
the politician directly, the spin doctor is responsible for maintaining the pundits 
network. Notions of professionalism emerged in relation to these practices. 
Catalan practitioners described –without naming specific politicians- that is common 
practice for the politician to be involved in the appointment of news editors and news 
directors to make sure they are ‘on their side’: 
 ‘Politicians regard news media as just one mean to get to their voters, and their 
big obsession is to transform news media in simple message deliverers…There 
is a dance of media editors because when there is a change of government, they 
always say they would change the director at La Vanguardia [most read Catalan 
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newspaper]. The reason is because politicians want to control everything and 
the better the merrier’ (Catalonia, April 2014); 
‘It has always happened that they change the media director because someone 
[a politician] makes a phone call. We have known that for a long time. The 
attitude towards the media is that of strong interventionism’ (Catalonia, April 
2014). 
Practitioners blame politicians for their interventionist attitudes towards the media in 
an attempt to claim their image as ethical relationship managers. However, it seems 
quite unlikely that practitioners, as experts in the media sphere and managers of media 
relationships, would not have any sort of involvement in these practices. It is also the 
case that interviewees were reluctant to talk about their involvement in managing their 
party’s network of media pundits. Political parties have an unofficial team of 
supportive media pundits who regularly appear on television and radio debates 
defending the party’s position. They are not presented as party members to the public 
but only as people whose views are in line with those of the party. Therefore, media 
pundits are part of the relationship between news media and political parties. 
Nevertheless, one of the interviewees clearly explained that the spin doctor is the 
person in charge of making sure media pundits’ statements are in line with those of 
the party: 
 ‘My party was not capable of creating a network of strong media pundits to 
defend their ideas. I could make a list of all the media pundits and I could tell 
you who is who. All media pundits receive the party’s core arguments at some 
point during the week. I am saying so because I have sent those party’s 
arguments and then you listen to them on the radio. I have also seen phone calls 
from media pundits two days before the political show asking what they have 
to say’ (Catalonia, April 2014). 
The relevance of media pundits seems to be increasing in communications strategy. 
The spin doctor is expected to be knowledgeable about what media pundits are 
associated with each political party. This knowledge is considered essential to prepare 
the politician when they take part in television or radio talk shows: 
‘When he goes to an interview, I always make sure that the media pundits are 
not going to be like ferocious animals running against you. That is the same as 
a football coach having a bad referee: when things are going wrong this can 
change the result of the game’ (Catalonia, April 2014). 
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Media pundits are one additional element in the levels of political parallelism between 
news media and political parties. Editorial lines of television channels and radio 
stations are evaluated  by practitioners on the basis of the political diversity of media 
pundits: 
 ‘There is no Spanish television with a conciliatory message towards what a 
big part of the Catalans want (referendum). How many sovereignists (pro-
referendum) media pundits can you see in a Spanish television?’ (Catalonia, 
April 2014); 
‘This figure of the media pundit, they are people that have nothing better to do 
and I don’t know if that has any electoral effect. That has been generated to the 
service of whom you already know. They are doing harm to our society not 
because they express their opinions but because their debate is not 
corresponding with what people is interested in’ (Catalonia, April 2014). 
Media pundits seem to have been incorporated into a political role that some news 
media have in the Catalan media system. It is worthwhile to note that two of those 
interviewed for this research are nowadays recognised media pundits. It is hard to tell 
if this is a significant trend amongst former spin doctors in Catalonia or if it is just a 
coincidence. Media pundits serve as a framing tool that Catalan radio stations use to 
articulate their editorial positioning in political talk shows (Montagut 2013).  
7.3.3 Public broadcast governance structures 
One of the elements that positions Catalan practitioners more powerfully than their 
Scottish counterparts is Catalonia’s model of public broadcast governance. According 
to the data, government spin doctors can be involved in the decision-making process 
of policies affecting the public broadcaster because the public broadcast governance 
model allows for the majoritarian party –usually the government party- to effectively 
control the public broadcast network When in opposition, practitioners can also take 
part in the party’s proposal of candidates to the Board of Directors (Corporació 
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Catalana de Mitjans Audiovisuals, CCMA), the governing body of the Catalan Public 
Broadcaster7.   
The vast majority of interviewees were reluctant to explain if they had any 
involvement in the CCMA when they were in government, but some of them admitted 
off the record that the spin doctor has a saying in that. On the record, interviewees 
described attitudes of political interventionism towards the Catalan Public Broadcast 
Enterprise (TV3) as common practice: 
‘You need to take into consideration that here, the Board Directors of TV3 is 
directly appointed by political parties and they would never put there someone 
with a little bit of moral principles’ (Catalonia, April 2014); 
‘Tv3 is not independent no matter what they say. It will always be the voice of 
its owner [the government], they will put political input according to the party 
in government. Tv3 is not the BBC.  Maybe it’s just a coincidence but the news 
presenter’s boyfriend is someone from the party Esquerra Republicana. I don’t 
believe it’s a coincidence. Esquerra is a party with a strong voice within the 
government, if they say it’s enough, the government- it’s over. They are also a 
party that are keen on putting their own people in strategic positions’ 
(Catalonia, April 2014). 
As managers of the relationship between their political organisation and the news 
media, it seems quite obvious that the spin doctor is part of the political 
interventionism practices described in these quotes, an important dimension in the 
relationship between the party and the public broadcaster in Catalonia. Previous 
research has demonstrated that Southern European countries have a long tradition of 
political control and influence over their public broadcasting system (Hallin and 
Papathanassopoulos, 2002; Gonzalez, Rodriguez and Castromil, 2010; Pfetsch, 2013), 
and Catalonia is not an exception (Fernández et al., 2011). The involvement of the 
spin doctor with the Catalan Public Broadcaster when the spin doctor’s party is in 
government was also confirmed by one of the interviewees, who explained how he 
tried to change the election campaign coverage regulations within TV3: 
                                                 
7 As explained in Chapter 4, it is common practice for each party in Parliament to get 
one or more of their candidates elected for these positions depending on the size of the 
party.  
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‘They have always accused me of imposing the electoral blocs and it’s true I 
defended them. One time we tried to work without those regulations for a week 
and it was a disaster. I still remember some of the conversations with the news 
editor and some of the journalists’ (Catalonia, April 2014). 
Consequently, it can be assumed that Catalan practitioners, when they are in 
government, can play or ‘use’ their direct influence over the Public Broadcaster as part 
of their communication strategy. 
7.3.4 Personal relationships with journalists 
Section 7.1.2 shows that Scottish practitioners use their personal networks and 
personal relationships with journalists as their main tool of work. Scottish practitioners 
endeavour to use these networks to overcome editorial hostility. These 
conceptualisations of power and media relations differ from those of Catalan 
practitioners. Catalan practitioners contend they are not powerful enough to use their 
individual relationships with journalists to counteract editorial lines. Journalists are 
seen as motivated by their personal political orientations that in most cases are aligned 
with the editorial line of the news media they work for: 
‘The vast majority of the political journalists, they work for some sort of 
political goal. 80% of the journalists in Barcelona are supporters of the 
independence of Catalonia. They are journalists because they want to favour 
the independence process and I think that is a huge mistake. That is very 
frustrating when you are working as a spin doctor’ (Catalonia, April 2014);  
‘For instance, the newspaper ARA, if you don’t follow their ‘wave’, they don’t 
let you [journalist] work there. Not only the politics section is biased but all the 
sections are oriented towards the idea that Spain is shit’ (Catalonia, April 
2014);  
‘When I was there, we had a significant journalistic sectarianism oriented 
towards leftist positions in some news rooms. Televisions, radios, newspapers 
and the…I have always been surprised by the link between the journalistic 
profession and leftist worldviews. This link happens because it is a cheap way 
to change the world’ (Catalonia, April 2014). 
All Catalan interviewees expressed these views regardless of the party they worked 
for. These quotes reflect two things: the tradition of advocacy journalism, and how this 
limits the capacity to influence in a strongly polarised political climate. The spin doctor 
and political parties cannot influence the content or the framing of news by advocating 
the liberal values of the journalist, since this is not associated with ideas of independent 
professionalism. Advocacy journalism is described as the motivation that journalists 
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have to promote specific political perspectives (Waisbord, 2004). This journalistic 
ideology (Deuze, 2005) has also been related to commentary-oriented journalism, not 
strongly differentiated from political activism; and associated in those contexts with 
high media political parallelism (Hallin and Mancini 2004). Catalan interviewees 
bitterly complained about the blurring lines between facts and opinion:  
‘I think that in Spain and in Catalonia, it is not journalism what they do, it’s 
opinion. Classic journalism, that one with the traditional reporter that went to 
the parliament and just explained what happened, that has died. Nowadays you 
find parliamentary pieces that say ‘the opposition biggest mistake’ and is not a 
report- that is an editorial. I talk to a lot of journalists and I tell them, ‘listen, 
what you did yesterday was just opinion and I respect that, but that is not a 
report not even a little bit’’ (Catalonia,  April 2014). 
Catalan political PR practitioners seem to share the same normative view on 
journalists’ role: they need to report from an impartial point of view. One might 
question whether these views on journalists’ roles are motivated by practitioners’ 
ethical standards or whether these views reflect their frustrated attempts of influence. 
It can be assumed that both elements (ethical standards and instrumental perception of 
journalists) are behind the views expressed in the quote above.  
7.4 Key findings  
The analysis of the relationship between the political PR profession and media systems 
in Scotland and Catalonia shows that: 
- Political PR practitioners have an instrumental perception of their media and 
political context. The context is constituted by tools that facilitate their job or 
barriers that limit their ability to get messages across. 
- One of the roles of the political PR practitioner is to maintain and feed 
relationships of political parallelism with news media 
- Relationships of political parallelism are not simple tasks, but they require as 
much effort and time as relationships with non-supportive news media 
7.5 Conclusions 
The aim of this chapter was to understand how the profession is shaped by the wider 
structure of the media system in Scotland and Catalonia. The main finding is that 
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media systems influence the degree of professional power of political public relations. 
The element that determines the professional power of political public relations is 
related to the tools of influence that these professionals have over the media system. 
The different configuration of the relationship between the political and the media 
sphere in Scotland and Catalonia generates different tools of influence that 
practitioners use in their strategies and daily tasks. These tools of influence range from 
the effectiveness of individual relationships with journalists to sub-state intervention 
on media policies. In the comparison between Scotland and Catalonia, Catalan 
practitioners emerge as having more professional power. The main reason is because 
Catalan practitioners operate in a highly complex media system where there is a strong 
interdependency between political powers and news media. The analysis of the data 
indicates that this interdependency is articulated through a series of tools of influence 
that in most cases are part of the communication strategy of parties and governments 
and therefore, executed or supervised by political public relations practitioners. 
The data analysis indicates that both Scottish and Catalan practitioners have an 
instrumental view on the role of news media in the public sphere. In other words, they 
all consider influencing news media is the aim of their relationship with journalists 
and editors. For instance, almost all Scottish and Catalan practitioners complained 
about public broadcasters blocking their attempts to influence news content. The main 
difference is that those attempts of influence in Catalonia they are more successful for 
two reasons. There is an institutional context that allows parties to partly influence 
news media, mainly through public subsidies and strong interventionism on media 
policies. In addition, there are a series of practices of political parallelism accepted 
amongst the political elites. For instance, the intervention of politicians in the 
appointment of news editors or the existence of extensive networks of party-controlled 
media pundits. This is not to affirm that Scottish practitioners are not influential 
players in their relationships with the media sphere or that there are no relationships 
of political parallelism. 
The main tool of influence available to Scottish practitioners is the individual 
relationship with journalists. Scottish practitioners use their relationships with 
journalists to overcome editorial lines and even impartiality regulations in 
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broadcasting. Certainly, some Scottish political parties such as Scottish Labour have 
supportive newspapers such as Daily Record. However, the existence of internal 
pluralism in Scottish news media (several views in one newspaper) allow practitioners 
to use this flexibility to obtain positive coverage in specific articles.  The data shows 
a political context that does not easily accept practices of political parallelism as the 
ones identified in Catalonia. It might be the case that practitioners are wary of news 
media exposing some of their activities as part of news stories. Nonetheless, the most 
important feature is the lack of a socio-institutional context that restricts some of their 
attempts to influence news media.  
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CHAPTER 8  THE PRACTICE AND PROFESSION OF POLITICAL PR 
 
This chapter discusses the overall findings of this thesis on the practice of political 
public relations in Scotland and Catalonia in relation to the academic literature on 
professionalisation, political public relations and political communication. This 
chapter highlights the core empirical and theoretical contributions of this thesis.  
The chapter aims to contribute to generating a more empirically-based understanding 
of the practice of the political public relations occupation. It also intends to contribute 
to the understanding of the impact that different media systems have on the practice of 
political public relations. In terms of a more theoretically-oriented debate, this chapter 
aims to develop the neo-institutional sociological approach to professions to 
understand and explore emerging professions and their practices in the political 
communication sphere. 
The central argument of this thesis is as follows. The practice and performance of 
political public relations occupies a particular niche in the division of labour in the 
political field. The profession of political public relations uses networking and tactical 
management to solve the communication needs of parties and governments. Political 
public relations is a hybrid profession that seeks its own space in-between the constant 
influence of journalism and politics. The professional performance of political PR is 
influenced by the characteristics of the interaction between the media and the political 
spheres. The relationship between the media and the political spheres determines the 
tools of work used by professional practitioners. 
The chapter is divided into three main sections corresponding to the three aims of the 
thesis. The first section discusses the idea of the political public relations profession 
as a hybrid profession. It puts forward the idea that the profession of political PR 
reflects the interrelated nature of the relationship between the media and the political 
spheres. The second section deals with the implications of the main tasks, roles and 
functions of the political PR profession. It relates these elements with the practice of 
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public relations in the corporate sector. The third section discusses the impact of the 
different configurations of the relationship between the media and political spheres on 
the political public relations profession. It argues the differences encountered in the 
performance of political PR in Scotland and Catalonia reflect and expose the political 
communication culture prevailing in each context. It questions the power of political 
PR practitioners in parties and governments. The final section explores the limitations 
of the thesis and the lines for future research. 
8.1 The hybrid profession of political public relations  
This section explores the professional structures of political public relations and 
discusses the idea of political public relations as a hybrid profession resulting from the 
interaction between the media and the political spheres. In doing so, this section deals 
with the first aim of this thesis: to outline the constitutive elements of the political 
public relations profession.  
This thesis makes a theoretical and empirical contribution to understanding how 
communication has become a professional field in the political sphere. This thesis is 
the first study to apply a neo-institutional approach to professions (Suddaby and Viale, 
2011) to the political sphere. It has outlined for the first time the idea that the political 
public relations profession in the political sphere is a hybrid profession (Noordegraaf, 
2007). One of the goals of this thesis was to challenge previous studies that argued 
political public relations is not a profession (Negrine and Lilleker, 2002a; Maurer and 
Pfetsch, 2014). Using a neo-institutional approach, what emerged is that political 
public relations is a dynamic institution resulting from constant interaction between 
the media and the political spheres. This interaction can be observed in three 
characteristic aspects of the profession: the origins of the profession, professional 
knowledge and the profession’s system of informal credentialism. 
The main argument of this section is that the characteristics of the political PR 
profession reflect the interrelated nature of the media and political spheres. 
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8.1.1 The origins of the profession 
The profession of political PR exemplifies the interrelated nature of media and politics. 
The profession itself emerges from the need of political parties to interact with the 
wider media sphere to communicate their messages. One might argue that the 
increasing complexity of the media sphere (Chadwick, 2013) and its multiple channels 
of communication – 24/7 media, online platforms, social media – are behind the 
emergence of the political PR profession. However, the existence of communication 
experts in political parties and governments dates back to the early beginnings of the 
20th century (Kelley, 1956), even before the emergence of television. The emergence 
of the political PR profession is rather more directly related to the important role that 
the media plays in politics (Strömbäck, 2011; Stromback and Van Aelst, 2013).  
The profession of political PR is related to the relevance that politicians give the media 
sphere as the best means not only to communicate their message, but also to influence 
other dynamics of the democratic process such as policy-making (Deacon, 2004; 
Davis, 2009; Kunelius and Reunanen, 2011). Certainly, the increasing complexity of 
the media sphere plays a role in the consolidation and development of the political PR 
profession. Chapter 6, for example, shows how online communication is nowadays a 
relevant task of these professionals. Nonetheless, the political PR profession responds 
to the need of political parties by influencing the media sphere.  
8.1.2 Inferential and practice-based knowledge 
Political PR practitioners respond to political actors’ need to understand and influence 
the media sphere by offering inferential and practice-based knowledge of politics and 
media. This double knowledge in media and politics allows them to align the interests 
of the party (political knowledge) with the characteristics, routines and interests of the 
media sphere (media knowledge). However, a significant element found in the data 
analysis is that professional knowledge does not emerge from a scientific theory 
applied to a specific situation through a defined technique, as classic and knowledge-
based professions have done (Noordegraaf, 2007).  
As Noordegraaf (2007) explains, hybrid professions apply a case-treatment structure 
to their daily work, but instead of inferring that knowledge from a body of abstract 
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theories or learned techniques, professionals tend to rely on experiences and 
professional behaviours to make judgements and apply creative solutions. In line with 
its neighbouring professions –journalism (Deuze, 2005) and public relations (Pieczka, 
2000) – the body of knowledge claimed to be the basis of the profession is derived 
mainly from expertise accumulated through practice, often obtained as former party 
employees or former journalists and public relations professionals. Political public 
relations is practiced on the basis of an inferential and practical-based knowledge of 
media and politics. In other words, practitioners claim themselves to be professionals 
in political communication because they have expert and first-hand knowledge of how 
politics and news media operate in their respective national contexts. Depending on 
the route of access they followed, political knowledge might come as a result of their 
first-hand experience working for the party in different positions while their 
knowledge of journalism comes as an indirect element of their work, or vice-versa in 
the cases of former journalists.  
It is important to note here that two sets of knowledge and skills are claimed as 
essential for the profession: political knowledge and media knowledge. Previous 
studies described political public relations as having in-depth knowledge of the logic 
of the media (Esser et al., 2001), and being able to anticipate, stimulate and simulate 
journalists' actions (Frenkel-Faran, 2006). However, participants explained that they 
also need a strong understanding of the political environment and the rules of the 
political game to be good practitioners. The relevance of this combined political and 
media knowledge is observed in practitioners who also serve as their organisation’s 
Chief of Staff and manage the politician’s political agenda, not just the communication 
side of things. For instance, Scottish practitioners highlighted that, because of the 
referendum campaign context, part of their role was to coordinate the political agenda 
with the campaign platform. In those cases, they described their political knowledge 
as being essential for developing their role. It is the combination of these two sets of 
knowledge that makes them unique, and different from journalists and politicians. 
These results reinforce previous findings on the relevance of political knowledge as 
part of the expertise of political marketing campaign consultants in the US (Grossman, 
2009).  
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8.1.3 Informal credentialism 
The system of informal credentialism of the political PR profession shows there is a 
revolving door between journalism, public relations, politics and political public 
relations. Political public relations practitioners are part of the political and media 
elites of the nation, along with politicians and journalists. Some comparative studies 
on political communication argue there is a growing professional split ‘between the 
media and political actors, one that transcends national boundaries’ (Pfetsch and 
Moning, 2013, p.289). If that professional split refers to a differentiation process of 
professional identities and tasks, then the data of this thesis might reinforce this 
assumption. However, the data of this thesis also shows that the process of 
differentiation is not in terms of sociological groups.  
Classic professions restricted access to the profession through credentialing processes 
of education, training and examination (Witz, 2003). However, in this case the data 
demonstrates formal and certified university degrees are not part of the selection 
criteria. According to Catalan and Scottish practitioners, they are hired by parties and 
governments because of their expertise in the media-political sphere. The basic 
selection criteria requires having experienced how the relationship between the media 
and the political spheres works from one or another perspective: they need to know 
the rules of the game before entering it.  
As Mills (1956) defended and still accepted amongst elite theorist scholars, elites 
maintain closure by co-opting social types that reproduce similar values, personalities 
and knowledge. It might be argued that the system of informal credentialism is related 
to the fact that political elites, as the employer of these professionals, seek some sort 
of guarantee that the people they hire will adapt to the values and routines of their 
organisations. They need to create credential systems to filter down specific social 
types that, from an elite theory point of view, ‘are compatible with existing structures 
of power’ (Akard, 2000: 270). Certainly, politicians seem to filter down their 
candidates carefully. The process of recruitment is not publicly advertised, but parties 
seek out their political PR candidates through their networks of contacts amongst 
political journalists, public relations and party employees. Therefore, only those who 
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already belong to these political and media networks would find out about open 
positions. Practitioners describe how they were offered jobs because of their 
connections with political leaders and party members, often after a change in the 
party's leadership or after electoral outcomes.  
8.1.4 The political PR professional identity 
The characteristics of the political PR professional identity also reflect the constant 
dynamics of influence between the media and the political spheres. The professional 
identity of political PR practitioners brings together interests in the media and the 
political spheres. This can be observed through practitioners’ conceptions of 
professionalism, work ethics and their interactions with journalists. In this case, the 
influence of politics and journalism over political PR is not about translating 
professional values from one to the other, but about these professions defining what 
the other profession should do.  
8.1.4.1 Client-oriented professionalism 
Political public relations’ concept of professionalism serves both the politician and the 
journalist. As a hybrid profession, political public relations practitioners orientate their 
professionalism towards their survival in a rapidly-changing and unstable environment 
(Noordegraaf, 2007). Their survival depends both on their employer –governments 
and parties- and their main tool of work –actors in the media sphere. Both politicians 
and journalists can be considered the clients of the profession. The good professional 
never overshadows the politician’s popularity either in the media or inside their own 
organisation. However, at the same time, they need to stick to journalists’ behaviour 
standards, foremost being no lying to them, to maintain good relationships with news 
media. 
Previous studies have criticised the lack of ethical standards and professionalism of 
spin doctors (Sumpter and Tankard, 1994; Gaber, 2000b; Charon, 2004; Dhani, 2011; 
Schmitz and Karam, 2013). Their activities have been described as ‘unorthodox 
methods that get the job done’ according to ‘liquid conceptions of truth’ (Sumpter and 
Tankard, 1994, p.24).  Certainly, political public relations practitioners, in opposition 
to journalists, do not have a body of normative values oriented to providing a better 
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public service (Deuze, 2005). Political public relations coexist with politicians and 
journalists, whose notions of professionalism are strongly related to their duty towards 
the citizens (Uhr, 2012; Meyers and Davidson, 2016) as basic pillars of the democratic 
system. According to the data, inside these basic pillars of the democratic system is 
another profession –political public relations- whose main principles are related to a 
service-dominated economy (Faulconbridge and Muzio, 2012; Svarc, 2015) rather 
than democratic and public service normative values.  
One of the central ideas that runs across this thesis is that of challenging the concept 
of ‘spin doctors’ as it is understood in political communication and media studies. This 
thesis contributes to understand that the spin doctor concept is useful to understand 
how practitioners reflect on their professional identity –ie. it is the informal label of 
the profession- and their cultural references. However, the concept cannot be used to 
describe the essence of the political public relations profession. First of all, political 
communication and media studies fail to identify that the label spin doctor refers to 
three different organisational roles: the Head of Communication, press officers and the 
additional role of the Chief of Staff. Each of these roles has different attributed tasks 
and functions. There are no elements in the data that indicate the systematic unethical 
practices described by some of these studies. There are elements to question the power 
of these non-elected practitioners specially when they are involved in the design of the 
content of political messages or when in Catalonia they use media policies to influence 
the media. These practitioners have conflictive relationships with the media but they 
also adapt to their routines and demands in a mutually self-interested relationship. The 
question of whether these practitioners attempt to breach the watchdog function of 
journalists can only be answered in relation to the overall prevailing political 
communication culture. 
Do political public relations need to adopt democratic and public service normative 
values? Attempts to establish a professional code of ethics amongst US political 
consultants have failed precisely because practitioners do not regard having an ethical 
code as something essential to provide good service to their clients (Grossmann, 2009). 
Almost none of the practitioners interviewed considered needing a sort of ethical code 
to improve their practices. There was only one Catalan practitioner –one of the two 
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who worked for more than one party- who had created their own ethical code that can 
be read on their website8. Practitioners describe communication strategies where the 
message is sent from the party to the voters through different channels of 
communication; there is no feedback considered when creating communication 
strategies other than the occasional use of marketing studies during campaign periods. 
It is not a matter of building a strong relationship with the voters; rather, the 
professional spin doctor is the one who ensures the voters are aware of the party’s 
message because, ultimately, they serve the party and not the public. 
8.1.4.2 Jurisdictional battles between journalists and practitioners 
One of the elements that regulates professional identity in political PR is the constant 
interaction between journalists and practitioners, and the subsequent jurisdictional 
battles between the two professions. Journalists are one of the main tools of work for 
political PR practitioners and vice-versa (Hobbs, 2015). They need to work together, 
and to do so both professions need to establish rules of interaction. The interaction also 
depends on the power balance between the two professions in the wider media system 
and the public exposure of political PR practitioners in the media. Here, there are some 
significant differences between Scotland and Catalonia.  
Previous studies have defined the relationship between spin doctors and journalists as 
symbiotic and co-dependant (Atkinson, 2005) and as an exchange (Brown, 2003a; 
Quinn, 2012). Chapter 1 explains that the media’s exposure of spin doctors has 
fascinated some media and political communication researchers (Esser, Reinemann 
and Fan, 2000; McNair, 2004; Esser and Spanier, 2005; Joe Atkinson, 2005). These 
studies see journalists portraying ‘spin doctors’ badly to complain about politicians 
manipulating news stories (J Atkinson, 2005). However, none of these studies 
understand these interactions as part of the jurisdictional battles between the two 
professions. 
 The rules of interaction between journalists and political PR practitioners in Scotland 
and Catalonia are based on the same principles: political PR practitioners should not 
                                                 
8 https://politikomblog.wordpress.com/2010/03/04/la-consultoria-politikom-presenta-el-primer-
codigo-etico-para-profesionales-de-la-comunicacion-politica/ 
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lie to journalists; the practitioner should always attend to journalists’ requests; and 
confrontational attitudes and rudeness are detrimental for the relationship. These rules 
show the influence that journalists have over the political PR profession. Political PR 
practitioners consider that part of their role is to be available 24/7 to journalists’ 
requests.  
Nevertheless, Scottish political PR practitioners are more susceptible to journalists’ 
influences over their professional behaviours than their Catalan counterparts. If 
Scottish political PR practitioners break the rules of the relationship, they expose 
themselves to the danger of appearing as part of a news story. In addition, Chapter 7 
demonstrated that personal relationships with journalists is one of the main tools of 
influence Scottish practitioners have over the media system. Scottish practitioners use 
their personal relationships with journalists to influence particular news stories and 
overcome editorial hostility and impartiality regulations. In contrast, Catalan 
practitioners are not exposed to this threat because there is no tradition of portraying 
‘spin doctors’ in Catalan news media. Furthermore, Catalan practitioners claim to be 
less capable of influencing particular journalists. 
8.2 Constitutive elements of the practice of political public relations  
This section discusses the practice of political public relations and answers the second 
aim of the thesis: explore the performance of political public relations and determine 
the main tasks, functions and roles of these practitioners. 
This thesis makes an empirical contribution to understanding how individual 
practitioners enact what academia has defined as political public relations. The second 
aim of the thesis aimed to overcome two limitations of the academic literature (see 
Chapter 1). The first limitation is the lack of studies that empirically explore the tasks, 
functions and roles that fall into the theoretically-defined field of political public 
relations. The second limitation is the existence of a biased explanatory framework 
that categorises spin doctors’ activities as ethical or non-ethical, using journalists’ 
descriptions as the data source.  
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The main arguments of this section are that the roles, tasks and functions of political 
PR are similar to those of the practice of public relations in the corporate sector. The 
section also argues the tasks, roles and functions of political PR pose some normative 
questions in terms of the power they can achieve inside parties and governments. 
8.2.1 The field of political public relations  
One of the central arguments of this thesis (see Chapter 1) is that the emerging 
academic field of political public relations (Kiousis and Strömbäck, 2011) is offered 
most convenient framework to define the actions of communication experts in parties 
and governments. Chapter 1 explained that the figure of communication experts in 
political parties and governments has been approached by five different fields, each 
one with a different vision of the main task and role of these experts. The central 
argument was that the recently emerged field of political public relations offered the 
most integrative approach and it was free from biased normative frameworks. The 
results of the data analysis point out to the adequacy of the concept of political public 
relations to describe the core activity of communication experts working in political 
parties in Scotland and Catalonia. The results also point out to strong similarities 
between these experts working in parties and governments and public relations experts 
working in the corporate sector.  
The examination of the daily tasks, roles and functions of experts in Scotland and 
Catalonia demonstrated that networking and relationship management are the core 
element that sustains the practice of political public relations. Both Scottish and 
Catalan practitioners described long lists of daily routines that ranged from writing 
press releases to coordinating messages with the different party branches. Practitioners 
also described sometimes their roles go beyond strictly communication-related tasks 
and they get involved in tasks that ultimately decide the content of the message such 
as deciding what topics will be included in the next parliamentary speech. All these 
tasks, despite practitioners differentiated between political and communication 
strategy, they all had something in common: they are all based in practitioners 
knowing what networks of people (ie. journalists, bloggers) are willing to send out the 
message and what relationships need to be fostered to get the message across, generate 
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interest around it, and eventually convince. Basically their daily practices are about 
knowing how to navigate two worlds media and politics that are strongly based on 
relationships and networks (Savigny, 2009). 
On the light of these results, previous definitions of the spin doctors’ activities as either 
strategic news management (Hobbs, 2015) or as agenda-setting (Aira 2012) seem 
limited. This is not to affirm that news management or agenda-setting are not an 
essential part of political public relations but the crucial element that practitioners sell 
to politicians is the ability to generate relationships and navigate networks. For 
instance, news management understood as ‘the strategy to control the media news 
agenda in order to influence public opinion’ (Lilleker 2006 p.131) according to 
practitioners is one of their most-consuming tasks but it is not the only one. 
Practitioners in Scotland and Catalonia also act as liaison with other parties, advise the 
leader on different strategies or strategize their online image. The concept of political 
public relations seems to better encompass all the tasks, roles and functions found in 
the data analysis. 
Kiousis & Strömbäck (2011) defined political public relations as: 
‘the management process by which an organization or individual for political 
purposes, through purposeful communication and action, seeks to influence 
and to establish, build, and maintain beneficial relationships and reputations 
with its key publics to help support its mission and achieve its goals’(Kiousis 
& Stromback, 2011 p.8).  
It was not the goal of this thesis to empirically test Kiousis and Stromback’s (2011) 
definition. However, the analysis of practitioners’ descriptions indicates that their 
practices are about relationship and reputation building. These relationships and 
reputations are mostly built amongst the actors of the media and politics sphere. As 
explained in the previous section, practitioners do not see themselves as the ones 
building the relationship between the politician and the voter. They consider their 
public service is that of helping the politician to inform citizens about the party or 
government’s actions. In that sense, the data also indicates that the goal of the 
profession is to support the mission of the organisation: practitioners serve the party 
or government they work for. The results here described also indicate significant 
differences with the field of public relations as examined in next section. 
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8.2.2 The similarities between political PR and corporate PR 
The findings of this thesis show that there is nothing inherently different between the 
tasks, roles and functions of political PR practitioners and those described as belonging 
to corporate public relations. There are some differences in terms of how the concept 
of the public plays in each sector. Nonetheless, in both cases (politics and corporate 
sector) the basic role of their practitioners contains persuasive communication and an 
organisation that has communication needs. 
One of the core challenges of this thesis was to label and situate the actions of this 
group of practitioners in a context where different fields had different views regarding 
their main actions and practices (see Chapter 1). The central argument was that the 
recently-emerged field of political public relations (Kiousis and Strömbäck, 2011) 
offered the most integrative approach and was free of biased normative frameworks. 
The definition of the political public relations field assumes there are elements that 
distinguish this from the field of public relations (Strömbäck and Kiousis, 2013). 
However, there are almost no empirical studies on the practice of political public 
relations. Consequently, this distinction needs to be endorsed with caution as the 
results of this thesis demonstrate.  
The analysis of the results confirms the adequacy of the political public relations 
umbrella to define the actions of this group of practitioners in Scotland and Catalonia 
because of its integrative approach. However, the results also point to strong 
similarities between these experts working in parties and governments and public 
relations experts working in the corporate sector. These similarities can be seen in the 
tasks, roles and professional careers of political PR practitioners.  
Similarities are to be observed at the very functional level: the list of tasks and 
activities traditionally associated to public relations (Cutlip et al. 2000; Fawkes, 2004) 
is almost equal to the list of activities described by political public relations 
practitioners –see Chapter 6. For instance, Cutlip et al. described public relations 
activities and functions as consisting in media relations, research, management and 
speech writing (2000:6). As described in the data analysis, the main tasks and functions 
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of the political public relations are: media relations, marketing research, coordination 
of the communication strategy, speech writing and online communication. 
There are also similarities with the so-called public relations roles (Dozier and Broom, 
1995; Vercic et al., 2001) that, despite having received strong critiques, are useful in 
this case for the following reasons. For instance, Dozier and Broom’s (1995) 
differentiation between the communication technician and the communication 
manager relates to the distinction between the press officer and the Head of 
Communication, respectively. The data shows press officers’ tasks are those of the 
communication technician: manage the daily tasks of writing press releases, 
organising events and producing web content. The Head of Communication operates 
as the communication manager: the expert strategizing and elaborating plans and 
communication programmes (Dozier and Broom, 1995).  
Vercic et al.’s (2001) European roles of public relations relate to the distinction 
between the Chief of Staff and the Head of Communication. When the Head of 
Communication also manages the political agenda through the role of the Chief of 
Staff, it is because the role developed to support the entire organisational mission 
(Vercic et al., 2001), and both communicative and political goals are understood as a 
single issue. However, when the Head of Communication only manages the 
communication strategy, is because the role ‘is concerned with the communication 
plans developed by others and is aimed only at the implementation and evaluation of 
the communication processes’ (Vercic et al., 2001, p.380). 
The thin line that separates public relations and political public relations can also be 
observed in the revolving door that exists, both in Catalonia and Scotland, between 
public relations practitioners from corporate settings and the communication heads for 
political organisations. Practitioners from corporate settings that have connections 
within the political world, derived for example from public affairs activities, may be 
hired to manage the communications of political parties. The same system works in 
the other direction, with examples in Scotland and Catalonia of spin doctors 
transferring to corporate settings. 
 205 
 The differences can be found in political PR practitioners’ idea of publics. 
Practitioners do not see themselves as the ones building the relationship between the 
politician and the voter. They consider their public service is that of helping the 
politician to inform citizens about the party or government’s actions. In that sense, the 
goal of the profession is to support the mission of the organisation: practitioners serve 
the party or government they work for.  The concept of the public in political PR 
practice challenges concepts of dialogue and symmetry in public relations (Grunig, 
Grunig and Dozier, 2002). Citizens and voters play a passive role in political PR 
practitioners’ strategies. Political PR practitioners aim to build fruitful and influential 
relationships with those actors that control or influence the different channels of 
communication.  
Both Scottish and Catalan practitioners have a top-down approach to communication 
strategies, wherein news media are instruments to disseminate messages passively 
received by voters. Chapter 5 already indicated that these findings are not new. 
Previous studies on Spanish political PR practitioners showed the dominance of 
unilateral communication strategies in the political sphere (Xifra, 2010; Castelló and 
Montagut, 2011). In that sense, Somerville and Kirby (2012) argue that 
communication practices in the political sphere cannot  be examined according to 
‘virtually impossible demands of dialogue’ (2012, p.240). The underlying idea is that 
inside the democratic system are asymmetrical relationships and, therefore, 
asymmetrical communication strategies to support these relationships. For instance, 
the prevalence of top-down approaches seems to be related to political actors being the 
decision-makers of the democratic game (Kriesi, 2004). Decision-makers use top-
down approaches because they want their political claims to get people’s attention and 
to eventually obtain public support for their policies.  
All these similarities found at the empirical level call for a reformulation in 
understanding the spheres in which public relations is practiced. Part of this 
reformulation can be found in Moloney’s (2000) redefinition of public relations as a 
concept that refers to the management of communication by an organisation, as a 
practice related mostly to media relations, and as persuasive communication used to 
advance material or ideological interests. This definition incorporates the two basic 
 206 
elements of communication in the political sphere: ideology and persuasion (McNair, 
2011). 
8.3 The impact of the relationship between the media and the political 
sphere 
This section discusses the impact that the relationship between the media and the 
political spheres (i.e. the media system) has on the political public relations profession. 
This section combines the results from the micro- and macro-level analysis. In doing 
so, this section answers the second research question of the thesis: how do specific 
media systems impact the political public relations profession? It also responds to the 
third aim of the thesis: outline the elements of the media system that influence the 
practice and profession of political public relations. 
This thesis has contributed to an expansion of the most-used framework (Hallin and 
Mancini, 2004) in comparative political communication studies (Esser and Pfetsch, 
2016) with two new elements: the incorporation of political public relations 
practitioners and the use of sub-state nations as the context of study. The incorporation 
of political public relations practitioners in the dimensions of the relationship between 
the media and political spheres has shed light on the fact that, from the side of the 
political sphere, there are a series of tools to exert influence over the media sphere. 
The concept of tools of influence emerges from transforming the different dimensions 
of the relationship between the media and the political spheres into instruments – more 
specifically, into professional instruments. The use of sub-state nations as contexts of 
analysis has demonstrated that projects of nation-building have a very significant role 
in the configuration of the relationship between the media and the political spheres. 
There are two significant elements in this contribution. The first is the relationship 
between the professional performance of political PR practitioners and the prevailing 
political communication culture. The second is the relationship between the tools of 
influence and the professional power of these practitioners, which also poses some 
normative questions.  
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8.3.1 The prevailing political communication culture 
Chapter 7 demonstrates the configuration of the relationship between the media and 
the political sphere influences the professional performance of political PR 
practitioners. The focus of Catalan practitioners’ performance is to feed and maintain 
existing ties of political parallelism with news media, whereas Scottish practitioners’ 
performance aims at overcoming the barriers that limit political influence over the 
media sphere.  
This thesis makes an empirical contribution to understanding the political 
communication dimensions of Catalonia and Scotland. The long-standing tradition of 
comparing the two cases (Keating, 1996; Greer, 2007; Solano, 2007) had focused on 
the political dimension  of the two sub-states, ignoring significant differences in the 
communication dimension of politics. Sub-state nations have proven to be very useful 
contexts of study because the impact of the nation-building variable becomes more 
evident. The analysis of the data demonstrates the significance of communication for 
these two sub-state nations that are immersed in a process of claiming their own space 
either inside or outside Spain or the UK. At the same time, using Pfetsch’s (2004) 
concept, the data suggests that these similar demands do not necessarily translate into 
similar prevailing political communication cultures. Catalonia has developed an 
institutional and established context with practices of close relationships between the 
political and the media spheres. Scotland instead has a limited institutional context 
with less political power over media policy and the prevailing political communication 
culture restricts attempts of political influence over the media sphere.  
Pfetsch defends that ‘the objectives of political public relations are a consistent 
expression of the communication culture prevailing in each country’ (2001, p.63). In 
that sense, one might wonder about what this thesis, and more specifically the results 
of this section, says about the communication and political cultures of Scotland and 
Catalonia. Pfetsch justifies her assumption using the concept of political 
communication culture. The concept refers to ‘the empirically observable orientations 
of actors in the system of production of political messages toward specific objects of 
political communication, which determine the manner in which political actors and 
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media actors communicate in relation to their common political public’ (Pfetsch, 2004, 
p.348). Certainly, the data of this thesis contributes to the understanding of some of 
the elements Pfetsch points out. 
There are elements that might indicate political parties and governments in Catalonia 
are particularly concerned about the media and communication dimension of political 
competition. This is not unique to Catalonia, and this is not to affirm that Scotland’s 
political actors are not concerned about media and communication. Nevertheless, there 
are elements in the data that indicate Scotland’s political parties and governments 
manage their concerns about the media and communication dimension of political 
competition in a subtler manner because of a prevailing culture that does not allow 
them to do otherwise.  
Catalan practitioners from all parties constantly complained about a political elite that, 
from their point of view, is obsessed with influencing news media. Practitioners 
described a political elite that considers news media –as well as new online media 
platforms- as part of their political strategies. In this context, it is not a coincidence 
that political public relations practitioners in Catalonia have access to more tools of 
influence than their Scottish counterparts. Scottish practitioners also explained that 
politicians constantly attempt to influence news media. However, Scottish 
practitioners regard news media as an institution independent from political powers.  
Catalonia’s political elite certainly operate in an institutional and established context 
where there are practices of close relationships between the political and the media 
spheres. Chapter 3 explained that the media –including online, cinema and arts- play 
a central role in Catalonia’s nation-building project (Villarroya, 2012; Guimera and 
Fernandez, 2014) as a reaction to the political, identity and language conflicts with the 
Spanish nation-building project (Guibernau, 2004). This conflict is partly, but not 
exclusively, the cause for Catalonia having developed more interventionist media 
policies (Keating, 1996); there are economic reasons as well (Prado, 2014). In 
addition, Catalonia is immersed in the overall Southern European context where, as 
there research points out, there is a tradition of patron-client relationships in media 
relations (Hallin and Papathanassopoulos, 2002). In this model of media relations, 
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news media have historically played a very active political role (Gunther, Montero and 
Wert, 2000; Chaqués-Bonafont, Palau and Baumgartnet, 2015; Durán, 2015). As 
Hallin and Mancini (2004) find, in Southern European countries there are two elements 
that explain the relevance of mediated communication: the mass media having been 
intimately involved in political conflicts; and parties regarding news media as a means 
of ideological expression and political mobilisation. 
Scottish political public relations practitioners operate in a context that partly restricts 
politicians’ attempts to influence the media sphere. This restriction comes from an 
institutional design that limits relationships of political parallelism with newspapers 
and online media, and a public broadcast system that is not a devolved power to 
Scottish parliament (Mcnair, 2008; Hutchison, 2016). In addition to these institutional 
features, Scotland, as part of the UK, is embedded in a political culture that condemns 
overtly political attempts to influence news media (Hutchison, 2016). Newspapers’ 
political orientations are understood as commercial responses to the public’s political 
interest (Davis, 2007). News media are seen as serving the interest of the public, and 
not the interest of political elites and the different dynamics of political competition 
(Mcnair, 2008). For instance, UK governments are expected to use their 
communication resources in a citizen- and neutral-oriented manner (Canel and 
Sanders, 2014). This is not to say that parties or governments are not successful 
influencers of news media in Scotland, but that the prevailing culture restricts some of 
these attempts. The reduced number of tools of influence Scottish practitioners have 
compared to their Catalan counterparts relates to this cultural feature. 
As both Byrne (2014) and Hobbs (2015) argue, communication practices within 
political organisations are the result of a set of accepted rules between media and 
political powers: those practices include both democratic and anti-democratic actions, 
but they are equally accepted as part of the game. 
8.4 The legitimacy of the political public relations practitioner 
Political public relations practitioners are not elected figures and that poses questions 
about the legitimacy of their professional power. The legitimacy of political public 
relations is rooted in different dimensions of their work: the legitimacy and 
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transparency of the selection process of these experts; their power and capacity of 
influence beyond the party or government’s communication sphere; the effects and 
implications of the relationship dynamics with journalists; and the effects and 
implications of the significance of the communication dimension in the party or 
government’s strategy. 
There is nothing inherently anti-democratic in politicians hiring experts to manage 
different aspects of political life. The basis of current democratic systems is the 
delegation of power to democratically-elected representatives (Lijphart, 2012). This 
delegated power gives politicians the legitimacy to decide how to better organise and 
manage their party or government. Certainly, the selection criteria and recruitment 
process of political PR practitioners is not transparent nor open to public knowledge. 
However, political PR is linked to the dynamics of the democratic process because 
professional success is dependent on the party, politician or government’s success. 
Chapter 5 explained that electoral failure or the end of a politician’s career usually 
implies that the political PR practitioner leaves his or her job. 
Chapter 6 demonstrated that some political PR practitioners work beyond the 
boundaries of the communication area. Practitioners can be involved in the decision-
making process of the content of the party’s message, especially when they play the 
double role of the Head of Communication and the Chief of Staff. Public relations 
theory has long claimed public relations needs to be practiced from a managerial 
position and practitioners need to be part of the dominant coalition of their 
organisations (Grunig, Grunig and Dozier, 2002). Section 8.2 explained that the 
existence of the double role of the Head of Communication and the Chief of Staff 
relates to how the organisation perceives the relevance of the communication area. 
Communicative and political goals become part of the entire organisational mission 
(Vercic et al., 2001). Further research could potentially explain whether there are any 
consequences to political and communicative goals becoming a single issue. 
Finally, one of the elements that questions the legitimacy of political PR practitioners 
is how they manage their relationships with journalists and whether this has any 
implications for the wider democratic system. Some media and political 
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communication scholars (Brants et al., 2009; Van Aelst, Sehata and Dalen, 2010; van 
Dalen, Albaek and de Vreese, 2011) assume that journalists’ perceptions of their 
relationship with political actors influence the content of the news, and consequently 
can affect democratic engagement (Davis, 2009). There are no elements in the data 
that indicate the existence of systematic, unethical practices in the relationship 
between political PR practitioners and journalists as described by previous studies on 
spin doctors (Sumpter and Tankard, 1994; Louw, 2005; Schmitz and Karam, 2013; 
Ribeiro, 2015), but moments of conflict are evident. It seems difficult to connect the 
micro-dynamics of two actors in the political sphere –journalists and political PR 
practitioners- with the wider and more complex phenomena of democratic 
engagement.  
The following section will summarize the key conclusions of this thesis.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis put forward two research questions: What are the constitutive elements of 
the performance and practice of political public relations profession? and How do 
specific national media systems impact on the political public relations profession?  
The approach taken in this thesis relies on key concepts drawn from three sources: a 
political public relations approach to define and categorise communication practices 
in the political sphere (Kiousis and Strömbäck, 2011) communication in the political 
sphere is a managerial process to establish influential relationships in the political 
sphere; a neo-institutional approach to professions (Schinkel and Noordegraaf, 2011) 
that conceptualizes professions as changing institutions shaped both by its 
practitioners and the characteristics of its environment; and a theory of media systems 
that identifies the main dimensions in the relationship between the media and the 
political sphere (Hallin & Mancini, 2004) adapted to sub-state nations. These three 
sources were the basis to combine a micro-level analysis of the practice and 
performance of political public relations with a macro-level analysis of the eco-system 
where these practitioners operate, the relationship between the media and the political 
sphere (media system). The empirical data used in the thesis derives from in-depth 
interviews with Heads of Communication (political public relations experts) in 
political parties and governments in Scotland and Catalonia. 
The main conclusions of this thesis are as follows. 
1. The common professional structures and identity features between Catalan 
and Scottish  political PR practitioners outline a profession constantly shaped 
by the influence of journalism and politics. The profession of political PR 
reflects the relevance that politicians give to the media sphere. The profession 
emerges from the need of political parties to generate influential relationships 
with the different channels and actors of the media sphere. Political PR 
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practitioners use inferential and practice-based knowledge on politics and 
media to solve parties and governments’ communication needs.   
2. The practice of political PR is based on principles of networking and 
relationship management with the core actors and channels of the media 
sphere. The profession of political PR sees their public duty as maintaining an 
informed citizenship in a public sphere where citizens and voters emerge as 
passive receivers of political messages.  
3. The role and position of political public relations practitioners in governments 
and parties results from the combination of political-related and 
communication-related functions and tasks. The balance between political and 
communication tasks generate variations in the managerial position and 
power that these practitioners claim to have in their organisations. The roles, 
tasks and functions of political PR are similar to those of the practice of public 
relations in the corporate sector 
4. The profession and practice of political PR poses normative questions about 
the legitimacy of these practitioners when their capacity of influence goes 
beyond the party or government’s communication sphere. Particularly, 
Catalan practitioners can achieve high levels of power when they are in 
government. The institutional design of Catalan governments can sometimes 
(not always) give the practitioner the capacity to control and design media 
policies.  
5. Levels of professional power and differences in the performance of political 
PR between Scotland and Catalonia indicate the prevailing political 
communication culture in each sub-state nation. Sub-state nations have proven 
to be useful contexts to observe the influence that nation-building projects have 
on the political communication culture. Catalonia’s nation-building project 
gives a strong significance to use and create their own communication 
channels and dedicated media, the identity debate between Spain and 
Catalonia is played out in the media sphere. In that context, political PR 
performance aims to maintain the strong relationships of political parallelism 
with news media. Scotland’s nation-building project has a less influential or 
direct relationship with the Scottish media sphere. The prevailing political 
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communication culture puts the focus on limiting political influence over news 
media. The performance of Scottish political PR practitioners aims to 
overcome the barriers for political influence.  
6. The configuration of the relationship between the media and the political 
sphere provides practitioners with different tools of influence over the media 
system and therefore, different levels of professional power. The configuration 
of the relationship of political parallelism between parties and news media 
influences different strategies of professional performance. Catalan 
practitioners aim their performance to maintain relationships of political 
parallelism with news media using powerful institutional tools of influence and 
informal practices. Whereas Scottish practitioners aim their performance to 
overcome the limitations to political influence that exist in the relationship 
between the media and the political sphere in Scotland.  
 
I. Limitations of the thesis 
The first limitation in a project of this kind is created by the researcher’s own choices. 
Firstly, one might argue that the sampling of this thesis is a determining and limiting 
element. I decided to limit the complexity of deciding who constitutes a political public 
relations practitioner by creating my own sampling values. The main decision was that 
the official position of Head of Communication corresponded to the practitioners of 
political public relations. As a result, I ignored other experts that might also play a role 
in the communication dimension of parties and governments, such as party leaders or 
party secretaries. I also restricted the complexity by limiting the nature of the political 
organisations included in the sample, using only governments and political parties with 
parliamentary representation. Other political organisations such as unions and think 
tanks were excluded from the sample. 
I also decided to reduce some of the complexity of the task by selecting the 
professional framework. While there are substantive elements in previous studies to 
consider the idea of political public relations being a profession, in the end the 
professional framework is the result of the researcher’s choice. As in any project of 
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this kind, there is the inevitable tension between choosing the most adequate 
framework to understand the data or imposing the framework on the results of the data. 
I find using a neo-institutional framework to understand professions and their eco-
systems offers a flexible approach to, for example, recognise both alternative and 
traditional professional structures in the political public relations profession.  
Throughout the thesis, there is also the inevitable tension between agency and 
structure. In the final section of Chapter 8, one might argue I inclined the balance 
towards the relevance of structures in shaping the individual actions of political public 
relations practitioners. 
Secondly, there is a limitation concerning the feasibility of some elements of the data. 
This thesis used in-depth interviews with practitioners as its only data source. One 
might argue that there is a risk of uncritically accepting practitioners’ reflections 
because there are no elements to contrast them. I contend the thesis demonstrates a 
good level of critical analysis and the data was carefully contextualised and questioned 
before any generalisations were made. For instance, a critical view can be observed in 
the analysis of what practitioners describe as the ethical principles of the profession. 
These principles are questioned and finally explained as a self-interested and 
consequentialist professional norm. 
Thirdly, there is a limitation concerning the generalisability of the results. The main 
concern is how much this thesis can make claims for political public relations 
practitioners in other contexts or for political public relations as a global profession in 
Western democracies. The high degree of similarities found between Scotland and 
Catalonia, despite the strong contextual differences (notably in their media systems), 
indicate there is a case to be made for the generalisability of the thesis’ results. There 
are no elements in the data that indicate political public relations is a particular 
phenomenon of Scotland and Catalonia. Moreover, there are no elements that indicate 
that because Scotland and Catalonia are sub-state nations the generalisability of the 
data is any different from other possible cases such as France or Italy.  
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II. Further research 
Building upon the research done in this thesis, further research might well be 
conducted on three main topics: 
 
Firstly, further research could explore the contextual elements that are behind the 
emergence and origins of the political PR profession. This could be done by exploring 
how the political PR profession is perceived by its main clients: politicians. This thesis 
has demonstrated that the political PR profession has a client-oriented professionalism 
based on attending the needs of the party or government using the tools of the media 
sphere. However, exploring the politicians’ reflections on the political PR profession 
could shed light on the characteristics and tone of the relationship between politicians 
and political PR practitioners.  
Secondly, by exploring the views and reflections of politicians, further research could 
also offer insights about the institutional weight that communication has in parties and 
governments and more importantly, about the role that communication plays in 
political strategies. Further research could explore the relationship between parties’ 
overall political strategy and the use of different communication strategies. This 
research has demonstrated that the performance of political PR –the enactment of 
communication strategies- is influenced by the wider media system. Nevertheless, 
there is scope to explore for instance the impact of the left-right or pro-anti-
independence axis influence the design and enactment of communication strategies. 
Thirdly, further research could explore cases that go beyond European or North-
American cases. For instance, this thesis has demonstrated that there are significant 
differences between Scotland and Catalonia in terms of political communication 
culture. Further research could for example explore whether Mediterranean nations 
share common political communication culture features going beyond the three 
traditional cases explored by Hallin and Mancini (2004) –Spain, Greece, Italy. Finally, 
there is scope to explore how the political PR profession emerges in supra-state level 
systems such as the UN. By moving to supra-state level dimensions, future research 
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could explore how different political communication cultures interact and play out in 
a shared and common space.   
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